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ABSTRACT 
Turnaround Strategies in the Banking Industry 
(September, 1980) 
Hugh M. O'Neill, B.A., Syracuse University 
M.S., Polytechnic Institute of New York 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor George S. Odiome 
This research project uses discriminant analysis to study the proc¬ 
ess of turnaround in the commercial banking industry. 
The Bank Compustat Database provides the sample. Ihe annual net in¬ 
come growth of all banks in the data base is compared to the industry's 
performance in net income growth. If a bank's annual growth exceeds the 
industry's, then that year is recorded as a growth year. If a bank's 
annual growth lags the industry's growth rate, then that year is recorded 
as a decline year. Banks which exhibit three years of continuous decline 
provide the base for further analysis. 
After a period of three year decline, which is called phase 1, the 
banks in the sample either turnaround or decline during the next three 
years. This three year period following phase 1 is called phase 2, and 
provides the grouping variable for discrimination; a group of turnaround 
banks is compared to a group of decline banks. Ihe final sample includes 
51 banks; 31 are turnaround banks, and 20 are decline banks. 
After the sample is identified, the study proceeds through several 
stages. First, the Bank Compustat Database provides the records of each 
VI1 
bank's performance on twenty three variables over the six year period of 
the phase 1 and phase 2. These twenty three variables measure eight gen¬ 
eral classes of performance: profitability, expense control, employee 
utilization, asset management, revenue enhancement, credit quality con¬ 
trol, leverage and loss coverage, and growth measures. Second, the ex¬ 
planatory power of these variables is tested through a regression model. 
Third, mean growth rates on each variable for the groups are ccmputed and 
tested for the first three years. Finally, the dimensions of the group 
differences are analyzed through the use of discriminant analysis. 
The discriminant analysis is performed at the first and third year 
of phase 1 and at the first and third year of phase 2. Where there is 
significant discrimination, the best set of discriminators is identified 
through the use of the structure loading matrix. The ten best discrim¬ 
inators are then used in a discriminant analysis. The discriminatory 
power of other variables not included in this reduced set is assessed by 
testing the increase they contribute to the Mahalanobis difference be¬ 
tween the groups. A discriminant analysis is also performed on factor 
scores for each general class of performance. 
After the quantitative analysis, the public reports available for each 
bank in the sample are inspected. This qualitative analysis includes such 
sources as popular journal articles, trade journal articles, annual re¬ 
ports, and special staff reports. This review is used to gain insight 
into management's perceptions of the turnaround strategy. 
The results of the study indicate that the turnaround requires man¬ 
agement attention in several key areas. Turnaround banks increase the 
vm 
amount of net income earned per employee, through the careful control of 
operating expenses, asset growth, and loan quality. The hypothesis that 
regional differences, structural differences, or size differences can ex¬ 
plain the turnaround process is tested through the use of a durrmy regres¬ 
sion model. This hypothesis is rejected. 
The qualitative review indicates that banks which don't turnaround 
attempt to enact the same strategies that turnaround banks enact. This 
unexpected finding leads to two proposed hypotheses for further research. 
First, it is possible that successful turnaround can be attributed to 
successful implementation, rather than successful choice, of strategy. 
Second, it is possible that there are at least two types of decline. 
Strategies that are successful for one type of decline will not be suc¬ 
cessful for another type of decline. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
When a large multi million dollar business is in a state of steady 
decline, what strategies must its management follow to reverse that trend 
and start it on an upward course? The answers to this question are 
sought in this research. 
This study analyzes strategic responses to continued declines in 
profitability in commercial banks, as measured by net income. The aim 
of the study is to identify the response patterns which commercial banks 
may use to turn around from steady decline to an upward trend of rising 
net income. 
After a comparative study of banks which turned around and banks 
which didn't, the variables which were changed, manipulated or altered by 
management are analyzed, and are clustered into strategic patterns which 
comprise turnaround strategies. Thus, one objective of this research is 
to identify the content of turnaround strategies. 
While the research study is done with banks, we first make an effort 
to define what might be the basis for turning around the fortunes in the 
market place of other companies not in banking. Continued decline often 
precedes failure, and since the possibility of business failure is one 
which is of concern to society, as well as the employees, creditors, de¬ 
positors, customers and stockholders of companies which are in a state of 
1 
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decline, the search for some general strategic principles behind turn¬ 
around action is one of some significance and considerable scholarly in¬ 
terest. 
The variables studied. Strategic patterns of response are observed through 
an analysis of the performance of banks on several operating and financial 
variables. Eight general classes of variables are analyzed: profitabil¬ 
ity measures, expense control measures, employee utilization measures, asset 
management, revenue enhancement, credit quality control measures, leverage 
and loss coverage, and growth measures. Banks which continually decline are 
compared to banks which enter a period of decline, and then turnaround and 
enter a period of growth in net income. Decline is operationalized through 
the comparison of an individual bank's rate of growth in net income to the 
industry's rate of growth in net income. When a bank's net income has in¬ 
creased at a lesser rate than industry net income, its performance for 
that year is recorded as a decline. Conversely, when a bank has increased 
its income at a rate greater than industry growth, its performance is re¬ 
corded as growth. This operational definition of decline follows the meth¬ 
odology of previous studies on decline and turnaround. 
The population studied. The initial sample is identified through the use 
of Compustat tapes. (See Appendix I) These computer tapes contain the 
record of the performance ratios of 136 banks over many years. A twenty 
year period (1959-1978) is covered to identify the banks to be studied. 
The initial sample of subject banks includes all banks which have three 
consecutive years of performance declines. This three year period is 
called "phase one" throughout the stud};. The three years following the 
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decline (called "phase 2" throughout the study) determine whether the bank 
meets the requirements of the study of being a turnaround bank. The final 
sample includes banks which exhibit three consecutive years of growth in 
phase 2, or three consecutive years of decline in phase 2. These are called 
pure turnaround banks, or pure decline banks, respectively. . The final 
sample also includes those banks which exhibit at least two consecutive 
years of growth in phase 2, or two consecutive years of decline in phase 2 
These are called turnaround banks, or decline banks, respectively. This 
design creates a sample of banks which have declined which can then be sub¬ 
divided into groups which reversed the decline, and groups which did not. 
The calendar period is not the same for each bank. For example, one bank 
may be analyzed for its turnaround during the years 1972 through 1978, 
while another bank may be analyzed during the period 1969 to 1975. The 
comparison is made for the decline and turnaround period, rather than ac¬ 
tual calendar periods. 
The problem to be solved. The research problem is directed at analyzing 
the differences between the turnaround and decline groups. The study is 
designed to answer several fundamental and important questions, such as: 
- are there specific strategies which banks use to turnaround per¬ 
formance? 
- are there specific conditions within an individual bank which pro¬ 
mote turnarounds in performance? 
- are there specific significant differences between banks which turn¬ 
around and those which don't? 
- can the differences which exist between turnaround banks and non- 
turnaround banks be controlled by the management of those banks? 
- are the conditions of turnaround determined outside the control 
of management; that is, in the environment? 
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The answers to these questions should refute or support the hypothesis 
proposed by Glueck that "the major cause of growth, decline and other 
large scale changes in firms are exogenous factors in their environment, 
rather than any purely internal developments" (1972, p. 108). 
Relation to Broader Management Theory 
This study will add to the growing body of knowledge in the field of 
strategic planning. Strategy is a match between the organization's capa¬ 
bilities and its environment (Ansoff, 1965; Drucker, 1954; Hofer and 
Schendel, 1979). An effective strategy is one which leads to the out¬ 
comes intended by the strategy designers. This study will identify the 
content of strategies which lead a declining bank from the condition of 
decline to the condition of growth. Thus, the study will answer the call 
for more studies which analyze strategy within specific industries (Hatten, 
1979). The study should also add to our understanding of the contingent 
nature of strategy (Hofer, 1975; Luthans and Stewart, 1977; Weir, 1979). 
The field of business policy has recently developed as a distinct 
discipline within business schools (Hofer and Schendel, 1979). The re¬ 
search for this field has focused on the concept of strategic planning. 
The research methodology ranges from single case studies to complex multi- 
organizational studies (e.g., Rumelt, 1974; Hatten, 1974). While signif¬ 
icant progress has been made in the attempt to understand the complex proc¬ 
ess of strategic planning, much work remains to be done. 
There are two main reasons for the need to increase the research ef¬ 
forts in the field of strategic planning. First, much of the research has 
5 
been exploratory-normative. That is, policy experts have analyzed single 
organizations and prescribed what the best strategy would be for that or¬ 
ganization. If the strategy works, the analyst generalizes that strategy 
to any and all organizations. This method has generated many interesting 
hypotheses, but the hypotheses await further testing to assure their val¬ 
idity. Second, the strategic planning process is an extremely complex one. 
One theorist identifies 55 variables which impact the effectiveness of a 
strategic plan. Many of these variables change quickly over time. No 
single study can hope to control or analyze all the appropriate variables. 
The discipline probably will be built through careful research, with each re¬ 
searcher working on separate parts of the problem. In time, theories will 
develop which reflect the process more powerfully and accurately than cur¬ 
rent theories do. 
Generally, however, it seems there is some agreement that the strate¬ 
gic planning process involves several steps. These include a strategic 
profile, an analysis of the environment, strategic forecasting, a resource 
audit, the generation of strategic alternatives, a test of consistency, 
and a strategic choice (Uyterhoeven, Ackerman and Rosenblum, 1973). 
The strategic profile is an explicit definition of the firm's busi¬ 
ness or businesses, its competition, and its self concept. Ibis profile 
is used to identify how the firm competes, and how well it competes. 
The analysis of the environment is a definition of the factors out¬ 
side of the direct control of the business which impact the firm's per¬ 
formance. These factors include but are not limited to competing firms, 
economic conditions, local and federal government regulations, interest 
groups, customers, and suppliers. The strategic forecast is a natural 
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extension of the analysis of the environment. In this setup, the firm's 
management attempts to identify the future patterns of activity in the 
relevant environmental dimensions, and how these future patterns will im¬ 
pact the firm. 
The resource audit is an analysis of the firm's internal dimensions. 
In this audit, the management analyzes the firm's operational, financial, 
and managerial strengths and/or weaknesses. 
The generation of strategic alternatives is an attempt to identify 
the full set of possible actions which the firm might undertake to improve 
its performance. The methods for generating these alternatives include 
brainstorming and research. As the alternatives are generated, they are 
tested for consistency; that is, do these alternatives match the firm's 
abilities and goals? The distinction must be made between what the firm 
might do, and what the firm should do. This process leads to the final 
step of strategic choice, which is a decision which identifies the firm's 
future course. 
Each of these steps requires different skills and information. The 
successful completion of each step will lead to an effective strategy; 
that is, one which meets the goals of the strategy designer. Different 
goals require different strategies. Similarly, different economic con¬ 
ditions require different strategies, etc. 
This study assumes that a strategy designer has specific goals, such 
as the goal to reverse decline, under specific conditions, i.e., a three 
year decline. The study analyzes what the content of successful strategy 
would be given that the strategic agent chooses the goal of turnaround. 
7 
The Outline of This Report 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 will report the lit¬ 
erature review. The literature reviewed includes previous research in 
the area of strategic planning, the area of bank management, and the area 
of business success and failure. The literature review will also include 
a review of studies which have used methodologies similar to those em¬ 
ployed in this study. 
Chapter 3 will introduce the research design and methodology. The 
methodology includes quantitative and qualitative components. In the 
quantitative analysis, multivariate discriminant analysis will be used to 
analyze the dimensions of difference between the groups of interest. This 
analysis will supplement univariate analysis (t-tests), and regression 
analysis which will be used to assess the explanatory power of the finan¬ 
cial and operating variables used. The qualitative analysis includes a 
review of primary and secondary sources to assess the expressed intentions 
of management during the period of study. Several authors suggest that 
observed strategic patterns can be different than intended strategic pat¬ 
terns (Mintzberg, 1972). This qualitative analysis will serve to test 
whether intended patterns were different than observed patterns. Where 
appropriate, exogenous factors will be tested through blocking. 
Chapter 4 will present the results of the analysis. First, the sam¬ 
ple will be identified. Then, the results of the regression and t-tests 
will be reported. This will be followed by a report of the results of 
the discriminant analysis. 
Chapter 5 will present a thorough analysis of the results. The pur¬ 
pose of Chapter 5 will be to synthesize the information developed through 
hypothesis testing, in order to present a clear picture of the differences 
8 
between banks which turnaround and banks which continue to decline. 
Chapter 6 will present the results of the qualitative research. This 
chapter will present the strategies that are enacted by banks after a 
period of decline. While the hypothesis testing in Chapter 4 will iden¬ 
tify what actually happened in the turnaround and decline banks, the 
analysis in Chapter 6 will discuss the antecedent actions which contrib¬ 
uted to the decline or failure. 
Chapter 7 will close the study with a sunmary, and with suggestions 
for future research. 
The strengths and limitations of the research. This study has several 
strengths and weaknesses, which shall be presented in order. 
The strengths of the study include its classification of conditions 
and its control of extraneous variables. The study is designed to iden¬ 
tify those strategies which are successful after a firm has undergone a 
period of decline in a specific industry. While this strength limits the 
results of the study to the banking industry, its successful completion 
will add general validity to the normative literature which suggests that 
strategic planning is possible and necessary (Steiner, 1979; Holmberg, 
1978). As such, it should add to our growing knowledge of the tools avail¬ 
able to management to improve performance. The control of extraneous var¬ 
iables will be provided through the consideration of alternative explana¬ 
tions for the turnaround process. These controls will add validity to the 
findings about variables which management can control in the turnaround 
process. 
The combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques adds fur¬ 
ther strength to the study. Any variation found in the statistical 
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analysis can be due to chance; the review of other sources will help re¬ 
duce the doubt about chance variations. Where a strategy has been initiated, 
the secondary sources will confirm its use. Additionally, the secondary 
sources will provide further confirmatory information about the differences 
or lack thereof between the groups. 
The limitations of the study also are important. Due to its applica¬ 
tion to the banking industry alone, the results will not be amenable to 
generalization beyond the banking industry. Since the banking industry 
is almost unique in terms of its regulatory environment, this weakness can¬ 
not be avoided. As mentioned above, the confirmation of management dis¬ 
cretion to improve performance in a highly regulated industry will lend 
strength to the model of strategy for all industries. 
A major weakness of the study is its ex post facto nature. This 
weakness is unavoidable because the process of decline and turnaround can¬ 
not be manipulated directly by the researcher. The major weakness of such 
studies is the risk of improper interpretation (Kerlinger, 1973). This 
weakness can be overcome by the use of hypothesis generation, and the use 
of control hypotheses. This study has attempts to use both methods to re¬ 
duce the risk of improper interpretation. Of course, little can be said 
about causality because of the infinite domain of alternative possible 
explanations. In general, experimental control might provide more strength 
for causal arguments. Rather than debate the importance of the relation¬ 
ships uncovered in this study, I will list the thoughts of Kerlinger: 
"... the study of cause and causation is an endless maze. One of the dif¬ 
ficulties is that the word 'cause' has surplus meaning and metaphysical 
undertones. Perhaps more important, it is not really needed. Scientific 
research can be done without evoking cause and causal explanations" 
(Kerlinger, p. 393). 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction and Purpose 
Per Hofer and Schendel (1978), "the basic characteristics of the 
match an organization achieves with its environment is called its strat¬ 
egy". This match can occur by accident, or by planning. As organiza¬ 
tions and their environments become more complex, a successful match re¬ 
quires careful planning. 
Strategic planning has been defined in different ways by different 
authors. Drucker (1954) calls strategy the answer to two questions: 
''what is our business" and "what should it be?". Andrews (1971) calls 
strategy "the pattern of objectives, purposes, or goals and major poli¬ 
cies and plans for achieving these goals, stated in such a way as to de¬ 
fine what business the company is in or is to be in and the kind of com¬ 
pany it is or is to be". Ansoff (1965) calls strategy a "conmon thread" 
that matches an organization's activities and the products and markets 
that the organization competes in.. 
The following chart compares the concept of strategy according to the 
leading text authors in the field. The major difference between these 
authorities lies in their definition of the field. I list the arguments 
of Hofer and Schendel here. Some authorities hold a broad view of the 
subject; they define strategy as the process of setting goals and objec¬ 
tives, choosing strategies, implementing strategies, and controlling or 
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monitoring performance. Other authorities hold a narrow view of the sub¬ 
ject. They define strategy as a choice of means to a given end. They 
separate the steps of formulating goals and objectives, implementing strat¬ 
egy, and monitoring performance from the strategic planning process. Both 
views are useful; the research in this study follows the narrow view, in 
that the problem analyzed is the choice of means to a desired end. 
This literature review includes three sections: first, there is a 
review of the literature on strategy; second, there is a review of the 
literature on the problem of failure and turnaround; third, there is a 
review of the literature on bank management. 
Strategy 
The process of strategic choice. Those who hold the broad view of the 
field of strategy rarely separate the term "strategy" from the term "plan¬ 
ning." Planning is a highly reflective activity, in which the planner iden¬ 
tifies current conditions, current trends, future conditions, and future 
trends. The planner then matches his organization's capabilities with 
the requirements of future conditions, in order to maximize his goals. 
There is no doubt that this highly reflective process is being used. Gen¬ 
eral Electric, for example, employs a staff which exists for this purpose. 
Popular periodicals report the efforts of consulting groups which offer 
their services and expertise in the area of planning. The ultimate goal 
of such planning efforts is a roadmap to the future. The practical re¬ 
sult of these efforts often falls short of the goal. 
Several theorists have noted that strategy can occur without the con¬ 
cept of planning. Mintzberg (1972) argues that strategy can be developed 
in three modes: adaptive, planning, and entrepreneurial. 
14 
The adaptive mode of strategy occurs when an organization reacts in 
a disjointed manner to external pressures. The adaptive mode of planning 
is similar to the process of organization described by Cyert and March 
(1963), wherein management is described as reacting to a range of goals 
in a sequential manner. The sequence of goals can be determined by fac¬ 
tors beyond the immediate control of management. 
The planning mode of strategy is the systematic, integrated process 
most often associated with strategy. In this process, top management de¬ 
signs strategy through the use of sophisticated methodologies provided 
either by management or staff specialists. This model of managerial be¬ 
havior can be traced back to the prescriptions of early management theo¬ 
rists (Fayol, 1949; Gulick, 1937), who called upon management to plan, 
organize, coordinate, etc. 
The third mode of planning is the entrepreneurial mode, in which a 
great leader pushes an organization forward through his inspired knowl¬ 
edge and skills. This model of planning grows from economic literature, 
which describes the influence of the owner manager in the process of busi¬ 
ness development. The entrepreneurial mode of strategy has been studied 
most extensively by Collins and Moore (1964). 
Dunlop (1977) supports the view that strategy is adaptive. He 
writes: "decisions largely flow from the relatively short-term pressures 
of necessity and the clash of conflicting interest, not from the ideas of 
intellectuals, their voices in the air, or frcm their memoranda. And in¬ 
terest groups are far too pragmatic to be the puppets of intellectuals." 
While Dunlop's main experience in the process of policy formulation was 
in government. He wrote these words soon after he stepped down as Secretary 
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of Labor. There is little doubt that the corporate environment or the 
business environment is quickly becoming similar to the political en¬ 
vironment in terms of the necessity to respond to "the clash of conflict- 
ing interests." Elkins and Callaghan (1978) review the increasing pres¬ 
sure on business executives that comes from the same lobbies which Dunlop 
refers to. 
Lindblom (1959) describes the adaptive process as "muddling through." 
Quinn (1978) argues in a similar vein. He states that "when well-managed 
major organizations make significant changes in strategy, the approaches 
they use frequently bear little resemblance to the rational analytical 
system so often touted in the planning literature. The full strategy is 
rarely written down in any one place. The process used to arrive at total 
strategy are typically fragmented, evolutionary, and largely intuitive." 
Quinn describes the process of strategy building in 10 major companies, 
and concludes that the strategy is built through a system of "logical 
incrementalism." This is a proactive technique in which top management 
deals with many subsystems in the organization. Through a process of 
trial and error, a strategy is reached. Murray (1978) describes a sim¬ 
ilar process, and calls strategy a negotiated outcome. 
The planning mode of strategy design receives extensive attention 
in the literature, and normative theories teach that strategists should 
plan. Several studies show that planners out-perform non-planners. Ihune 
and House (1970) matched pairs of companies in several industries. They 
found that formal planners outperformed non-planners in the area of re¬ 
turn on investment, return on equity, and earnings per share growth, while 
maintaining equal performance or better with non-planners in the area 
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of sales growth. Herold (1972) extended these studies for four additional 
years, and found that planners increased their lead in most of the per¬ 
formance measures. Karger and Malik (1975) did a similar study for ten 
years in the machinery, electronic, and chemical industries, and found 
the same trends: planners consistently outperformed non-planners. 
The success of planning in these studies might suggest that planning 
is the mode necessary for effective strategy, but Quinn's study was of 
successful companies. They did not use systematic planning methods pre¬ 
scribed by the strategic planning models. Rue and Fulmer (1973) found 
that planning did not lead to better results in the production of non¬ 
durable goods, while it did lead to better results in the production of 
services and industrial goods. Sheehan (1975) found sane Canadian firms 
which did not plan outperformed other firms which did plan. 
The evidence, then, is inconsistent. Planning is clearly a necessary 
methodology for design in strategy in some instances. In other instances, 
alternate methodologies, adaptive, incrementalism, etc., may be necessary. 
Some theorists suggest that the bridge between the competing views of the 
strategic design process may lie in the nature of the environment. We use 
the environment to mean all those variables which impact management, but 
which management cannot control. Khandwalla (1976) argues that if the 
environment is highly dynamic, then strategy must be flexible and innova¬ 
tive. One might observe a strategy that is flexible and innovative, and 
call it adaptive or incremental. In a non-dynamic environment, strategy 
(per Khandwalla) can be very specific. One might call this type of spe¬ 
cific strategy a planned strategy. In a similar vein, Paine and Anderson 
(1977) argue that highly uncertain environments call for an adaptive mode 
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of strategy: "including incremental, remedial decisions arrived at in 
part through bargaining among members of a power coalition". In environ¬ 
ments of perceived certainty, Paine and Anderson suggest that the plan¬ 
ning mode is necessary. 
The banking environment during the period of this study has been per¬ 
ceived as an uncertain one by bankers. Baker (1973) lists the unprece¬ 
dented rate of change which has taken place in the banking industry in 
the following areas over recent years: volatile interest rates, changed 
deposit mix, Regulation Q, growth of non-interest expense relative to 
non-interest income, asset composition, capital considerations, perform¬ 
ance measurement, improved management information systems, and theoretical 
developments. This uncertain environment suggests that the strategies 
observed in this study may not be formally planned by the managers enact¬ 
ing them. How, then, do we define the strategies of interest? 
Mintzberg (1972) defines strategy "as a pattern in a stream of sig¬ 
nificant decisions." Khandwalla (1977) defines strategy as a "coupling 
together of decisions, guidelines, and hueristics." This study adopts 
the ideas of these authorities. Strategy is defined as a pattern in a 
stream of decisions. This pattern can be observed through an analysis 
of the decision outcomes. By observing the results of performance, that 
is, by measuring performance on operational and financial variables, the 
study will deduce the contents of strategy. 
Strategic choices and the contingencies which affect them. Regardless 
of the process used to arrive at a strategic choice, the actual choice 
is the critical variable of interest for the strategy designer. The 
18 
choice must be one which can lead to desired outcomes. A strategic choice 
is the selection of a set of actions from an infinite range of possible 
actions. The chosen set of action is called the "content" of the strat¬ 
egy (Hofer, 1973, 1975; Bourgeois, 1980). Research on strategy content 
attempts to discover successful and unsuccessful strategies. This sec¬ 
tion will briefly review a portion of this literature. 
The primary decision in strategy is the decision of which businesses 
the firm will compete in. This primary decision rarely occurs for the 
small business, and occurs more often for the large business. Bourgeois 
suggests that strategy is best studied by separating primary decisions 
from secondary decisions. Secondary decisions are decisions about how 
to compete in a given business arena. For corporations which compete in 
major businesses, portfolio management is one tool which has been devel¬ 
oped to aid in the process of primary decision making (Boston Consulting 
Group, (1968)). Portfolio theory guides the decision maker to a choice 
of strategy which will maximize returns while minimizing risk for the 
corporation. Each business in the corporation must then make the secon¬ 
dary choice of how to compete in its industry within the constraints of 
corporate strategy. For this study, the primary decision is a constraint 
the firms analyzed have chosen to compete in the caimercial banking in¬ 
dustry. The task of this study is to determine effective strategy choices 
after a bank's performance has declined for three years. 
Similar studies, that is, studies of secondary strategy, have been 
done by several researchers. Schoeffler, Buzzell, and Heany (1974) find 
that 37 factors explain 80% of the variance in profit of a wide range of 
companies in several industries. Homermesh, Anderson and Harris (1978) 
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find that successful low market share companies follow specific strate¬ 
gies such as competing in carefully segmented markets, making efficient 
use of research and development budgets, limiting growth and diversifica¬ 
tion, and employing a strong executive officer. Gutmann (1964) finds 
that growth strategies include: 
1) choice of a general industrial field growing quicker than the 
economy 
2) or choice of specific fast growing sub-sectors 
3) or choice of fast expanding market segments 
4) or choice of subsectors before everybody else 
The Hcmermesh, Anderson and Harris study, and the Gutmann study, are 
illustrative of a wide range of studies which are situational in nature. 
They assume a goal, , that is, to be a successful low market share company, 
or a successful growth company;, and then analyze the content of strate¬ 
gies which have been used by companies to attain these goals. Such situ¬ 
ational studies may be the first step in the development of a contingency 
theory of strategic management. 
Per Hofer and Schendel, "the contingency theory approach is concerned 
with the mid range body of theory which stands between 'universal truths' 
and 'each situation is unique.' The contingency approach seeks to deter¬ 
mine a relationship in which observable response in and to organizations 
is dependent upon specific environmental conditions" (1979, p. 103). 
They identify four types of strategy: environment, corporate, business, 
and functional strategy. Corporate strategy is similar to Bourgeois' 
primary decision, while business strategy is similar to Bourgeois' sec¬ 
ondary strategy. Hofer (1975) reviewed the field of business strategy 
20 
in an attempt to build a contingency theory of business strategy. He re¬ 
viewed studies by Chevelier (1972), Fruhan (1972), the Boston Consulting 
Group (1970), Udell (1972), Khandwalla (1974) and Schaeffler et al. (1974) 
(see Table #2). Hofer lists three difficulties in the attempt to build 
this theory: 1) the situational nature of the field; 2) the lack of data 
bases; and 3) the difficulty of designing the data bases. The empirical 
work to date offers a rich base of knowledge, but they "lack precision 
with regard to the circumstances in which they apply" (Hofer, 1975). The 
circumstances in which these findings would apply are contingent upon 
significant environmental and organizational variables (Table #3 lists 
some of the significant variables). The variables include economic con¬ 
ditions, demographic conditions, sociocultural trends, political and legal 
factors, supplier variables, industry structure variables, market and con¬ 
sumer variables, and organizational characteristics and resources. A 
contingent theory would relate certain strategic variables with certain 
strategic choices. For example, given a particular industry structure, 
with economic growth, and high market share, the firm should choose a 
particular option for competition in the marketplace. To date, the num¬ 
ber of clearly defined contingencies is small, because of the large num¬ 
ber of contingent variables. This problem might be solved through a 
careful classification system. Such a system would group key variables 
together; in effect, the data reduction would achieve parsimony; this 
parsimony would lead to theory which has greater general applicability. 
A technique which Hofer uses to achieve such parsimony is to identify 
life cycle stages of products as a key variable. At each stage of the 
life cycle, only a few of the variables in each class of variables are 
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strategically important. For example, in the maturity stage, the rele¬ 
vant competitor variables are the degree of specialization within the in¬ 
dustry and the degree of capacity utilization. (For a similar classifi¬ 
cation technique, see Tuason (1973)). 
Another approach to building contingency theories is the approach 
which controls certain environmental or organizational variables. Rumelt 
(1974) controlled organizational variables through a product mix clas¬ 
sification scheme. He classified firms as single product, dominant prod¬ 
uct, and related and unrelated product businesses. He tested the propo¬ 
sition that each type of firm required different strategies and different 
organizational structures. Schendel and Patton (1976) controlled environ¬ 
mental variables through the use of SIC codes. Ward (1976) developed a 
measure of product-market diversity. He used a Delphi method to classify 
firms according to degree of product market diversity. Theoretically, 
firms in different classifications would require different strategies. 
Ford (1978) classified economic conditions and competitive conditions in 
the banking industry through the use of dummy variables in a regression 
model. Mayne (1976) used a similar system to classify bank management 
policies for particular types of bank organization structures. In these 
different approaches, the relevant strategy choice depends upon the busi¬ 
ness' classification in a particular product classification, or product- 
market diversity classification, or SIC code, etc. 
The crucial choice for the contingency theory researcher is the choice 
of variables which will be identified as the key variables. To date, 
there is no consensus as to what those variables should be. Any set of 
variables chosen leaves a wider set unchosen. That wider set may explain 
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more than the chosen set. There have been suggestions that the key vari¬ 
ables are the environment and the organization. Paine and Anderson (1977) 
argue the important effect of the environment on the process of planning. 
Luthans and Stewart (1977) suggest that the key variables are the en¬ 
vironment, the management, and the set of resources available. But these 
classifications are arbitrary, to the extent that there is no agreement 
on the methods necessary to measure these key variables. In the case of 
classifying organizations, for example, both deductive and inductive 
methods have been used. However, a general contingency theory cannot be 
built until some agreement has been reached about the definition and mea¬ 
surement of key variables. 
Industry as a key contingent variable. One of the possible key variables 
in the design of strategy may be the industry variable. Industrial dif¬ 
ferences affect the success of strategic choice. For example, in the 
brewing industry, there is a relationship between market share and return 
on equity (Hatten, 1974; Patton, 1976). In pooled industry studies, there 
is a positive relationship between market share and return on equity; that 
is, as market share increases, returns on equity increase. When homogen¬ 
eous brewer groups are studied, however, the relationship changes. By 
defining three groups of brewers (national, regional, and local), the 
researchers found that there is a negative relationship between return 
on equity and market share within each group. This research offers sup¬ 
port for the idea that there are different successful strategies within 
an industry. One might easily reason as Hatten does (1979) that these 
relationships change from industry to industry. A good strategy in one 
industry is not necessarily valid in another industry. 
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Other researchers have chosen industry as the key variable for analy¬ 
sis. Graham and Richards (1979) studied deteriorating firms in the rail¬ 
road industry. Datta (1979) studied firms in the television industry 
for the period 1950-1960. Datta writes: "this research is based on the 
premise that because of its inherently complex nature and vast differences 
not only between but within markets, a generally applicable theory of strat¬ 
egy at the business level is unlikely to be very meaningful; such a theory 
can be better developed through studies of individual industries as op¬ 
posed to a more global approach." 
This research study follows the logic of Datta. It is a study in a 
single industry, commercial banking. This choice of a single industry 
sacrifices our ability to generalize any results to other industries. 
This sacrifice is necessary because the commercial banking industry is 
unique in many ways. It is highly regulated compared to most private 
industries, and its product is unique. The industry requires study 
which focus specifically on this one industry if only because contin¬ 
gency theories of a more general nature may not apply to the banking in¬ 
dustry because of its particularly peculiar environment. Furthermore, 
this study analyzes specific conditions in the banking industry. The 
study attempts to identify those strategies which will be successful in 
turning around a declining bank's performance. The next two sections 
will review the literature on failure and decline, and the literature 
on banking. 
Failure and Turnaround 
Studies of failure. A hard fact of business life is that failure is more 
common than success. About 90% of new businesses formed in a given year 
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will fail within five years. Many of these businesses fail due to in¬ 
adequate management. The businesses which remain in existence after 
five years are not imnune to failure, however. W. T. Grants, once a 
household name, is only one of the many examples of good firms that have 
gone bad. The Grant's example, failure, is an important area of concern 
for the policy analyst. The Grant's example might have been even more 
important if management could have saved this giant retail firm from 
failure. Only a few studies have tried to analyze firms which have be¬ 
gun to decline, and then turned around. 
Argenti (1976) writes "the study of the causes and symptoms of com¬ 
pany failure has been a most neglected area of management. There is 
hardly any literature at all and there is certainly nothing approaching 
a body of knowledge such as one can easily find on other management 
topics-mergers, for example, or incentive schemes." 
There are several reasons for this neglect. First, the failure 
problem cannot be foreseen in most cases. Therefore, research in the 
area of failure is, by its very nature, ex post facto. Second, the rea¬ 
sons for failure which are frequently cited are excuses, rather than 
causes. Mach of the information about failure is provided by the man¬ 
agement which supervised the failure — a highly unreliable source at 
best. Third, failures occur randomly. They are not anmenable to the 
systematic methods of research. 
Nevertheless, some research has taken place on the process of fail¬ 
ure in organizations. The literature can be divided into two categories: 
Those studies which attempt to predict failure in organizations and those 
studies which attempt to describe the conditions in the firm at the time 
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of failure. Many of the predictive studies come from the fields of fi¬ 
nance and accounting, while many of the descriptive studies come from the 
fields of policy and organizational behavior. We shall review studies 
from each category. 
The research problem in this study is not failure, but rather turn¬ 
around. However, the turnaround process occurs after a period of decline. 
The literature on failure exhibits some clues about the nature of the de¬ 
cline process. 
The accounting/finance studies. Beaver (1968) studied failing firms to 
test which financial ratios are the best predictors of failure. He de¬ 
fined failure as the "inability to pay financial obligations as they 
mature." He used a sample, identified through Moody's, of failed and 
non-failed firms during the period 1954 through 1964. Through three dif¬ 
ferent methods, he tested the effectiveness of measures conmonly used to 
analyze firm performance by investors. He found that non-liquid asset 
ratios were the best predictors of performance over time. He found that 
these predictors are useful over a five year period. In describing the 
behavior of the failed firm, Beaver states: "for the most part, the be¬ 
havior of the failed firm is what would be expected. They generate less 
sales, and the growth in sales is less than that of non-failed firms. 
They have poorer cash flow and net income positions, and they incur more 
debt. This combination causes a marked deterioration in their solvency 
position" (p. 118). It is important to note that the successful predic¬ 
tion of failure fades as you get further away from the failure; it is 
easier to predict failure one year from the event than five years from 
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the event. It is also necessary to note that Beaver's sample includes 
only firms which finally reached insolvency; intuitively, one would sus¬ 
pect that some firms sense their deterioration, and act to turnaround 
before reaching the failure stage. 
Altman (1968) used a multiple discriminant analysis technique to 
assess the effectiveness of financial measures to predict failures. He 
used data from 1946 to 1965 to identify 66 firms which had failed. He 
then matched these failed firms with similar firms which had not failed. 
Through the discriminant analysis, he identified five ratios which were 
the best predictors of failure over a five year period. Again, the best 
prediction occurred the year before the failure. As the prediction 
model moved away from the time of failure, its ability to predict de¬ 
clined. Altman tested the ability of his variables to predict through 
the use of the classification matrix. This is a test of how well dis¬ 
criminant functions, derived from observations on data, predict. Ihe 
following chart lists the classification success rate by year: 
One year before failure 95% correctly classified 
two years before failure 72% 
three years before failure 48% 
four years before failure 29% 
five years before failure 36% 
Altman's analysis did not include firms which might have declined and 
then turned around; his study was of firms that were either bankrupt or 
non-bankrupt. 
Bazley (1976) studied failed firms to test the effectiveness of dif¬ 
ferent cost measures; historical, adjusted, and current, in predicting 
failure. He found that the best predictors of failure were cash flow/ 
total liabilities, and net income/total assets. He cites the causes of 
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failure as inadequate sales, excessive costs, excessive receivables, in¬ 
ventory difficulties, excessive fixed assets, and availability of credit. 
In studies similar to Altman's in that they use discriminant analy¬ 
sis, Emery, Halonen, and MacStravic (1976) and Sinkey (1975) studied 
failure in the hospital and banking industry, respectively. Emery et al. 
find that there are key financial and operational variables which predict 
failure for different types of hospitals. For government hospitals, the 
key predictors are occupancy, admissions, and personnel variables. For 
non-profit hospitals, the key variables are the number of services, the 
expenses per bed, personnel variables, and admission rates. For profit 
hospitals, the key variables are admissions, total expenses, and expenses 
per bed. Emery et al. imply that hospital management can trace these 
variables to detect decline in the organization, and act to deter that 
decline. Sinkey, in his study of banks, finds that asset composition, 
loan characteristics, capital adequacy, sources and uses of revenue, ef¬ 
ficiency, and profitability are good indicators of possible problems in 
performance. 
These studies provide some groundwork for the present study. The 
work of Beaver and Altman strongly suggest that failure can be detected 
before it occurs. Potential failure should trigger some action to pre¬ 
vent bankruptcy in the declining firm. These studies suggest that the 
period of decline can be observed more than one year before failure, but 
less than five years before failure. The Emery et al. study, and the 
Sinkey study, suggest that the declining firm in a specific industry can 
trace key variables. These studies, however, leave several questions un 
answered. Both studies aimed to provide knowledge to industry planners. 
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They ingore the processes that occur within the firm while failure is im¬ 
minent. This study will identify the specific strategies management has 
undertaken to counteract decline. The sample of interest will not neces¬ 
sarily be firms which failed, but rather firms which avoided failure. 
Management studies. The aforementioned studies traced the results of cer¬ 
tain management behaviors. In these cases, the results were failure. The 
studies hint at the actual management behaviors, but they don't identify 
the actions which management took or didn't take. In failure, sales 
and income decline while debt increases. What are the management actions 
which precipitate these results? Several studies of the failure process 
list the possible behaviors of failing management. 
Argenti lists three main reasons for failure: management defects, 
accounting defects, and resistance to change. His research is based on 
discussion with the caretakers of failing organizations; accountants, re¬ 
ceivers, bankers and analysts, and on the history of failing organiza¬ 
tions. The management defects include the heavy reliance on one man 
usually an autocrat, the use of a passive board or a board which does 
not have a good mix of directors who have functional business skill, and 
an insufficient depth of top management. The accounting defects include 
the inability of the organization to accurately assess cost and profit 
performance. Failing firms make key mistakes; leveraged too highly, over¬ 
trading, and engaged in large projects, which better accounting informa¬ 
tion might have helped the firm to avoid. The resistance to change in¬ 
cludes the unwillingness of the organization to update products, proc¬ 
esses and equipment, and the unwillingness to engage in planning. Argenti 
31 
asserts that all firms might not have all the defects listed but they all 
have at least one defect in each area. 
Richards (1973) studied 8 private firms and two government firms. 
He defines failure in more general terms than Beaver: "failure is a rel¬ 
ative term but the firms reported upon experienced failure in the sense 
that a severe setback in relation to their strategic plans occurred." 
The types of failure observed in this study included extreme cost over¬ 
runs, bail out by other institutions, bankruptcy, and forced mergers. 
Richards notes that failing firms made overoptimistic estimates of proj¬ 
ects, they suppressed contrary information, and they had dognatic leaders. 
These findings concur with Argenti's findings. 
Miller (1977) defined failure as a protracted period of poor prof¬ 
its and declining market share. He ran a factor analysis to analyze the 
dimensions of management behavior in failing firms. He found that four 
patterns emerged: the impulsive firm, the stagnant bureaucracy, the head¬ 
less firm, and the firm swinming upstream. Failure in these firms is the 
result of extremes: too much or too little product-market innovation; 
too many or too few controls, too powerful or too weak a chief executive. 
The findings of this study are similar to the findings of Argenti and 
Richards. Indeed, Richard states: "initial comparisons of failing to 
successful firms indicate that the successful enterprises are less risk 
prone, less optimistic, and more objective in information processing than 
the firms reported on in this study. This comparison alone can be ex¬ 
tremely dangerous, however, if one attempts to extrapolate policy impli¬ 
cations to conclude that complete information processing, no risk expo¬ 
sure, and executive pessimism are preferred strategic orientations. 
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Rather, strategic success and failure are probably curvilinearly related 
to these variables such that optimal strategy lies at neither extreme." 
These studies suggest that there are management patterns in the 
failure process. They suggest that the way to avoid failure is to avoid 
these management patterns. Yet, the studies look at organizations which 
fail, rather than organizations which turnaround. 
Studies of turnaround. Graham and Richards (1979) studied the patterns 
of strategic change in rail based holding companies after a period of 
deterioration in performance. Their study suggests many interesting ideas 
about the turnaround process. 
The most important idea stressed in these studies is that strategic 
change requires a major deterioration in performance: "Cyert and March 
suggest that problem solving search does not wander very far from past 
and familiar solutions. Strategic change, however, constitutes a dra¬ 
matic alteration of prior organizational activity. Thus, revising strat¬ 
egy would not be contemplated unless organizational slack had in some way 
been reduced to unsatisfactory levels." Their study confirms this key 
idea. Firms which did enact strategic changes (the strategic change in 
this study was diversification) had significantly lower returns than 
firms which did not enact these changes. The change included changes in 
the composition of the Boards of Directors, and changes in the experi¬ 
ence and background of the management team. 
The implication of these findings is that the management of a de¬ 
clining firm may not be able to diversify the firm. If these findings 
are accurate in all cases, they imply that turnarounds which include 
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diversification require substantial changes in the management team. Fur¬ 
thermore, this study implies that diversification strategies may be strat¬ 
egies of a last resort. It is possible that the management in a declin¬ 
ing organization either accepts the decline as inevitable, or reacts to 
the decline in a manner which is ineffective. Unfortunately, this study 
only reports results for firms which did enact diversification strategies. 
There is a wide range of alternatives that management might choose during 
the condition of decline; this particular study does not identify the 
full range. 
Schendel and Patton (1976) studied the process of corporate decline 
and turnaround. They studied pairs of firms in similar environments. 
One of the firms had declined and turned around; the other firm had con¬ 
tinually declined. They analyzed each pair of firms in terms of finan¬ 
cial measures, management actions, resource allocation, and strategies. 
They attempted to identify the key differences in financial and perform¬ 
ance ratios between failing and non-failing companies. The results of 
their study suggest several interesting factors about the turnaround 
process: 
"The scenario that emerges from this exploratory re¬ 
search is that a stagnating or declining company seems 
to first need a deepened threat or shock to spur it into 
action. Steadily poor performance so long as it does 
not develop a crisis seems to be tolerated. Once a 
crisis arrives, the firm can move into action. While 
there are different specific strategies involved, turn¬ 
around usually requires substantial changes in the 
business; and often new businesses either acquired or 
developed internally can lead to sales growth that more 
than outstrips investment increments. At the same time, 
attendant efficiency moves in working capital, in pro¬ 
ductivity, and in other areas also are sought; or ef¬ 
ficiency accrues to strategy changes made." 
34 
This study implies that turnaround often requires a primary strategic 
decision; that is, a change of business. Turnaround firms often diver¬ 
sify into new businesses. It is also possible to turnaround through the 
use of secondary decisions; that is, the decision to develop new prod¬ 
ucts or services, or the decision to improve operating efficiency. Fur¬ 
thermore, the failure to turnaround can be traced to several sources: 
the strategy choice could be the wrong choice. In one set of matched 
pairs, growth through acquisition and merger worked while growth through 
internal expansion did not work. The strategy choice could be frustrated 
by government; in one case, a firm's attempt to expand was stopped by 
government action; or the strategy choice could fail to poor implementa¬ 
tion. 
Ross and Kami (1973) did an intensive study of firms which failed, 
and developed a set of prescriptions for management. These ten conmand- 
ments are: 
1. Develop and comnunicate a strategy 
2. Use overall controls and costs controls 
3. Insist on an active board of directors 
4. Avoid one man rule 
5. Provide management depth 
6. Keep informed of, and react to, change 
7. Don't overlook the power of customers 
8. Use, but don't abuse, computers 
9. Do not engage in accounting manipulations 
10. Provide an organizational structure that meets the needs of the 
workforce 
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This study implies that there are strategies which a firm can use to 
avoid failure. The strategies suggested by this study are similar to 
the strategies suggested by the studies reviewed to this point. 
This research analyzes the process of decline and turnaround in the 
comnercial banking industry. The research is based on the premise that 
management can detect a decline (Beaver, Altman), and enact specific 
although not necessarily unique strategies to counteract that decline. 
The research is an attempt to refute the hypothesis, proposed by Glueck, 
that "the major cause of growth, decline and other large scale changes 
in firms are exogenous factors in their environment, rather than any 
purely internal developments" (1972, p. 108). 
Bank Management Studies 
Mich of the literature on the performance of banks has focused on 
the comparison of holding companies with other banks, and on problem 
banks (Ford, 1974). Little has been written on the process of managing 
successful banks (although excellent texts have been written by Crosse 
(1962) and Corns (1968)). Perhaps the most extensive work on the man¬ 
agement of successful banks has been done by Ford. Ford identifies 
"high performance banks," and then analyzes the difference between high 
performance banks and other banks. A bank earns the high performance 
classification if it has a very high average rate of return for five 
years, and if it ranks in the top 50% of profitability for the year pre¬ 
vious to the year of study. His on-going project is updated annually 
Ford finds that there are distinct differences in the management of high 
performance banks. High performance banks earn higher yields on assets, 
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and they have much lower expenses than low performing banks. They pay 
their employees more, and they obtain more performance from their em¬ 
ployees. They have better loan yields, and higher quality loans than 
low performance banks. 
Ford traces the cause of performance in high performance banks to 
the skills of managers. The managers of the high performers set finan¬ 
cial goals, develop long range strategies, establish short range profit 
plans, and track and reformulate plans (Ford, 1978). They succeed in 
recessionary times through careful management processes. Indeed, all 
variation in performance can be traced to the careful management of vari¬ 
ables under the control of management: 
"Overall, our tests of non-management factors were not 
very conclusive. Although it appears that economic 
growth stimulates bank profitability and that exten¬ 
sive branching and strong competition from thrift in¬ 
stitutions can depress profitability, the amount of 
variation explained by these factors is not very high. 
This, coupled with the fact that rates of return for 
banks within the same state (and even within more lo¬ 
calized markets) exhibit substantial differences, sug¬ 
gests that non-management factors influence only mod¬ 
estly banks' rate of return; most of the variation in 
profitability seems to be caused by factors which man¬ 
agement should be able to control." (1978) 
The factors that management should be able to control fall into several 
classes: profitability, expense, employee utilization, asset manage¬ 
ment, revenue enhancement, credit quality control, leverage and loss 
coverage, and growth measures. The variables in each of these classes 
are listed in Table #4. 
Ford's variables are similar to those used by other researchers to 
assess bank performance. For comparison, the variables used by Sinkey 
(1975) and Mayne (1976) are listed in Table #5. Sinkey found that 
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Table 4 
Ford's Variables 
of Bank Performance 
Profitability Measures: 
1. Net income/average equity 
2. Return on earning assets 
3. Net interest income/eaming assets 
Expensive Control Measures: 
4. Operating expense/earning assets 
5. Overhead/earning assets 
6. Interest on deposits/all deposits 
7. Interest on deposits/time and savings 
Employee Utilization Measures: 
8. Net income/employees 
9. Payroll expense/employees 
10. As sets/employees 
Asset Management: 
11. Gross loans/all deposits 
12. Cash and treasuries/DDA 
Revenue Enhancement: 
13. Loan income/gross loans 
14. Securities income/securities 
13. Municipal income (tax ads)/municipal 
Credit Quality Control Measures: 
16. Loan loss provision/earnings assets 
17. Gross chargeoffs/loans 
Leverage and Loss Coverage: 
18. Equity assets 
19. Loan loss coverage ratio 
20. Reserve loans 
Growth Measures: 
21. Annual asset growth 
22. Annual deposit growth 
23. Annual equity growth 
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Table 5 
Sinkey's Variables of Bank Performance 
1. Liquidity la. 
2. Loan volume 2a. 
3. Loan Quality 3a. 
4. Capital Adequacy 4a. 
5. Efficiency 5a. 
6. Sources of Revenue 6a. 
(as a % of revenue) b. 
c. 
7. Uses of Revenue 7a. 
(as a % of revenue) b. 
[Cash + U.S. Treasury Sec.]/Assets 
Loans/Assets 
Provision for Loan Losses/Oper. Expense 
Loans/[Capital + Reserves] 
Operating Expense/Operating Income 
Loan Revenue/Total Revenue 
U.S. Treasury Securities' Revenue/ 
Total Revenue 
State & Local Obligations' Revenue/ 
Total Revenue 
Interest Paid on Deposits/Total Revenue 
Other Expenses/Total Revenue 
Mayne's Variables of Bank Performance 
I. Assets 
Liquid Assets/Total Assets 
Muncipal Securities/Total Assets 
Total Loans/Total Assets 
Consumer Loans/Total Loans 
Residential Mortgages/Total Loans 
II. Deposits 
Time and Savings Deposits/Total Deposits 
Interest on Time and Savings Deposits/Total Time and Savings 
Deposits 
III. Capital 
Capital/Risk Assets 
IV. Revenue 
Deposit Service Charges/IPC Demand Deposits 
Loan Revenue/Total Loans 
V. Expenses 
Operating Expenses/Total Assets 
"Other" Operating Expenses/Total Assets 
Loan Losses/Total Loans 
VI. Profitability 
Operating Profit (After Tax)/Total Assets 
Net Profit/Total Capital 
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certain factors within these performance variables can be used to dis¬ 
criminate between problem and non-problem banks. The factors include 
asset composition, loan characteristics, capital adequacy, sources and 
uses of revenue, efficiency, and profitability. These factors can be 
controlled by management. 
One factor which might affect bank performance is bank structure. 
Some banks are holding company banks, that is, a central corporation 
owns several banks, while other banks are unit banks. Theoretically, 
the management of unit banks might be at a disadvantage; the competition 
offered by the bigger holding companies might be a variable that they 
can't control. Mayne (1976) finds that this is not true; in an analysis 
of the performance of banks managed under different structure, she finds: 
"the weight of the empirical evidence reported in this paper indicates 
few differences between non-affiliated banks and subsidiaries of decen¬ 
tralized systems, and little difference between the latter class and mem¬ 
bers of more formally cohesive groups." This finding, coupled with Ford's 
findings that high performance banks tend to fall in the $10 to $100 mil¬ 
lion size range, offer further evidence that management controlled fac¬ 
tors do determine success in the bank, although Mayne's findings are not 
confirmed in a similar study done by Johnson and Meinster (1975) . 
Baker offers further support for the idea that management can affect 
performance in the banking industry: "high performance banks have been 
able to continue recording above average earnings during the deposit mix 
transition because they become better at pricing loans and other serv¬ 
ices, minimized their loan losses, controlled manageable costs, limited 
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fixed asset comnitments, and maximized investment income by utilizing tax 
exempt securities to reduce the tax burden" (1978, p. 36). 
The iixmediately aforementioned research suggests that there is a 
difference in bank performance between successful and non-successful 
banks that can be traced to management strategies. The literature, how- 
ever, does not assess how a low performance bank becomes a high perform¬ 
ance bank. One would guess that they initiate the strategies of high 
performers, and turn their performance around in time. This guess does 
little to suggest which of the strategies employed by the high perform¬ 
ing banks are the most important in terms of turning performance around. 
This research study will attempt to identify those strategies which a 
declining bank can use to turn performance around. The next chapter 
will present the methodology for the study. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the methodology of the study. The methodo¬ 
logical section of the chapter is preceded by a discussion of the re¬ 
search problem, and a discussion of the pertinent hypotheses. 
Problem Statement 
Over time, the performance of any organization can change. Some or¬ 
ganizations grow. Some organizations decline. Some organizations de¬ 
cline for a period of time, and then grow. This research project focuses 
on the phenomena of decline, and decline followed by growth. 
There may be an infinite variety of strategies which an organization 
can use to turnaround performance. This variety is due to several fac¬ 
tors. First, the cause of the decline can impact the strategy for turn¬ 
around. If the decline is due to a particular weakness, then the turn¬ 
around might be accomplished by removal of the weakness. For example, a 
commonly cited cause of failure is the unwillingness to plan. If decline 
is precipitated by this weakness, then the decline might be counteracted 
by the installation of a planning process. Similarly, a commonly cited 
cause of failure is inaccurate accounting information. Under these con¬ 
ditions, the failure might be turned around through the installation of 
a more effective reporting system. 
Creativity lends complexity to the turnaround process. Creative op¬ 
tions vary for each organization that attempts to turnaround. Turnaround 
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efforts are often successful because firms add new products, new markets, 
or new businesses. These new options are almost unlimited; few organ¬ 
izations are constrained in their options for new competitive vehicles. 
A comnon turnaround strategy is the new team of managers approach. 
In this approach, the turnaround is accompanied by management and/or 
board changes. If previous research paints an accurate picture, then 
there is a threshold point of failure in organizations, as found by 
Schendel and Patton (1976) or Graham and Richards (1979), who describe 
how organizations only react to sharp declines which have occurred over 
a long period of time. Often, when the organizations reach this thresh¬ 
old point, there are changes in the management group. The new management 
group then enacts new strategies. In these situations, we do not know 
the causal agent of the turnaround. If the former management group had 
acted before the threshold point to initiate the same strategies which 
are initiated after the threshold point, perhaps the turnaround could 
have occurred earlier. 
The fact that turnaround often requires multiple strategies also 
lends complexity to the analysis of these strategies. Decline is rarely 
due to one single factor (Argenti, 1976; Richards, 1973); turnaround, 
similarly, is rarely due to one single factor. Success requires atten¬ 
tion on several fronts. Any turnaround strategy is really a mixture of 
several strategies. 
A priori, we can identify turnaround strategies that might be per¬ 
tinent to comnercial banks. The research problem is to identify those 
strategies which successful turnaround banks use. Furthermore, the 
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research problem is to isolate other factors which might cause the turn¬ 
around. For example, changes in the environment rather than changes in 
strategy might cause the turnaround. 
The possible turnaround strategies include: 
1) the reversal of a big loss, such .as cutting losing departments. 
2) increasing deposits to increase investable funds. 
3) merging with other banks. 
4) controlling expenses. 
5) reorganizing. 
6) opening branches in growth areas. 
7) improving marketing programs. 
8) bringing in a new management team. 
9) bringing in a new system of management. 
10) changing the investment mix. 
11) expanding markets nationally or internationally. 
12) improving legal leverage. 
13) investment in new technologies 
14) investment in new business. 
This list is not meant to be exhaustive; it has been developed through 
discussions with management experts and through a review of the turn¬ 
around literature. This study will identify those strategies used by 
turnaround banks; the study should add to this a priori listing. 
Identification of Sample and Definitions 
The initial sample is drawn frcm Bank Compustat Tapes (see Appendix 
for description). Bank Compustat Tapes lists financial and operational 
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variables for 136 banks. The time period used in this study is 1939 
through 1978. Two categories of banks are identified. The first cate¬ 
gory of banks are called the decline group. The second category of banks 
are called the turnaround group. Decline banks are banks which have con¬ 
tinuously declined for three successive years and then at least two of 
the next three years. Turnaround groups are banks which have declined 
for three successive years, and then grown for at least two of the next 
three years (See Figure #1). 
The first step in identifying the sample is the choice of classifi¬ 
cation variable. Following the lead of Schendel and Patton, the classi¬ 
fication variable is net income. While Schendel and Patton compared net 
income to growth in GNP, this study compares growth in net income for a 
bank to the industry-wide growth in net income. If a bank's net income 
grows at a higher rate than industry-wide net income, then that year is 
called a growth year. If a bank's net income grows at a lesser rate than 
industry-wide growth in net income for a particular year, then that year 
is labeled a decline year. This comparison normalizes the growth/decline 
pattern over time. The comparison follows the logic that a bank which 
has increased its net income at a rate less than industry growth in net 
income has lost ground, while the bank that has grown faster than the 
industry has gained ground. 
Industry growth is computed through the use of aggregate data com¬ 
piled by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). For each 
year, the percentage increase in net income over the previous year is 
computed. This percentage increase is then used to categorize each year 
of performance for each bank as decline or growth. 
Figure 1 
Graphic Representation of Turnaround 
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The classification of each year takes place through the use of a 
transformed variable. For each bank in the initial sample, the first 
year's net income is used as the initial base period. The first year 
is then transformed to reflect the growth in net income for the entire 
industry. The second year is then compared to this transformed first 
year. More precisely, 
XT = XY: XT = transformed net income 
X = net income 
Y = growth in net income for industry 
In the first year, the transformed net income is the base period. For 
each subsequent year, the net income is divided by the transformed net 
income of the previous year. The natural log of this calculation is 
then computed. A negative natural log indicates decline, while a posi¬ 
tive natural log indicates growth. More concisely, this calculation is 
as follows: 
In (X/XT-1), where X = the current year's net income, and 
XT-1 = the transformed net income for the 
previous year. 
The results are visually inspected to detect desired patterns. Banks 
which exhibit three consecutive negative scores are classified as de¬ 
clining banks. Thus, a decline is recorded where: 
X^ < Xj_^T for three years. 
This first period, three years of consecutive decline, will be called 
"Phase 1". 
All banks which exhibit the three years of decline are part of the 
sample. The problem focus of this study is the pattern over the next 
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three years. For the second three years, which shall be called "phase 
2", there are eight patterns which can be observed. The eight patterns 
are as follows: 
-(three years of decline, where < X^_^T for three years) 
+ + + (three years of growth, where > X^_jT for three years) 
~ + + 
+ _ + (inconsistent growth, where X- > X-_-,T for two of 
_ three years) 1 1 
+- 
- + - 
-+ 
(inconsistent decline, where X^ < X* FT for two of 
three years) 1 
The pure decline group is defined as the group which includes those 
banks which have pure decline in phase 2. These banks have gone through 
a six year period in which their performance has declined relative to 
industry performance. 
The pure turnaround group is defined as the group which includes 
banks which have pure growth in phase 2. These banks have gone through 
a six year period, which includes three years of decline followed by 
three years of growth. 
A second pair of groups will be formed. Inconsistent decline banks 
will be added to the pure decline group, while inconsistent growth banks 
will be added to the pure turnaround group. The expanded decline group 
which is called the impure decline group, includes those banks which 
exhibit pure decline, and those banks which interspace their decline with 
one year of growth. The underlying assumption in this classification 
scheme is that the one year of growth is a random occurrence, since it 
has occurred only in one year out of six, this seems reasonable. 
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Similarly, the expanded turnaround group, which is called the impure 
turnaround group, includes those banks which exhibit pure turnaround in 
phase 2, and those banks which interspace the growth with one year of 
decline. The underlying assumption in this classification scheme is that 
the turnaround strategies for the inconsistent turnaround banks have met 
with partial success. This classification method is similar to the clas¬ 
sification method used by Schendel and Patton. 
For each bank in the sample group, financial and operating ratios 
identified by Ford (1978) will be calculated for the six year period. 
These variables have been chosen because they are representative of the 
variables of interest to theorists of bank management. The variables are 
vl: net income/average equity 
v2: return on earning assets 
v3: net interest income/eaming assets 
v4: operating expense/earning assets 
v5: overhead/earning assets 
v6: interest on deposits/all deposits 
v7: interest on deposits/time and savings 
v8: net income/employees 
v9: payroll expense/employees 
vlO: assets/employees 
vll: gross loans/all deposits 
vl2: cash and treasuries/dda (demand deposit accounts) 
vl3: loan income/gross loans 
vl4: securities income/securities 
vl5: municipal income/municipals 
vl6: loan loss provision/eaming assets 
vl7: gross chargeoffs/loans 
vl8: equity/assets 
vl9: loan loss coverage ratio 
v20: reserve loans 
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v21: asset growth 
v22: deposit growth 
v23: equity growth 
The calculation of each variable is presented in the appendix. 
Hypotheses and Methodology 
The analysis is performed in four separate stages. The first stage 
of the analysis is an attempt to estimate the explanatory power of the 
variables chosen for analysis. The second step of the analysis is the 
test of hypotheses generated about turnaround strategies. The third step 
of the analysis is the test of alternative hypotheses. The fourth step of 
the analysis is qualitative confirmation of the process. We shall con¬ 
sider each step in order. 
Testing the model. The first step in the study involves a test of the 
model. The study assumes that variation in performance can be explained 
by the variables chosen for analysis. These variables have been tested 
in other studies; they have been chosen only after a careful review of 
the appropriate literature. However, most studies that have used this 
set of variables have had a different purpose than this study. Ford 
(1978) studied the differences between high performing and low perform¬ 
ing banks. These banks may be different than non-turnaround and turn¬ 
around banks. The device which will be used to test the power of these 
variables is the regression model. 
In the regression model, Y = BX + e, where Y is the dependent vari¬ 
able, B is beta, X is a T x (K+l) matrix, and e is an error term. In 
this particular model, Y is net income; X is a matrix of 23 independent 
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variables. B is estimated by the least squares method (throu^i the normal 
equations) by the formula (X'X)-1 X'Y. (Goldberger, 1964). 
Given the estimate of b, we can then compute the vector of calculated 
values of y, y, where y = Xb. We can then calculate the vector of resid¬ 
uals, e, where e = y-Xb = y-y. This calculation allows us to decompose 
the total variance into two components: the variance due to regression, 
and the variance due to error. Thus, 
SST = SSR + SSE 
SST = y'y - (i'y)2/T 
SSR = b'X'y - (i'y)2/T 
This gives us a "natural measure of goodness of fit," (Goldberger, 1964), 
9 
which is the coefficient of determination (cormonly called R ). 
R2 = SSR/SST 
2 • • • 2 
An R of 1 is a perfect fit, while an R of 0 is indicative of zero ex- 
* 2 
planatory power. The higher the R value, the higher the explanatory 
power of the model. 
A regression is run for each year of phase 1 and phase 2 for the 
2 
turnaround and non-turnaround groups. The R is then computed for each 
2 regression. A consistently high R offers confirmation for the power 
2 
of the model; the high R confirms that these variables do explain the 
turnaround process. The relative contribution of each variable cannot 
be determined through the regression analysis because there is a high 
degree of multicollinearity between the independent variables (for a dis¬ 
cussion of the effects of multicollinearity, see Kerlinger (1973)). 
Hypotheses testing and methodology. These hypotheses are tested on the 
decline and turnaround groups which are pure cases, and on the expanded 
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impure decline and impure turnaround groups. 
Each hypothesis is presented with a brief discussion of the theory 
which suggests the hypothesis, and the operational method for testing 
the hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #1: The rate of decline of net income in turnaround firms will 
be greater than the rate of decline of net income in non- 
turnaround firms during phase 1. 
This hypothesis is based on the theory of Cyert and March (1963), 
and the findings of Schendel and Patton (1976). 
The hypothesis is tested through the use of t-tests. The rate of de¬ 
cline is defined as the average percentage decline from the first to the 
third year of phase one. The computation of average rate of decline is 
computed for each group. The rate of decline is: 
X = net income 
for year n 
—
1
 
X
 
t—
1 1 
_
1
 
_X2 " Xl_ *3" *2 
L *0 J 
+ L h J + L ^ J 
If we call the rate of decline for company i D^, then the average 
rate of decline for a group is: 
n 
rd = y 
i=l n 
D. 
l 
The null hypothesis, Hq, is as follows: 
Hq: RD = RDn, where RDt = rate of decline for turnaround group 
RD = rate of decline for non-turnaround 
n 
group 
H-: RD. > RD 
i t n 
The null should be rejected at a .05 level of significance. This is a 
one-sided t-test, where the test statistic is: 
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Z = Xl-*2 
Hypothesis #2: The performance of the groups will be the same on the 
financial and operating ratios for the decline phase 
(phase 1) 
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the turnaround banks 
and the non-turnaround banks are equal performers during the decline 
phase. 
Performance is defined as a change overtime. The average percentage 
change for each of the 23 performance variables over the three period of 
decline will be computed: 
Change in performance for V = 
- V, 0 
V, 0 
3 
If we 
group 
call performance on variable 
is 
then the rate of change for each 
i = variable 
j = company 
The null hypothesis is as follows: 
Hr,: P. = P. , where P. = rate of change on performance vari- 
u it in' it 
able i for turnaround group 
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P^n = rate of change on performance vari¬ 
able for non-turnaround group 
The null should be accepted at .05 level of significance. The test is a 
two-sided t-test. The test statistic is as before. 
Hypothesis #3: The performance of the groups (turnaround and non-turn¬ 
around) is different on the financial and operating ratios 
for phase 2. 
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the turnaround group 
is different than the decline group in phase 2. The turnaround group has 
initiated strategies which are different than those followed by the non- 
turnaround group; the effect of these strategies should be observed in the 
financial and operating ratios. 
Performance is again defined as change over time. The average per¬ 
centage change for each of the 23 performance variables over the three- 
year period of phase 2 will be computed: 
Change in performance for V = 
3 
Again, we call performance on variable i P^, 
group is: 
n P- • 
I 41 
j=l J 
the rate of change for each 
i = variable 
j = company 
The null hypothesis is as follows: 
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Hq: = P^, where P^j. = rate of change on performance vari¬ 
able i for turnaround group 
P^n = rate of change on performance vari¬ 
able i for non-turnaround group 
The null should be rejected at the .05 level of significance. The test 
is a two-sided t-test; the test statistic is as before. 
Hypothesis #4: The two groups will not be discriminated successfully when 
phase 1 of the turnaround group is compared to phase 1 of 
the decline group. 
The method of analysis to test this hypothesis is multiple discrim¬ 
inant analysis. Discriminant analysis "finds a linear combination of the 
p variables that gives maximum separation between the groups" (Frederick, 
1975). The assumption behind this hypothesis is that there is no differ¬ 
ence between the groups of banks during the decline phase. The hypothesis 
is partially based on the work of Schendel and Patton, who used separate 
multiple regressions to analyze differences between stagnation and turn¬ 
around. 
Multiple discriminant analysis: "is a statistical technique used 
to classify an observation into one of several a priori groupings depen¬ 
dent upon the observation's individual characteristics. It is used pri¬ 
marily to classify and/or make predictions in problems where the depen¬ 
dent variable appears in qualitative form; e.g., male or female, bankrupt 
or non-bankrupt. Therefore, the first step is to establish explicit 
group classifications. The number of original groups can be two or 
more." (Altman, 1968). In our case, the explicit group classification 
is turnaround or non-turnaround. In phase 1, the both groups are in 
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decline. Therefore, there should not be a successful discrimination at 
this point. 
The test of discrimination between the groups is Bartlett's chi- 
square approximation: 
X2 = -(n-l-(p+g)/2) In A 
where A= (1/1+Aj) 
This methodology follows two assumptions: one, that the dispersion 
matrix of each group is equal; two, that the distribution of the under¬ 
lying population is multivariate normal. 
The discriminant analysis will be run at year 1 of phase 1, and year 
3 of phase 1. 
Hypothesis #5: The two groups will be discriminated successfully when 
phase 2 of the turnaround group is compared to phase 2 
of the decline group. 
This hypothesis flows from the previous hypothesis. While the groups 
were similar during phase 1, during phase 2 a change occurred; that is, 
the turnaround group has now entered a new trend, while the non-turnaround 
group continues to decline. The characteristics of this change should be 
detected by the discriminant analysis. 
The statistical methodology is the same as the methodology for the 
previous hypothesis. However, the discrimination should be successful; 
Bartlett's chi-square should be significant. 
This test will be conducted for year 1 of phase 2, and year 3 of 
phase 2. 
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Hypothesis #6: Several variables will be more important than the other 
variables in the discriminant function. Specifically, 
variables operating expense/earning assets, overhead/ 
earning assets, interest on deposits/all deposits, net 
income/employees, payroll expense/employees, assets/ 
employees, cash and treasuries/DDA, municipal income/ 
municipals will be among the variables that contribute 
the most to the discriminating function. 
This hypothesis is suggested by Ford's (1978) analysis of high per¬ 
forming banks. 
This hypothesis will be tested through the use of discriminant 
weights and discriminant loadings. The discriminant analysis is run on 
standardized data; the discriminant function is produced; then, discrim¬ 
inant scores are calculated. These scores provide a relative measure of 
the contribution of each variable in the discriminating process. The 
higher the score, the higher the contribution. When the scores are listed 
in rank order, the variables predicted to contribute the most will fall 
within the top half of the list. Discriminant loadings which show cor¬ 
relation between variables and the discriminant score will be computed 
and inspected. 
After the initial discriminant analysis, a reduced set of variables 
is identified and used for further analysis. The task of identifying 
the most important discriminators within a set of collinear predictor 
variables is a complex one, because there is no unambiguous answer to 
the problem of collinearity (Green, 1978). The options available in¬ 
clude dropping variables after inspection of the correlation matrix 
(Green, 1978), the use of significance tests on the difference in 
Mahalanobis distances between full sets and reduced sets of variables 
(Rao, 1952), the use of partial F-tests (Klecka, 1975), the use of the 
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structure matrix (Cooley and Lohnes, 1971), or the use of standardized 
discriminant weights (Green, 1978). The structure matrix is inspected 
to assess discriminatory power of variables. A reduced set of variables 
is then chosen, and the discriminating effects of these variables are 
tested on phase 2. 
At this point, an attempt is made to assess the discriminatory con¬ 
tribution of each class of variables; profitability measures, expense 
control measures, employee utilization measures, asset management mea¬ 
sures, etc. An index is built for each class of variables through the 
use of factor scores. The factor scores are then used in a discriminant 
analysis model, to assess the discriminatory power of each class of vari¬ 
ables . 
Alternate hypotheses. The assumption of this study is that the decline 
and turnaround process is not independent of management action. The de¬ 
cline occurs because management has made some strategic errors, and the 
turnaround occurs because management has made successful strategic ad¬ 
justments. This assumption may be in error. It is possible that al¬ 
ternative explanations for the turnaround process exist. 
The extraneous factors which have been proposed to explain declines 
in performance include size, organizational structure, and local economic 
conditions. 
Large size may be an advantage, while small size may be a disadvan¬ 
tage. The logic of this argument rests on the empirical phenomena known 
as the experience curve (Boston Consulting Group, 1968). In general, as 
size increases, production experience increases. This increase in 
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experience leads to a decline in cost. Due to cost advantages, the large 
organization is more successful than the small organization. In competi¬ 
tion, then, the small organization will decline regardless of the action 
of management. 
Organizational structure may impact bank performance. The key dif¬ 
ferences in organizational structure in the banicing industry lie in the 
difference between holding companies and unit banks. Holding companies 
are corporate organizations which own several banks, while unit banks 
are independent of affiliation with any other banking units. Several 
theorists have addressed the issues of the impact of holding companies 
on bank competition (Mayne, 1976); (Johnson and Meinster, 1975). It is 
possible that the unit bank is at a competitive disadvantage when com¬ 
peting with the holding company. The competitive advantage accrues to 
the holding company because of its ability to spread staff costs over 
several banks. Theoretically, the holding company will have better staff 
productivity per bank. 
Local economic conditions can impact bank performance through two 
channels. First, local economic conditions affect the portfolio of the 
bank. Its level can be decreased due to decreased business growth in a 
particular region, and its risk can be increased due to a decline in 
business activity unique to a region. Second, a particular region may 
have more competition than another region. There might be more commer¬ 
cial banks in a particular region, and there may be more alternate sources 
of funds for business such as savings and loans or insurance companies. 
High levels of competition can force management into expensive programs 
which don't contribute significantly to an increase in revenue. Such 
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competition would reduce a bank's performance relative to the industry, 
if the whole industry is not subject to the same conditions. 
These alternative hypotheses are not exhaustive; there probably are 
others. However, these are the alternative hypotheses most often de¬ 
bated in the literature. It would be impossible to exhaust the full 
range of hypotheses within the parameters of this study. 
The alternative hypotheses will be tested through the use of a re¬ 
gression model. 
Hypothesis #7: Extraneous variables (other than the 23 analyzed) will 
have insignificant effects. The major extraneous vari¬ 
ables will be size, organizational structure, and re¬ 
gional economic differences. The effects of these 
variables will be tested in a regression model, where 
the extraneous factor is used as a blocking variable. 
These tests will be run only if the extraneous factor 
appears in the sample. The independent variances will 
be net income and profitability measures. 
Operationally, the test of significance is as follows: 
Y=a+b1X1 +BX, where Y = income (net) 
linn’ 
b-, = beta for blocking vari¬ 
able 
X-i = the blocking variable 
(X = 0 or 1) 
b = beta for n variables, 
n measures of profitability 
Xn = n independent variables 
The statistical test is a test of b^: Hq*. = 0. I 
expect to confirm null at .05 level of significance. 
Qualitative support. The statistical methodology for this study assesses 
the effect of strategic response to decline. The specific content of the 
strategies are lost in numbers; the quantitative analysis shows results, 
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but not the activities which precede these results. The qualitative re¬ 
search will discover the strategies used by the banks which turned around, 
and those which failed. 
The qualitative research will take two forms. First, a letter will 
be sent to each bank in the sample to request information from the banks. 
Second, an extensive search of the literature will be undertaken to re¬ 
view reports about the strategies of each bank in the sample. 
The following chapter presents the results of the analyses. 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
This chapter reports the result of the statistical analysis. The 
results of each statistical test and test of hypothesis is presented in 
order. A discussion of the implications of the results appears in the 
next chapter. 
Sample Identification 
The industry growth in net income serves as the variable of compari¬ 
son to determine if a bank has declined or improved in performance in a 
specific year. Annual data published by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation serves as the source of information for this classification 
method. Table 6 lists industry income, the annual change in industry 
net income, and the percentage change in industry net incane. 
A growth in net income for each year for each bank occurs when the 
bank's net income growth percentage exceeds that of the industry. So, 
growth in 1978 implies a growth greater than 21.2% over the previous 
year; growth in 1977 implies a growth greater than 13.2% over the pre¬ 
vious year, and so on. Ihe decision rule for identifying growth or de¬ 
cline is based on the calculation of the natural log of year n, divided 
by the year (n-1), after year n-1 has been transformed to reflect indus¬ 
try growth. Table 7 lists the calculations for each year. 
The sample for the study is those banks which meet the decision rule 
for decline. The data used to identify the sample is the net income 
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Table 6 
Industry Net Income Figures 
For U.S. Banks 
Year 
Net Income 
(000's) 
Change (From 
previous year) 
Percentage Change 
(from previous year) 
59 2,372,519 — — — 
60 3,387,129 1,014,610 .428 42.8% 
61 3,401,822 14,693 .004 .4% 
62 3,260,178 -141,644 -.042 -4.2% 
63 3,379,546 119,368 .037 3.7% 
64 3,431,832 52,286 .015 1.5% 
65 3,543,895 112,063 .033 3.3% 
66 3,714,246 170,351 .048 4.8% 
67 4,319,012 604,766 .163 16.3% 
68 4,692,982 373,970 .087 8.7% 
69 4,334,567 *see note 
70 4,837,293 502,726 .116 11.6% 
71 5,236,205 398,912 .082 8.2% 
72 5,654,398 418,193 .080 8.0 
73 6,579,194 924,796 .164 16.4% 
74 7,091,264 512,070 .078 7.8% 
75 7,254,611 163,347 .023 2.3% 
76 7,843,277 588,666 .081 8.1% 
77 8,879,405 1,036,128 .132 13.2% 
78 10,759,534 1,880,129 .212 21.2% 
Note: As of 1/1/69, there was a change in the financial reporting sys¬ 
tem from a cash to an accrual basis. Therefore, a valid measure 
is not available for the increase from 1968 to 1969. The effects 
of this change on the make up of the sample are discussed in the 
appendix. 
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Table 7 
Calculations of Decline/Growth 
Rates in Net Income for U.S. Banks 
formula 
Growth over (+ is growth, 
Year_previous year- is decline) 
78 21.2% nl (78ni/77 x 1.212) 
77 13.2% nl (77ni/76 x 1.132) 
76 8.1% nl (76ni/75 x 1.081) 
73 2.3% nl (75ni/74 x 1.023) 
74 7.8 % nl (74ni/73 x 1.078) 
73 16.4% nl (73ni/72 x 1.164) 
72 8% nl (72ni/71 x 1.08) 
71 8.2% nl (71ni/70 x 1.082) 
70 11.6% nl (70ni/69 x 1.116) 
69 see note nl (69ni/68 x 1) 
68 8.7% nl (68ni/67 x 1.087) 
67 16.3% nl (67ni/66 x 1.163) 
66 4.8% nl (66ni/65 x 1.048) 
65 3.3% nl (65ni/64 x 1.033) 
64 1.5% nl (64ni/63 x 1.015) 
63 3.7% nl (63ni/62 x 1.037) 
62 -4.2% nl (62ni/61 x .958) 
61 .4% nl (61ni/60 x 1.004) 
60 42.8% nl (60ni/59 x 1.428) 
Note: Growth from 68 to 69 could not be determined (See Table 6 ) • There 
fore, declines are absolute declines in reported net income. The 
effects are discussed in the appendix. 
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reported by banks on compustat tapes for the period 1959 through 1978. 
One hundred thirty^six banks report their performance on the compustat 
tapes. Some banks have a history of less than twenty years on the tapes, 
however. The following chart reports the breakdown of the compustat 
tapes according to the number of years reported by member banks. 
Table 8 
Sunmary of Years Reported 
on Bank Compustat Tapes 
Number of years reporting Number of banks 
20 10 
18 1 
16 63 
15 9 
14 3 
13 9 
12 9 
11 2 
10 14 
9 4 
8 7 
7 3 
6 _2 
n = 136 
Source: Compustat Tapes. 
The data base expands over time (in 1959, there are 20 companies report¬ 
ing; in 1961, there are 11 companies reporting; in 1963, there are 74 com¬ 
panies reporting, etc.). This lack of stability in the data base used 
to generate the sample builds a bias into the decision rule, in that turn¬ 
arounds will be more likely in latter years. This bias is unavoidable, 
in that there is no substitute data base available. This lack of stabil¬ 
ity will not cause bias in the analysis of turnaround strategies. 
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The following sample serves as the basis for the remainder of the 
study. The banks are reported by group: 
Table 9 
The Names and Periods of Turnaround by Category of 
Banks in Sample 
Pure Turnaround Banks 
Bank Name Period of Turnaround 
Midatlantic Banks 
Union Planters Corp. 
United Virginia Bancshares 
Detroit Bancorp. 
Society Corp. 
Union Commerce Corp. 
Colorado National Bancshares 
Mercantile Texas Corp. 
1972-1978 
1971- 1977 
1972- 1978 
1969- 1975 
1970- 1976 
1966-1972 
1972-1978 
1971- 1977 
(n=8) 
Inconsistent Turnaround Banks 
Bank Name Period of Turnaround 
Chemical N.Y. 
Continental Illinois Corp. 
Mellon National Corp. 
Northern Trust Corp. 
Fidelity Union Bancorp 
First Empire State 
First Penn Corp. 
Hospital Trust Corp. 
New England Merchant's 
United Bancorp of N.Y. 
First Maryland Bancorp 
Maryland National Corp. 
Huntington Bancshares 
National Detroit Corp. 
Pittsburgh National Corp. 
Union National Bank Pittsburgh 
Liberty National Corp. 
Republic of Texas Corp. 
Texas Conmerce Bancshares 
Bankamerica Corp. 
First Hawaiian Inc. 
Hawaiian Bancorp Inc. 
Western Bancorporation 
1970-1976 
1965-1971 
1969- 1975 
1970- 1976 
1970-1976 
1972-1978 
1972-1978 
1972-1978 
1970- 1976 
1971- 1977 
1971-1977 
1970-1976 
1970-1976 
1969- 1975 
1970- 1976 
1969-1975 
1969- 1975 
1970- 1976 
1964-1970 
1960-1966 
1971- 1977 
1969- 1975 
1970- 1976 
(n=23) 
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Pure Decline Banks 
Bank Name 
Shawmt Corporation 
Baybanks, Inc. 
Greater Jersey Bancorp 
Hartford National Corp. 
Lincoln First Banks 
Marine Midland 
Equimark Corp. 
Period of Turnaround 
1969-1975 
1969-1975 
1971-1977 
1969-1975 
1969-1975 
1969- 1975 
1970- 1976 
(n=7) 
Inconsistent Decline Banks 
Bank Name Period of Decline 
State St. Boston Corp. 
CBT Corp. 
Girard Corp. 
Philadelphia National Corp. 
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico 
Financial General Bankshares 
First Union Corp. (N.C.) 
General Bancshares 
Indiana National Corp. 
Southwest Bancshares 
Bancal Tri-state Corp. 
Crocker National Corp. 
Security Pacific Corp. 
1969-1975 
1969-1975 
1969- 1975 
1971- 1977 
1972- 1978 
1971-1977 
1971- 1977 
1970- 1976 
1972- 1978 
1972-1978 
1971- 1977 
1969-1975 
1969-1975 
(n=13) 
The total sample size is 51. There are 31 banks which had turnarounds, 
and there are 20 banks which had declines. The period under study starts 
in 1969 and later for 48 of the 51 banks. The performance of each bank 
for the period of interest is presented in the appendix, along with a 
narrative history of each bank for the applicable period. 
67 
Report of Results 
For each bank in the sample, performance measures over the period of 
turnaround or decline are taken from the corapustat tapes. These vari¬ 
ables are then used to compute the variables of interest for the study. 
The variables are: 
Cash and due from banks 
U.S. treasury notes and securities 
IXie for banks (memo entry) 
Total investment securities 
Trading account securities 
Federal funds sold and securities purchase 
with agreements to resell 
Loans (gross) 
Total assets (gross) 
Total demand deposits 
Total deposits (worldwide) 
Time and savings deposits 
Reserve for bad debt losses 
Preferred stock (par value) 
Total book value 
Interest on fees and loans 
Interest on state and town obligations 
Total interest and dividends on investments 
Aggregate loan and investment revenue 
Trading account income 
Interest on due from banks 
Number of employees 
Salaries and wages of officers and employees 
Pension and employee benefits 
Total interest on deposits and borrowings 
Provision for loan losses 
Total interest expense 
Aggregate other current operating expenses 
Total current operating expenses 
Current operating earnings before expenses 
Net income 
Net credit or charge to reserves for debt 
recovery 
Average taxable investment 
Average non-taxable investment 
Average deposits: time and savings 
Average deposits: demand 
Total savings and deposits 
Total time deposits 
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The variables used in the study are: 
Profitability Measures 
vl) net income/average equity 
v2) return on earnings assets 
v3) net interest/earning assets 
Expense Control Measures 
v4) operating expense/earning assets 
v5) overhead/earning assets 
v6) interest on deposits/all deposits 
v7) interest on deposits/time and savings 
Employee Utilization Measures 
v8) net income/employees 
v9) payroll expense/employees 
vlO) assets/employees 
Asset Management 
vll) gross loans/all deposits 
vl2) cash and treasuries/demand deposit accounts 
Revenue Enhancement 
vl3) loan income/gross loans 
vl4) securities income/securities 
vl5) muni income/munis 
Credit Quality Control Measures 
vl6) loan loss provision/earning assets 
vl7) gross chargeoffs/loans 
Leverage and Loss Coverage 
vl8) equity/assets 
vl9) loan loss coverage ratio 
v20) reserve/loans 
Growth Measures 
v21) asset growth 
v22) deposit growth 
v23) equity growth 
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The definitions of the compustat variables, and the calculations of the 
variables of interest, are explained at length in the appendix. The 23 
variables are analyzed through the remainder of the study. 
Regression. The twenty three variables which are used to study the turn¬ 
around process have proven successful as explanatory variables in other 
studies (Ford, 1978), but have not been used in the context of this type 
of study. In order to assess the explanatory power of these variables 
for this study, a regression analysis is performed. Hie research is de¬ 
signed to explain the turnaround process. Due to high levels of multi- 
collinearity, the regression model cannot be used for the analysis of the 
turnaround process. However, it is used to assess the power of the 23 
performance variables to explain the variance in net income among the 
groups. 
The groups under study are turnaround and non-turnaround groups. 
Each bank in the sample is analyzed through a. six year period. Ihe re¬ 
gressions are run on all data, all groups for all years of the study; 
then, on the data for the turnaround and decline groups for separately, 
for the six years of the study; then, on each group for each year of the 
study: first year, second year, third year, fourth year, fifth year, and 
sixth year. 
The first two sets of regressions present no special computational 
problems. Ihe results are presented in Table #10. 
o 
There are problems in the calculation of the R for each year of 
data in both the decline and turnaround groups. Ihe problem is due to 
milticollinearity. In the event of high multicollinearity, the data 
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matrix can not be inverted. Recall from the previous chapter that the 
beta coefficient is estimated by the formula (X'X)-^^. With high mul¬ 
ticoil inearity, the X'X matrix is singular; it can not be inverted. No 
estimate of beta can be made; thus, no R can be computed. This problem 
can be solved by purging the data of multicollinearity. One method of 
purging the data of multicollinearity is through the use of principal 
components. 
Table 10 
Regressions: All Data, Turnaround Group, and Decline Group 
Sample R2 
All data .51802 
Turnaround group (six years) .61088 
Decline group (six years) .78943 
Principal components transforms the original data into a data set of 
orthogonal variables. These new variables are a linear transformation of 
the original data set which do not suffer the problem of multicollinearity. 
This transformed data set can be used as predictors in the regression 
model without any loss of predictive efficiency (Tatsuoka, 1971). Princi¬ 
pal components computes a new variable, Y, through the use of the trans¬ 
formation matrix V: 
Y = XV 
Where Y is an n by p matrix, X is an n by p matrix, and V is a p by p ma¬ 
trix. In the pure principal components model, the number of components 
is equal to the number of variables. Data reduction can take place by 
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retaining only the meaningful components. Many decision rules have been 
proposed to choose "meaningful" components: in this context, the rule 
chosen is / of variance explained. Sixteen components represent 94.3% 
of the variance. Since the last seven components contribute only mar¬ 
ginally to the variance, they are dropped from the subsequent analysis. 
Thus, for each year, a regression is run on the transformed data ma¬ 
trix. The results of these regressions are listed on Tables 11 and 12. 
Table 11 
Principal Components Regression on Each Year of 
Turnaround Sample 
Year of Turnaround R2 
year 1 .52988 
year 2 .66159 
year 3 .79958 
year 4 .69036 
year 5 .82265 
year 6 .65102 
Table 12 
Principal Components Regression on Each Year of 
Decline Sample 
Year of Decline R2 
year 1 .79604 
year 2 .98652 
year 3 .87664 
year 4 .93850 
year 5 .95558 
year 6 .86354 
The variables do explain a substantial proportion of the variance in 
net income. Subsequent analysis assesses the process of turnaround. 
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Hypothesis test: Rate of decline. The hypothesis is: 
V RDj- ~ RDnJ where RDt - rate of decline for the turnaround group 
RE>n - rate of decline for the non-turnaround group 
H : RD > RD 
a t n 
The rate of decline in net income is computed as follows: 
X1 -*0 *2 X1 . X3 *2 
+ 
*0 
X, 
*2 Xn - net income for 
year n 
The test is run on the mean rate of decline for pure decline and turn¬ 
around groups, and on the mean rate of decline for the full decline and 
turnaround groups. 
The following table records the results of the t-tests on the pure 
groups. 
Table 13 
Tests of Rate of Decline (Pure Groups) 
Group n of cases X t-value DF One-tailed prob. 
Decline 7 .0073 
Turnaround 8 -.3680 1.22 7.02 .131 
The following table records the results of the t-tests on the full 
sample (pure and impure groups). 
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Table 14 
Test of Rate of Decline (Impure Groups) 
Group n of cases t-value DF One-tailed prob. 
Turnaround 31 -.0959 
Decline 20 .0034 -1.21 30.57 .1185 
While the differences are in the hypothesized direction, neither t- 
value is significant at the hypothesized level of acceptance. The t-value 
is an approximation, calculated by the formula: 
This approximation is necessary because the groups do not have equal vari¬ 
ance. In a test for equality of variance, the null hypotheses that the 
variance are equal is rejected (for pure groups, F = 868.43, significant 
at the .000 level; for impure groups, F = 161.91, significant at the .000 
level). 
Hypotheses test: Performance ratios. Phase 1 is the period of decline 
during the first three years of the six year period under study. For 
each bank, performance ratios are calculated for seven years; the base 
year (Xq) , and the six subsequent years (X-^ through X^). Performance is 
defined as a change in any ratio over time. Thus, performance for ratio 
A for period phase one is: 
74 
T-tests are calculated to assess differences in mean performance for the 
pure groups (decline vs. turnaround), and for the full sample (pure groups 
and inconsistent cases, decline vs. turnaround). 
The following table reports the results for pure groups, phase 1. 
Table 15 
Performance Ratios: Means, T-values and Significance for 
Phase 1: Pure Groups 
decline Turnaround 
Variable_Group Mean Group Mean T-value Sig. 
*1 
vl ' net income/average equity 
v2 return on earning assets 
v3 net interest/earning assets 
v4 operating expense/earning 
assets 
v5 overhead/eaming assets 
v6 interest on deposits/all 
2 deposits 
v7Z interest on deposits/ 
^ time and savings 
v8 net income/employees 
v9 payroll expense/employees 
vlO*^ as sets/employees 
vll gross loans/all deposits 
vl2 cash and treasuries/demand 
deposit accounts 
vl3 loan income/gross loans 
vl4 securities income/securities 
vl5,v-> municipal income/municipals 
vl6' loan loss provision/eaming 
assets 
vl7 gross chargeoffs/loans 
vl8Vc-. equity/assets 
vl9l| loan loss coverage ratio 
v20' reserve/loans 
v21 asset growth 
v22.v, deposit growth 
V23'1 2 equity growth 
-.0380 -.5031 1.23 No 
.0431 .1167 -1.42 No 
-.0409 .0439 -2.53 A A 
.0332 .1505 -2.01 A 
.0065 .2140 -2.18 A 
.2914 .2542 .38 No 
.3501 .1726 2.33 A 
-.0359 -.4572 1.26 No 
.0643 .0675 -.27 No 
.1070 .0020 4.85 /\ A 4\ 
-.0056 .0136 -.89 No 
.0465 .0007 1.119 No 
-.0147 .1052 -3.42 
^i«. 
A 
.0223 .0892 -2.50 4\ A 
-.0078 .0042 -2.53 4\ A 
.1847 .7007 -2.29 
•.»- 
A 
.4761 .2442 .52 No 
-.0873 -.0182 -2.93 A A 
-.1027 -2.1205 1.08 No 
-.0688 .0054 -1.48 No 
.1516 .0736 3.29 4\ A 
.1528 .0637 4.15 A A A 
.0472 .0513 -.21 No 
1) Approximation: separate variance estimate. 
2) Invalid due to sample size (1). 
001 
05 
1 
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The variables which are significantly different are: 
v3: net interest inc/eaming assets 
v4: operating expense/eaming assets 
v5: overhead/eaming assets 
v7: interest on deposits/time and savings 
vlO: assets/employees 
vl3: loan income/gross loans 
vl4: securities income/securities 
vl5: municipal income/municipals 
vl6: loan loss provision/earning assets 
vl8: equity/assets 
v21: asset growth 
v22: deposit growth 
The Table #16 lists the results on phase 1 for the whole sample. 
The variables which are significantly different are: 
v5: overhead/eaming assets 
v7: interest on deposits/time and savings 
vlO: assets/employees 
vl5: municipal income/municipals 
v22: deposit growth 
These variables were also significant for the comparison of pure groups. 
The implications of these differences are discussed in the next chapter. 
Phase 2 is the last three years of the period under study. While 
all banks in the sample declined during phase 1 relative to industry 
wide performance as measured by growth in net income, performance dur¬ 
ing phase 2 is different for the groups. Pure groups exhibit three 
straight years of decline or growth, while the full sample includes banks 
with pure records of performance, and banks which exhibit growth or de¬ 
cline in two of three years. Two years of decline classifies a bank in 
the decline group, while two years of growth classifies a bank in the 
growth group. Performance is again defined as a change in a ratio over 
time. Thus, performance for ratio A for period phase two is: 
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Table 16 
Performance Ratios: Means, T-values, and Significance 
for Phase 1, Impure Groups 
Variable 
1 
beeline 
Group Mean 
Turnaround 
Group Mean T-value Sig. 
vl 
v2 
v3 
v4 
v5‘ 
v6 
v7 
v8 
v9 
vlO 
vll 
vl2 
vl3 
vl4 
vl5i vl6J 
vl7] 
V18-, 
vl9; 
V201 
v21 
v22 
v23 
net income/average equity -.0518 -.1749 -1.23 No 
return on earning assets .0923 .0776 -.49 No 
net interest/earning assets .0026 -.0005 -.09 No 
operating expense/earning .0692 .0951 .91 Nn 
assets 
overhead/earning assets .0297 .0887 1.71 «.!* 
interest on deposits/all .2849 .2189 -1.54 No 
deposits 
interest on deposits/ .1896 .0956 -1.92 
time and savings 
net income/employees -.0335 -.1784 -1.25 No 
payroll expense/employees .0721 .0659 -.71 
assets/employees .1000 .0459 -2.71 
gross loans/all deposits .0013 .0160 1.13 No 
cash and treasuries/demand .0571 .0290 -1.12 No 
deposit accounts 
loan income/gross loans .0344 .0522 .72 No 
securities income/securities .0478 .0511 .17 No 
municipal income/municipals .0041 .0283 1.81 
loan loss provision/earning .2659 .4447 1.22 No 
assets 
gross chargeoffs/loans .3650 1.3278 1.04 No 
equity/assets -.0517 -.0304 1.37 No 
loan loss coverage ratio -.0460 .1451 .25 No 
reserve/loans -.0568 -.0235 1.67 No 
asset growth .1236 .0978 -1.50 No 
deposit growth .1184 .0908 -1.76 A 
equity growth .0580 .0598 .22 No 
1) Approximation based on separate variance estimate *** = .001 
Table 17 reports the results for pure groups, phase 2. 
Table 17 
Performance Ratios: Means, T-values and Significance for 
Phase IUd, Pure Groups 
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Variable Itecline Group Mean 
Turnaround 
Group Mean T-Value Sig. 
vl1 -.38S7 2.0761 -1.08 No 
v2 .1023 .0176 2.19 4\ 
v3 .0346 .0262 1.05 No 
v4 .1263 .0169 2.41 A A 
v5 .1719 .0118 2.35 A A 
v6 .1524 .0381 1.74 No 
v7i .1137 .0235 1.56 No 
vS1 -.3129 2.3151 -1.03 No 
v9 .0791 .0785 .03 No 
vlO .0348 .0790 -2.35 A A 
vll -.0083 .0126 -.99 No 
vl2 .0955 .0712 .67 No 
vl3 .0860 .0137 1.96 %.»- A 
vl4. .0742 .0357 1.56 No 
vlb1 .0788 .0505 .95 No 
vl6-, .6049 -.0670 3.46 4\ A 
vl7X .5068 .3500 .38 No 
vl8n .0114 -.0246 .92 No 
V191 -.1046 2.9741 -1.09 No 
v20-, -.0544 -.0619 .18 No 
v21j .0238 .1391 -1.76 No 
v22: .0404 .1281 -1.33 No 
v23X .0300 .0514 -.39 No 
1) t-approximation based on separate variance scores. *** = .001 
The variables which are significantly different are: 
v2: return on earning assets 
v4: operating expense/earning assets 
v5: overhead/earning assets 
vlO: assets/employees 
vl3: loan income/gross loans 
vl6: loan loss provision/eaming assets 
The next table lists the results on phase 2 for the whole sample. 
Table 18 
Performance Ratios: Means, T-values and Significance for 
Phase Two, Impure Groups 
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Variable Decline Group Mean 
Turnaround 
Group Mean T-Value Sig. 
vl1 -.1226 .4717 1.08 No 
v2 .0686 .0316 -1.58 No 
v3 .0478 .0277 -1.26 No 
v4 .0828 .0434 -1.60 No 
v5l .1257 .0509 -2.47 
V61 .1131 .0545 -1.36 No 
v7l .0853 .0164 -1.74 No 
V81 -.0475 .5681 .95 No 
v9 .0824 .0847 .21 No 
vlO .0422 .0590 1.41 No 
vll .0126 -.0020 -1.41 No 
vl2 .0519 .0992 1.85 
vl3-. .0491 .0277 -.97 No 
v14L .0558 .1085 .99 No 
vl5 .0574 .0530 -.26 No 
vl6 .5028 .3442 -1.04 No 
vl7 .5109 .5467 .16 No 
vl8-, .0056 -.0048 -.64 No 
vl9X .0095 .7480 1.19 No 
v20 -.0622 -.0685 -.31 No 
v21n .0587 .1021 1.80 
v227 .0596 .0974 1.61 /> 
v23L .0564 .0760 1.15 No 
1) t-test approximation based on separate variance estimate. .001 
.05 
.1 
The variables which are significantly different are: 
v5: overhead/eaming assets 
vl2: cash & treasuries/demand deposit accounts 
v21: asset growth 
v22: deposit growth 
V5 (overhead/eaming assets) is the only variable which is significantly 
different during phase 2 for both the pure group and full sample compari¬ 
son. It is also the only variable which is significant during all com¬ 
parisons (phase 1 and phase 2). 
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The original hypothesis of the study states that there would be no 
difference in performance during phase 1, while there would be signifi¬ 
cant differences during phase 2. This hypothesis is rejected. There are 
significant differences during both phase 1 and phase 2; there are more 
differences in phase one. The implications will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant analysis on Phase 1. Phase 1 is the first three years of 
performance for each bank in the study. By definition, each bank has 
declined relative to industry performance in net income growth. By def¬ 
inition, there should be no difference between the groups, turnaround and 
decline, in phase 1. Differences should begin to appear in phase 2, the 
last three years of performance. 
The test for differences between the groups during phase 1 and dur¬ 
ing phase 2 is discriminant analysis. As previously stated, discrimi¬ 
nant analysis seeks a linear combination of variables which achieves max¬ 
imum separation between the groups. The assumptions of the method are 
that the dispersion of the groups are equal, and that the data is nulti- 
variate normal. There is some debate about the second assumption; 
Eisenbeis and Avery (1972) argue that nonnultivariate normal data may be 
used in discriminant analysis without biasing the results significantly. 
Discriminant analysis serves several purposes. First, it provides 
a set of weights which can be used to classify cases into one group or 
another. In a general sense, this can serve for description or predic¬ 
tion. Given a previously unanalyzed observation, a researcher can use 
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the classification function developed in a discriminant analysis study 
to classify that observation, subject to an error rate. Second, it can 
provide standardized discriminant coefficients. The magnitude of these 
coefficients give some indication of the relative contribution of each 
discriminating variable. In a general sense, given two groups with five 
discriminating variables, if a particular coefficient is twice as large 
as any other coefficient, then that larger coefficient contributes more 
to the differences between the groups (Klecka, 1974). There are problems 
with this method of interpretation, in that the standardized coefficients 
do not take into account correlation between the original variables 
(Perreault, Behrman, and Armstrong, 1979). The effects of this problem 
will be discussed in a later section of the study. Finally, the discrim¬ 
inant analysis procedure provides a test for the significance of differ¬ 
entiation between the groups. 
The hypothesis for phase 1 states that there will not be significant 
discrimination between the groups during phase 1. The methodology chosen 
to test this hypothesis is direct discriminant analysis, as programed in 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) (Nie, et al., 1975). 
At this initial stage of analysis, all variables are entered into the dis¬ 
criminant function. If there is significant discrimination, the struc¬ 
ture correlation matrix, which provides the correlations between the dis¬ 
criminant function and the discriminating variables is then used to iden¬ 
tify the most important discriminators. This reduced set is then used in 
the next step of the analysis, to further judge the discriminatory power 
of this reduced set. 
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The tests are run on pure groups and impure groups for the beginning 
and the end of phase 1, that is, the first and third year of the period 
of study. The following table presents the Wilk's lambda and its cor¬ 
responding test of significance. The Wilk's lambda is a measure of the 
success of discrimination between the groups. 
Table 19 
Discriminant Analysis on Phase 1: 
Pure and Impure Groups 
Group Year Wilk's Lambda Significance 
Pure 1 .0938245 .2882 
Pure 3 .1369178 .4421 
Impure 1 .4946657 .7212 
Impure 3 .1691671 .0563 
Note: In the analysis of pure groups, the tolerance parameter is .0005; 
in the analysis of impure groups, the tolerance parameter is .001. 
This reduction in tolerance was necessary to force more variables 
into the pure discriminant functions. 
At this point, a further test of the hypothesis that there is no dif¬ 
ference between the groups is performed on the impure groups at the third 
year. This is the Chow test (Kmenta, 1971), which is a test for the sta¬ 
bility of the beta coefficients across groups. The null hypothesis for 
this test is: 
The acceptance of the null hypothesis leads to the conclusion that the 
beta coefficients across groups are stable; therefore, the groups are from 
the same population. The test statistic is: 
82 
(ssec-sse1-sse2)/ic 
(SSE1"+SSE2)7n1+n2-2K 
where SSEc is the sum of squares resi¬ 
dual for the combined groups 
SSE^ is the sum of squares resi¬ 
duals for the nth group 
n-^ and n2 is the n of observations 
in groups 1 and 2 
K is the number of observa¬ 
tions 
The results of this test confirm the results of the discriminant analy¬ 
sis; the computed F-statistic is .615, which is not significant. Thus, 
the hypothesis that there is no difference between the groups during phase 
1 is supported. 
Discriminant analysis on Phase 2. The hypothesis for phase 2 states that 
there will be significant differences when a discriminant analysis is 
performed on phase 2. The following table presents the results of these 
tests. The tests are performed on the pure and impure groups, for the 
fourth and sixth years. 
As in phase 1, a further test is performed on the impure groups dur¬ 
ing the sixth year to ascertain if there are differences between the 
groups. The test is the chow test, as in the previous section. The F- 
statistic is 6.101, which is significant at the .05 level. 
An inspection of the results table reveals that there are signifi¬ 
cant differences in discrimination for the impure groups throughout phase 
2, and for the pure groups during the fourth year. Thus, the hypothesis 
is confirmed for the impure groups, and partially confirmed for the pure 
groups. 
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Table 20 
Discriminant Analsyis on Phase 2: 
Pure and Impure Groups 
Group Year Wilk's Lambda Significance 
Pure 4 .02939202 .0386 
Pure 6 .0467443 .1047 
Impure 4 .1807332 .0146 
Impure 6 .2194888 .0098 
Note: In the analysis of pure groups, the tolerance parameter is .0005; 
in the analysis of impure groups, the tolerance parameter is .001. 
This reduction in tolerance was necessary to force more variables 
into the pure discriminant functions. 
The major purpose of this study is the analysis of differences in 
performance between banks that have turned around, and those that have 
failed to turnaround. To this point, the discriminant analysis has con¬ 
firmed that there are differences between the impure groups in phase 2 
(years 4 and 6), and in pure groups during year 4. The next step is to 
identify those variables which contribute the most to discrimination. 
Since the impure groups exhibit consistent discrimination, they will be 
subjected to further analysis. 
An approach which is often used to identify the contribution of each 
variable in a discriminant analysis model is the use of standardized co¬ 
efficients. Perreault, Behrman and Armstrong (1979) argue that this ap¬ 
proach can be quite misleading because the standardized coefficients do 
not account for the correlations between the predictors. If two predic¬ 
tors are higjhly correlated, the discriminating power of those predictors 
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may be split between them; therefore, the standardized coefficients would 
be small. 
A second common approach used to identify the most important pre¬ 
dictors is the use of partial F-tests. The partial F-test is a stepwise 
procedure in which a one way analysis of variance is performed on the 
full set of discriminating variables for the groups; that variable which 
has the highest F is the first variable used as a discriminator. Then, 
the F-tests are recomputed with the initial entry variable serving as a 
covariate. The variable with the highest F on this second test is then 
entered, and the analysis of variance is recomputed with the two previously 
entered variables serving as covariates. This series of stepwise partial 
F-tests continues until all variables with F-values greater than a pre¬ 
determined limit are entered into the discriminant function. This method 
suffers difficulties under the presence of multicollinearity; as the step¬ 
wise precedure continues, the value of the F for a particular variable 
will fluctuate, because of the variable's correlation with other vari¬ 
ables . 
The twenty three variables of this study do exhibit collinearity. 
Therefore, the use of standardized variables or partial F-tests to choose 
a reduced set of variables is not the appropriate one. Following the 
arguments of Perreault, Behrman and Armstrong (1979), the correlations 
between the predictor variables and the discriminant function are used 
to identify the most important variables. 
The ten variables with the highest correlation are then used as in¬ 
dependent variables in a discriminant analysis. Their power is tested 
through the use of the Wilk's lambda, and their classification performance. 
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The discriminatory power of the next variable, the variable in 
the original model which has the eleventh highest correlation with the 
discriminant function) is assessed through the use of the test of sig¬ 
nificance of the difference in Mahalanobis distance between the two 
models. The test is as follows: 
m - m - 1 
n - p 
C(D2 - D2 ) 
n p' _____ 
1 + CDZ 
m-,nu 
where c = ssFzy 
mi = 
= 
m = 
n = 
P = 
sample size of group 1 
sample size of group 2 
total sample 
# of predictors in full set 
# of predictors in reduced 
set 
2 
D = Mahalanobis distance for n 
n 
predictors 
2 
D = Mahalanobis distance for p 
P P 
predictors 
The following table presents the matrix of correlations between the 
discriminating variables and the discriminant function for the impure 
groups years 4 and 6. The ten variables which provide the highest cor¬ 
relation serve as the discriminators for the remaining discriminant analy¬ 
sis. For the fourth year, these variables are: net income/employees, 
interest on deposits/all deposits, assets/employees, loan loss coverage 
ratio, equity/assets, gross loans/deposits, return on earning assets, net 
income/average equity, securities income/securities, and overhead/earning 
assets. For the sixth year, these variables are net income/employees, 
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Table 21 
Correlations Between Discriminant Functions and 
Discriminating Variables for Impure Groups, Phase 2 
Fourth Year Sixth Year 
v8 .19223 v8 .36809 
v6 .16742 v5 -.35952 
vlO .14351 v4 -.35497 
vl9 -.12875 v21 .31535 
vl8 .12166 vl6 -.30664 
vll .11236 vl7 .30583 
v2 .10006 v23 .26363 
vl .09044 vl .24830 
vl4 .08684 vl5 .21985 
v5 -.08400 v2 -.21769 
v9 .06838 vl8 .19250 
v? .05979 vlO .18622 
vl3 .05599 v22 .18125 
vl5 -.05482 vl3 -.16819 
v3 -.03795 v7 -.15920 
v23 .03434 vl9 -.12421 
v22 -.02829 v9 .10174 
vl7 -.01932 v3 -.10063 
v20 -.01492 v6 -.04986 
vl6 .01119 vl2 .04795 
v4 .00987 v20 .03621 
v21 .00764 vl4 -.03372 
vl2 -.00450 vll -.01783 
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overhead/earning assets, operating expense/earning assets, asset growth, 
loan loss provision/earning assets, gross chargeoffs/loans, equity 
growth, net income/average equity, municipal inccme/municipals, and re¬ 
turn on earning assets. 
Discriminant analysis on the reduced set of variables. This section de¬ 
scribes the process of testing a reduced set of predictor variables. 
The ten most important variables are tested for significance in discrim¬ 
ination as measured by the significance of Wilk's lambda, and the re¬ 
sults are presented. 
There is a full presentation of the results for the significant 
functions. In addition to the Wilk's lambda, the canonical correlation 
coefficient is presented. This is a measure of correlation between the 
discriminant function and the dummy variables which represent group mea¬ 
surement. Then, the classification functions are presented. There are 
two functions, each of which follows the form: 
DS = c. .X•, where DS is a discriminant form on case i 
ij ik 
c.. is the coefficient for the variable 
k in function j 
Xik is the k independent variables for 
case i. 
Each case is classified by computing its discriminant scores; it is 
assigned to that group in which it scores highest. Following the clas¬ 
sification functions, the standardized discriminant coefficients are pre¬ 
sented. This is followed by presentation of the correlations between the 
predictor variables and the discriminant function. This is followed by 
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a presentation of the results of classification. The final test listed 
in each case is the result of the Box's M test, which is a test for the 
equivalence of covariance matrices between the groups. 
Two problems are inherent in the preparation of these results. The 
first problem is the bias in classification results. When the classifi¬ 
cation function is used to classify the same data that was used to con¬ 
struct the function, there is an optimistic bias in the results. This 
happens because the sample is used to classify itself. In the case of 
large samples, the hold-out method can be used to eliminate this bias. 
In the hold-out method, a subset of the original data sample is held out 
during the construction of the classification functions. This reduces 
the bias since the sample held out for classification is classified by 
a function which has been generated from another sample. In this par¬ 
ticular study, the hold-out method is not possible because of the small 
sample size (51 cases in the largest groupings). Another method vhich 
reduces the bias in classification is the Lachenbruch method (Lachenbruch 
and Mickey, 1968). In this method, classification takes place through 
an iterative procedure. As each case is classified, it is held out from 
the sample. A classification function is constructed without the case 
to be classified, and then used to classify the case. Each case in the 
sample is subjected to the same procedure. Thus, the classification re¬ 
sults are obtained in a less biased method. This is the method employed 
by this study, through the use of the Bio-medical data processing pack¬ 
age. Classification results by both methods are presented; the classifi¬ 
cation results obtained by the Lachenbruch method are the less biased 
results. 
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The second problem inherent in the preparation of the results is 
the problem of missing data. There are twenty three independent vari¬ 
ables across six years for each company. In some instances, data for 
one variable in a particular year may be missing. The packaged programs 
do not allow for missing data in the process of building the classifica¬ 
tion functions, although SPSS will classify cases with missing variables. 
For each run, the n of cases may be reduced in the process of building 
classification functions; the reduction in group size is due to missing 
data. 
The results of the analysis of the fourth year are presented first; 
these will be followed by a presentation of the results of the analysis 
on the sixth year. 
The ten most important predictors in the fourth year did not dis¬ 
criminate successfully when used alone. The ten variables produce a 
Wilk's lambda of .5954113, which is not significant (the significance 
is .1131). In this case, more predictor variables are added to the ten 
in an attempt to gain successful discrimination. The remaining variables 
are added to the predictor variables in order of their rank in the struc¬ 
ture correlation matrix; as they are added, their contribution to dis¬ 
crimination is tested through the use of an F-test which tests for sig¬ 
nificant differences in Mahalanobis distance. If there is a significant 
difference in Mahalanobis distance, then the added variables do contribute 
to discrimination, and should be included in the analysis. 
The tests for the contribution of the remaining variables indicate 
that the addition of several variables to the reduced set of ten vari¬ 
ables does not contribute significantly to successful discrimination. 
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First, three variables (payroll expense/employees, interest on deposits/ 
time and savings, and loan income/gross loans) are tested for additional 
discrimination. These three variables rank eleventh, twelfth, and thir¬ 
teenth in terms of correlation with the discriminant function. Second, 
four variables are tested for additional discrimination (municipal income/ 
municipals is added to the previous group of three variables); then a set 
of five variables is tested for additional discrimination (net income/ 
earning assets is added to the list; this variable ranks fifteenth in 
the correlation matrix). The F-statistics and the appropriate degrees 
of freedom for each test are: 
addition of three variables 2.618 3,23 
addition of four variables 1.916 4,22 
addition of five variables 1.512 5,21 
In each case, the F is not significant at a level of .05 significance. 
At this point, further testing of additional sets of variables for dif¬ 
ferences in discrimination is terminated for two reasons; first, the six¬ 
teenth variable, equity growth, has a correlation of .03434 with the dis¬ 
criminant function. This correlation is low; it is not reasonable to 
expect that the addition of this variable would offer substantively dif¬ 
ferent results than the addition of the previous variables. Second, the 
aim of the study is to identify the most important characteristics of the 
differences between the turnaround and decline groups. A model of six¬ 
teen or seventeen variables would not offer much better description than 
a model of twenty three variables. The fact that it is difficult to build 
a reduced mudel of discrimination in the fourth year is not surprising. 
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At this point in time, the sample banks have just begun the turnaround. 
The effects of this effort appear at a later stage (that is, at year 
six). 
The classification functions, standardized coefficients, and classi¬ 
fication performance of the full set of twenty three variables is pre¬ 
sented on Table #22. 
For the sixth year, the ten predictors variables performed well. 
They produced a Wilk's lambda of .4358903, which is significant at the 
.05 level (significance of .0017). The full set of results for this 
analysis is presented on Table #23. 
The addition of additional variables does not add significantly to 
the discrimination provided by these ten variables. In a test of the 
differences in Mahalanobis distance, the difference added by the eleventh 
variable, vl8 (equity/assets), is not significant. The test of the dif¬ 
ference added by the eleventh and twelfth variable (equity/assets and 
assets/employees) is not significant. The difference added by the next 
five variables (equity/assets, assets/employees, deposit growth, loan 
income/gross loans, and interest on deposits/time and savings) is not 
significant. The appropriate F-statistics and their degrees of freedom 
are as follows: 
addition of the eleventh variable 1.872 1,29 
addition of the eleventh and 
twelfth 1.549 2,28 
addition of eleventh through 
fifteenth variable .64 5,25 
The ability of the ten variables used to discriminate is confirmed. These 
variables provide the basis for analysis of the turnaround process pre¬ 
sented in the next chapter. 
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Table 22 
Full Set of Predictors of 4th Year, Impure Groups; 
Discriminant Analysis Results 
Wilk's Lambda: .1807332 Sig.: .0146 
Canonical Correlation: .9051336 
Classification Functions 
Turnaround Decline 
vl -179.1437 44.62549 
v2 21761.60 23112.58 
v3 30807.72 -31735.12 
v4 5862.585 4575.558 
v5 -8710.018 -8222.437 
v6 -37880.55 -36310.80 
v7 -326.5968 -625.8414 
v8 2.222433 -4.447415 
v9 8.896036 9.931354 
vlO .1364018 .1453683 
vll 1674.960 1602.135 
vl2 348.0551 308.0456 
vl3 12474.96 12674.52 
vl4 -459.0847 -245.1863 
vl5 657.3229 634.1490 
vl6 -34911.50 -33190.96 
vl7 -17490.26 -19282.35 
vl8 6642.754 7352.675 
vl9 -.07082744 -1.637793 
v20 10250.75 8307.480 
v21 -79.12942 38.96393 
v22 -112.3703 -211.6190 
v23 39.73829 88.61458 
(constant) -1212.173 -1233.946 
Standardized Discriminant Coefficients 
vl 2.06803 
v2 3.34598 
v3 -1.92102 
v4 -4.17855 
v5 .81107 
v6 4.43454 
v7 -1.65960 
v8 -4.68766 
v9 .36261 
vlO .73854 
(continued) 
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Table 22 (continued) 
vll -1.61944 
vl2 -2.90999 
vl3 .47829 
vl4 .47431 
vl5 -.13891 
vl6 1.20361 
vl7 -1.66500 
vl8 1.89638 
vl9 -2.65084 
v20 -1.30506 
v21 2.62659 
v22 -2.09732 
v23 .50824 
Classification Matrices 
Without Bias Correction 
Predicted 
1 2 
Actual 1 16 1 
2 0 20 
% correctly classified 97.3 
1 - decline 
2 = turnaround 
Lachenbruch Method 
Predicted 
1 2 
Actual 1 12 5 
2 9 11 
/ correctly classified 62.2 
Box's m: could not be computed 
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Table 23 
Reduced Set of Predictor Variables: Sixth Year, Impure Group 
Wilk's Lambda: .4358903 Sig.: .0017 
Canonical Correlation: .7510724 
Classification Functions 
Decline Turnaround 
v8 1.621612 1.563296 
v5 374.0923 186.3944 
v4 196.3570 117.3750 
v21 41.49195 56.84478 
vl6 6.897981 550.1231 
vl7 -124.2870 546.5059 
v23 67.72046 84.94623 
vl -23.23303 -21.13189 
vl3 2803.889 3045.806 
v2 1227.104 1335.434 
(constant) -135.8100 -146.6344 
Standardized Discriminant Correlations Between 
Coefficients Disc. Function and Variables 
v8 .09427 v8 -.61015 
v5 .47353 v5 .59595 
v4 .43212 v4 .58841 
v21 -.51845 v21 -5.2274 
vl6 -.72795 vl6 .50830 
vl7 -.77552 vl7 -.50695 
v23 -.46402 v23 -.43701 
vl -.06291 vl -.41160 
vl5 -.44302 vl5 —.36444 
v2 -.45245 v2 .36086 
Classification Matrices 
Without Bias Correction Lachenbruch Method 
Predicted Predicted 
1 2 1 2 
Actual 1 14 2 Actual 1 11 5 
2 3 22 2 6 19 
% correctly classified 87.8 % correctly classified 73.2 
1 = decline 
2 = turnaround 
Box's M 160.53 F: 2.0331 Sign.: .0000 
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In the sixth year, the test of equal covariance between the groups, 
the Box's M statistic, finds statistical significance. Since the null 
hypothesis of this test is that the covariances are equal, the null mist 
be rejected. In essence, the data violate the assumption of equal dis¬ 
persion among the groups. However, this violation may not be serious. 
Miile it is often suggested that the use of the quadratic discriminant 
function is more appropriate under these conditions, there is some evi¬ 
dence that the linear function is satisfactory if the dispersion matrices 
are not too different (Lachenbruch, 1975). Furthermore, with a different 
sample size and a large number of variables, there is a conservative bias 
in the test. The null hypothesis is frequently rejected when the groups 
are in fact of equal dispersion. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
the use of linear discriminant analysis is appropriate. 
Discriminant analysis on factor scores. The process of comparing twenty 
three performance variables is, at best, unwieldly and at worst, impos¬ 
sible. The reduced number of variables lends simplicity to the data by 
finding a subset of the data which captures the difference between the 
groups. Since the performance variables are grouped into eight differ¬ 
ent classes, another approach to simplifying the analysis is available. 
This approach involves the construction of an index to represent each 
group of variables, and then using these indices as independent variables 
in the discrimant analysis. This approach is attempted and the results 
presented in this section. 
A method for building indices is the use of factor analysis. Fac¬ 
tor analysis is the general name for a wide ranging number of techniques 
which can be used to analyze data. The method used in this specific 
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approach is principal factoring (Kim, 1975). Principal factoring involves 
the construction of factors through the principal components. The method 
is equivalent to the method discussed in a previous section. A trans¬ 
formation matrix is constructed which will transform the original data 
into a new data set, which is a linear extension of the first data set. 
This new data set is composed of uncorrelated independent variables. 
Each case can be scored through the use of these new independent vari¬ 
ables . 
Mathematically, the factor score matrix, F, is: 
-1/2 
F = (ZV)L , where Z = original data in standard form 
V = the transformation vector 
L = dispersion matrix of transformed vari¬ 
ables 
In the context of this study, the index is built on each group of 
variables, for the first factor. The first factor captures the major 
portion of the variance in the original data; it can be used without loss 
of a major portion of the explanatory information. The indices are built 
as follows: 
Profit Index 
F- = (Z.V.)L"1/2, where F- is the score of the ith case 
i i J 1 
Z^ is the standardized observation for 
the ith case on variables one, two, 
and three (net income/aver, equity; 
return on earning assets; net intern¬ 
es t/eaming assets) 
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Vj is the transformation vector for the 
first factor 
L is the variance of the first factor. 
Expense Control Measure Index: This index is built from the vari¬ 
ables : 
operating expense/earning assets 
overhead/earning assets 
interest on deposits/all deposits 
interest on deposits/time and savings 
The employee utilization index is built from the variables which 
measure employee utilization; the asset management index is built from 
the variables in the asset management class, and so forth. A total of 
eight indices are built, to compute eight scores. The coefficients used 
to compute the scores are listed on Table #24. For each index, the per¬ 
cent of variance captured by the first factor is also listed. 
These factor scores are then subjected to a discriminant analysis. 
The purpose of the discriminant analysis is twofold: first, to confirm 
that there is discrimination between the decline and turnaround groups 
during phase 2 (this is entirely equivalent to our original hypothesis); 
second, to ascertain which scores contribute the discriminatory power. 
Since these scores reflect performance dimensions, any score which con¬ 
tributes to discrimination in the turnaround process is an area of prac¬ 
tical concern for the management which may attempt to enact a turnaround. 
The discriminant analysis on the factor scores of the pure groups is 
significant for year three (at the .05 level). For the impure groups, 
the discrimination is significant in years three, four, and six. The 
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Table 24 
Eight Indices Constructed from 23 Variables and the 
Coefficients for each Variable 
Index Variables 
A Variance 
captured 
by first 
factor Coefficients 
Profit Net income/average equity 
Return on earning assets 
Net in teres t/eaming assets 
46.1 -.36232 
+.59824 
+.48362 
Expense 
Control 
Operating expense/earning 
assets 
Overhead/earning assets 
Interest on deposits/all 
deposits 
Interest on deposits/ 
time & savings 
52.7 +.47082 
+.34651 
+.36207 
+.03453 
Employee 
Utilization 
Net income/employees 
Payroll expense/employees 
Assets/employees 
62.2 +.41594 
+.34080 
+.49706 
Asset 
Management 
Gross loans/all deposits 
Cash and treasuries/demand 
deposits 
52.0 -.69350 
+.69350 
Revenue 
Enhancement 
Loan income/gross loans 
Securities income/securities 
Municipals income/municipals 
44.8 .59532 
.45952 
.42332 
Credit Quality 
Control 
Loan loss provision/earning 
assets 
Gross chargeoffs/loans 
92.7 +.51935 
-.51935 
Leverage and 
Loss Coverage 
Equity/assets 
Loan loss coverage ratio 
Reserve/loans 
47.2 +.56198 
-.24003 
+.57653 
Growth Asset growth 
Deposit growth 
Equity growth 
71.5 +.44147 
+.44246 
+.27506 
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successful discrimination in year three is contrary to previous results 
and may be due in part to the reduced variance of the factor scores. 
The discriminant analysis on the full data set, and the chow test, indi¬ 
cate that the groups are the same in year 3. The classification success 
of the impure groups is 72.1% in year six in a classification by the 
Lachenbruch method. 
The results of the discriminant analysis on the factor scores for the 
sixth year analysis on impure groups are presented on Table #25. These 
results are chosen for full presentation for three reasons: first, they 
represent the major focus of interest for this study; second, in terms 
of level of significance (significant at .01 level), they represent the 
best discriminatory model; third, given the performance of the full and 
reduced sets of predictor variables, year 6 of the impure groups provides 
the most information about the turnaround process. 
Tests of Alternative Hypotheses 
While the twenty three performance variables analyzed through the use 
of t-tests and discriminant analysis explain much of the variation in 
performance between the groups of banks, they can't explain all the vari¬ 
ation in performance. These performance variables are variables which 
management can directly control through strategic choice. There are var¬ 
iables which are beyond the control of management, which may contribute 
to the decline or turnaround process. While it would not be possible to 
test all the extraneous factors which might impact performance, there 
are some factors which can be tested. The factors which may impact per¬ 
formance are regional economic conditions, size of the bank, and structure 
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Table 25 
Discriminant Analysis on Factor Scores: 
Sixth Year, Impure Groups 
Wilk's Lambda: .5454251 Sig.: .0042 
Canonical Correlation: .6742217 
Classification Functions 
Decline Turnaround 
Profit index -.10008 -.1980206 
Expense control index .6230481 -.1746864 
Employee use index .410944 1.039799 
Asset mgt. index -.03198 -.00489839 
Revenue mgt. index 1.623009 2.885811 
Credit Q.C. index 1.208532 .283031 
Leverage & loss index -1.358098 -.6523558 
Growth index -.3961221 .7276484 
(constant) -2.860673 -2.313965 
Standardized Discriminant Correlations Between 
Coefficients Disc. Function and Variables 
Profit index .0559 
Expense control index .29655 
Employee use index -.40984 
Asset mgt. index -.01543 
Revenue mgt. index -.40309 
Credit Q.C. index .38939 
Leverage & loss index -.27888 
Growth index -.37674 
Expense control index 
Credit Q.C.index 
Growth index 
Employee use index 
Profit index 
Leverage & loss index 
Revenue mgt. index 
Asset mgt. index 
.69495 
.68215 
-.59620 
-.56623 
.56191 
-.34441 
.14281 
.12267 
Classification Matrices 
Without Bias Correction 
Predicted 
1 2 
Actual 1 16 1 
2 6 20 
% correctly classified 83.7 
1 = decline 
2 = turnaround 
Lachenbruch Method 
Predicted 
1 2 
Actual 1 12 5 
2 7 19 
% correctly classified 72.1 
F: 1.9089 Box's M 88.96 Sig.: .0011 
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of the bank. The hypothesis is that these extraneous factors will not 
have a significant effect on the net income of the sample banks for the 
period of the turnaround. The test of the hypothesis is a durrmy regres¬ 
sion model, where net income is the dependent variable, and the indepen¬ 
dent variable is a dunroy variable which represents economic regions, or 
bank structure. The test of the hypothesis for bank size is a regression 
of asset size against net income. Net income is an imprecise measure, as 
net income which is large for a small bank is small for a large bank; 
therefore, tests are also run with profit measures as dependent variables. 
The profit measures are: net income/average equity, return on earning 
assets, and net in teres t/eaming assets. 
The study adopts the taxonomy of the Compustat tapes to operation¬ 
alize regional economic conditions. Banks which report to the Compustat 
system are divided into five regions: eastern, southeastern, midwestern, 
southwestern, and west coast. While this division is arbitrary, the 
division does represent much of the character of the regions that each 
bank performs in. The tests run herein do not address the differences 
between the regions for that is beyond the scope of this study. They only 
serve to test for the presence of differences. 
The study adopts a single variable to analyze the impact of bank 
structure. Banks can either be unit banks, wherein the corporation con¬ 
trols one bank; or multi-bank organizations, wherein the corporation 
owns all or most of many banks, each of which has its own management 
structure. The categorization of a bank is based on a review of its 
history as reported in Moody's, and/or a review of its annual reports. 
This structural alternative is beyond the control of management in the 
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banking industry because of the impact of state banking laws. Some state 
banking laws sanction the multi-bank holding arrangement, while others 
don't. Traditional studies which assess the impact of bank structure on 
performance compare the performance of unit banks to holding companies. 
This particular study is different in that the entire sample consists of 
holding companies. In the context of this study, the unit structured 
bank is one which has only a single domestic bank within the corporate 
umbrella. The corporation has other companies (leasing companies, etc.), 
and in some cases, interests in foreign banks. 
The study adopts asset size as a measure of the bank's size. There 
are other measures available, such as deposit size, earnings, number of 
employees, or number of branches. Asset size is a popular measure of 
bank size; it should closely correlate with all measures of bank size. 
One option for analyzing the effect of asset size on performance is to 
group banks by size, such as small vs. large banks, or small vs. medium 
vs. large. This grouping might be accomplished through the use of arbi¬ 
trary break points in groups at the median or at quartiles. Since the 
banks in this study are all large in comparison to the majority of com¬ 
mercial banks, this discrete grouping procedure is not advantageous. 
Therefore, a dumny variable is not used to test this hypothesis. 
The results of these tests are reported on Table #26. 
Regional difference account for some of the variation in performance 
on net income and net interest/earning assets. Given recent attention to 
the problems of decline in the north and east, and the growth of the sun 
belt, the finding that there is some difference in performance presents no 
surprise. The rather weak explanation that regional differences provide 
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Table 26 
Results of 
Tests of Alternate Hypotheses 
A) Regional Conditions 
Dependent Variable 
Net income/average equity 
Return on earning assets 
Net interest/earning assets 
Net income 
B) Structure 
Dependent Variable 
Net income/average equity 
Return on earning assets 
Net interest/earning assets 
Net income 
C) Size 
Dependent Variable 
Net income/average equity 
Return on earning assets 
Net interest/earning assets 
Net income 
R2 Sig. Sig. Betas 
.02995 .044 East, southeast 
.01434 .325 — 
.15533 .000 Southeast, midwest 
southwest 
.19299 .000 East, southeast, 
midwes t, sou thwes t 
R2 Sig. Sig. Betas 
.00230 .388 — 
.02995 .002 Structure 
.0032 .746 — 
.00582 .169 — 
R2 Sig. Sig. Betas 
.00027 .769 — 
.00927 .083 — 
.13719 .000 Asset size 
.92142 .000 Asset size 
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for performance confirms the ability of management to achieve turnaround 
even in regions that are not as conducive as others. 
Several caveats are necessary in presenting the results of this 
test. First, the nature of the test compares each region to a base re¬ 
gion, which in this case is the west. Where the test finds differences, 
it is only differences by pairwise comparison to the west region. Cer¬ 
tainly, further tests could be made, but they are beyond the scope of 
this study. Second, the differences do not suggest that the process of 
turnaround and decline matches regional borders. There are decline and 
turnaround banks in each region. In general, both the geographic distri¬ 
bution of declines and the results of this test confirm that the north 
and east presented tougher problems for bankers than the south and west. 
But there were turnarounds in the tough regions, and there were declines 
in the growth regions. The following table presents the number of de¬ 
cline banks and turnaround banks by region: 
Decline Turnaround 
East 10 8 
Southeast 3 4 
Midwest 3 i0 
Southwest 1 5 
West 3 4 
This test also provides no means for assessing the exact nature of the 
differences within the regions; surely, the differences could be internal 
to the banks, as well as in external events. 
The test of the impact of structure show that on only one measure 
dues structure have any impact on the performance variables, and for that 
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measure the impact is minimal. For seme reason, return on earning assets 
is related to structure, but the relationship explains only a small por¬ 
tion (2.9%) of the variance. 
The test of the influence of asset size shows that the asset size 
impacts the net interest/earning assets profitability measure, and net 
income. The explanation for the influence on the former variable is elu¬ 
sive. The explanation for the impact of asset size on net income is read¬ 
ily apparent; as the size of a firm increases, its net income should also 
increase. Since this increase in net income does not always lead to an 
increase in profitability, the impact of size is not a central issue in 
this study. Indeed, the lack of relationship between size and the first 
two measures of profitability confirm that size is not a major factor in 
the turnaround process. 
The results of these tests lead to a cautious acceptance of the hy*- 
pothesis. The extraneous factors tested do not explain the turnaround 
process. They may impact the turnaround process in some minor ways, but 
they are not the major explanatory factor in the process. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
This chapter presents an in-depth discussion of the findings pre¬ 
sented in the previous chapter. The discussion starts with preliminary 
comments about the sample, and then proceeds to consider the key find¬ 
ings of the statistical analysis. Ihe purpose of this chapter is to pre¬ 
sent a picture of the decline and turnaround process, as described 
through statistical analysis. The next chapter will present the results 
of a review of literature on each of the sample banks, in an attempt to 
compare qualitative and quantitative findings. The qualitative analysis 
includes the reports of management at the time of the turnaround; these 
reports should prove valuable aids to the research. 
This chapter includes four sections: first, a discussion of the 
sample; second, a discussion of the results of analysis on phase 1; third, 
a discussion of the results of the analysis on phase 2; finally, a sum¬ 
mary. 
The Sample 
The sample is limited to large banks. This only presents a problem 
if the results of the study are generalized to small banks. The findings 
of this study can only be used accurately to assess the turnaround proc¬ 
ess in large banks. 
The sample is well distributed geographically. While there is a 
large concentration of eastern banks, this concentration may not be 
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unusual in that there are more eastern banks represented on the Compustat 
tapes than any other region. There are both decline banks and turnaround 
banks in every geographic region. 
The time factor of the decline and turnaround process is interesting. 
All but two of the banks in the sample entered their decline after 1969. 
The sparsity of declines in the earlier years of the study indicate that 
the banking industry or the economy may have changed in the late sixties 
in some way. This has been suggested by many authorities (e.g., Baker, 
1978). After a period of uninterrupted economic growth accompanied by 
relatively stable interest rates, a new period of slower growth inter¬ 
rupted by recession and accompanied by large variations in the interest 
rate changed the pattern of the banking industry. These changes, generic 
in part to the banking industry, were accompanied by the overall growth 
in social demands that affected banks as well as other industries. In 
theoretical terms, the environment might have changed from a stable to a 
turbulent one (Emery and Trist, 1965). While it is beyond the scope of 
this study to analyze the differences over time, these differences do sug¬ 
gest that the results of this study may be limited to times of turbulence. 
The fact that the turbulence did not affect all banks in the same manner 
supports the contention that there is something to learn from those banks 
that did turnaround. 
2 
The results of the regression in terms of the R suggest that the 
variables chosen for this study do capture a substantial proportion of 
2 
the variance in net incane performance. The R are consistently high, 
with the best performance in the impure groups. 
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Phase 1 
Rate of decline. The hypothesis that there would be a significant dif¬ 
ference in rate of decline between the two groups was not supported. The 
difference was not significant at a meaningful level of statistical sig¬ 
nificance. However, there is an interesting phenomena to observe here. 
The study defined decline as a relative decline in net income. Perform¬ 
ance for each bank is compared to industry performance, and thus defined 
as decline or growth. In the sample groups, the banks which turnaround 
have absolute rates of decline; -36.8% for the pure groups, and -9.59% 
for the impure groups, while the banks which don' t turnaround have rela¬ 
tive rates of decline; that is, their net income increased, but at a rate 
slower than that of the industry; for pure groups, net income of decline 
banks increased .73% while in impure groups the increase was .34%. While 
the difference is not statistically significant, this finding suggests 
that management does not react to relative performance declines as quickly 
as it does to absolute declines. Slow growth, even if it is slower than 
industry average, is still growth. Slow growth is accepted and tolerated 
more often than absolute decline. Absolute decline may be the shock which 
spurs management into action. 
Phase 1 t-tests. Contrary to initial hypotheses, there are some differ¬ 
ences in mean performance between the groups. A discussion of the analy¬ 
sis of pure groups is presented, followed by a discussion of the analysis 
of impure groups. 
For pure groups, there are many significant differences in the per¬ 
formance of the independent variables. These differences were tested 
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through the use of t-tests; performance was defined as change in the in¬ 
dependent variables over time. 
The profitability measure of net in teres t/eaming assets improves 
for turnaround banks on phase 1, while it declines for the decline group. 
However, while net interest performance is improving, the non-interest 
expenses of turnaround groups are climbing more quickly. Operating ex- 
pense/eaming assets and overhead/eaming assets both increase irore dra¬ 
matically for the turnaround groups than for the decline groups. Inter¬ 
est expense as measured by interest on deposits/time and savings is in¬ 
creasing for both groups, but at a slower rate in the turnaround group. 
The turnaround groups have much slower increase in employee utilization, 
as measured by assets/employees. In the area of revenue enhancement, 
the turnaround groups are outperforming the decline groups. Loan income/ 
gross loans is declining for the decline group, and increasing for the 
turnaround group. Municipal income follows the same pattern. While 
securities income is growing for both groups, it is growing more quickly 
for the turnaround group. The turnaround groups are apparently suffering 
mere loan losses, as the loans loss provision/eaming assets ratio in¬ 
creases at a greater rate for the turnaround groups. The equity/assets 
ratio declines for both groups, but it declines more dramatically for the 
non-turnaround group (this group is increasing leverage at a faster rate). 
Both assets and deposits grow at a slower rate for the turnaround groups. 
The pure turnaround groups during phase 1 is improving its revenue 
performance, but non-interest costs are growing at a rate which counter¬ 
acts the improved revenue performance. In addition, loan losses are con¬ 
tributing to the decline in performance. Decline groups are increasing 
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assets and deposits faster than turnaround groups, but this increase does 
not result in a better record of performance in revenue enhancement. 
However, costs are not increasing as dramatically for the decline group 
as they are for the turnaround group. 
For the impure groups, a similar performance picture emerges, al¬ 
though the number of significant differences between the groups declines. 
The turnaround group's expenses for overhead are increasing more quickly 
during phase 1, while-their expenses for deposits are increasing less 
quickly. There is a slower growth in assets/employee for the turnaround 
groups, there is a greater increase in municipal income, and there is 
slower deposit growth. 
While both groups have declined during phase 1, there are some dif¬ 
ferences in performance even at this early stage of the turnaround proc¬ 
ess. Given the fact that these differences are unexpected, and complex, 
we can only suggest what they might be based on the previous analysis. 
Banks which will turnaround can attribute their decline to cost control 
problems. They might also contribute their decline to credit quality 
control problems. They generate revenue at a better rate than the de¬ 
cline banks, while the decline banks are increasing the level of assets, 
and deposits, but not improving their margins on this increased volume. 
A clearer picture of these unexpected performance differences should 
emerge after a consideration of the phase 2 performance in the next sec¬ 
tion. 
Even though there are differences in some performance trends during 
phase 1, the turnaround and decline groups are not different at this 
point. The discriminant analysis shows no significant differences between 
Ill 
the groups during year 1 and year 3, when the twenty three variables of 
performance are analyzed. 
Phase 2 
During phase 2, there are several differences between the decline and 
turnaround groups, as hypothesized. The performance differences that ap¬ 
peared in the groups during phase 1 begin to reverse themselves. This 
section will compare the performance differences between the decline and 
the turnaround groups during phase 2, while also comparing some of the 
results of phase 2 to phase 1. A discussion of the t-tests on the pure 
groups precedes a discussion of the t-tests on the impure groups. Then, a 
discussion of the discriminant analysis for the impure groups is presented. 
The t-tests on performance measures for pure groups show several dif¬ 
ferences. Return on earning assets is increasing at a faster rate for 
the decline group than for the turnaround group. This is a surprising 
situation, unless we consider the performance in phase 1, when the turn¬ 
around groups had better performance on a different profit measure. Ap¬ 
parently, the turnaround groups improve their profit performance early in 
the decline; the decline groups react later. While they are improving 
at a better rate than the turnaround group, this performance is too late 
to counteract the decline. 
The expense control performance sheds further light on this recov¬ 
ery process. Operating expense/earning assets and overhead/eaming 
assets are increasing at a greater rate for the decline groups. This is 
a complete reversal of phase 1 performance. As with the turnaround 
groups in phase 1, the increased expenses for the decline groups in phase 
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2 counteract any gains made in revenue performance. This comparison is 
confirmed by observing performance on the loan income/gross loans ratio. 
The decline group is improving performance at a better rate than the 
turnaround group. During phase 1, the decline group was deteriorating 
on this measure. They have now reversed this decline, but do not see 
the returns from this reversal during phase 2. 
The employee utilization measure, assets/employees, displays a sinr- 
ilar reversal. During phase 2, the turnaround group is increasing per¬ 
formance on this measure at a greater rate than the non-turnaround group. 
When considered in conjunction with the behavior of operating expense, 
this suggests that the turnaround process requires some investment before 
the turnaround begins. Initially, this investment contributes to further 
decline, but bears returns in the form of a turnaround later on. Whereas 
during phase 1, asset growth had been slower for the turnaround group, 
now the rate of asset growth is statistically equivalent for both groups. 
Perhaps the change can be attributed to the utilization of employees. 
The final measure which reflects differences on t-tests between the 
pure groups is the rate of growth in the loan loss provisions. This 
measure is increasing for the decline group, and decreasing for the turn¬ 
around group. This is, again, a reversal of trends from phase 1. The 
turnaround group is improving its quality control, while the decline 
group is just beginning to experience quality control problems. 
In the analysis of performance trends for phase 2 for the impure 
groups, a similar pattern appears, although not quite as dramatically 
as in the pure group case. The decline groups suffer a higher level of 
growth in operating expense/earnings assets; this is a reversal of the 
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phase 1 trend (however, the difference in phase 1 appeared in overhead 
rather than operating expenses). Deposit growth over this three year 
period is higher for the turnaround group than for the decline group; 
again, this is a reversal of the pattern. Asset growth is higher for the 
turnaround group than for the decline group, while cash & treasuries/ 
demand deposit accounts grow at a faster rate for the decline group. The 
higher rate of growth in cash and treasuries might explain the lower net 
interest margin of the decline group as these are not highly profitable 
uses of money. 
The discriminant analysis of the sixth year impure group provides a 
concise comparison of the differences between the groups. This discrim¬ 
ination was successful when a reduced set of ten predictor variables was 
used. The variables which provided the most correlation were: net in¬ 
come/employees, overhead/eaming assets, operating expense/earning assets, 
asset growth, loan loss provision/earning assets, gross chargeoffs/loans. 
These variables ranged in correlation from .50693 to .61015 (absolute 
values). The structure correlation matrix for the full set of ten vari¬ 
ables can be found on Table #23. 
For each of these important variables, the group means provide in¬ 
sight into the differences between the groups. Turnaround banks have 
higher net income per employee than decline banks; they have lower over¬ 
head and operating expenses. The turnaround banks have higher asset 
growth during the sixth year than decline banks; their loan loss provi¬ 
sions are lower, as are their gross chargeoffs. Less important (but 
still distinctive) differences are found in the equity growth, net in¬ 
cane/average equity, municipal income/municipals, and return on earning 
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assets variables. The turnaround group of banks have better performance 
on three of these variables. Somewhat surprisingly, the turnaround banks 
have a slightly lower average return on earning assets. This finding of 
lower return highlights the importance of expense control and loan qual¬ 
ity variables. 
Sumnary 
In order to sumnarize the results of the findings to this point, it 
is useful to present an analysis of the factor scores for the sixth year 
of the turnaround. The factor scores lend simplicity to this process 
because they present the discriminating power of each group of variables, 
rather than each individual variable. Table #25 lists the results which 
this discussion relies on. 
The most important discriminating groups of variables as judged by 
their correlation with the discriminant function are: expense control, 
credit quality control, growth, employee utilization measures, and profit 
measures. These results, combined with previous analysis, indicate the 
importance that expense control measures and quality control of the loan 
portfolio lend to the turnaround process. 
One way of comparing these groups is by a consideration of their mean 
scores on the discriminant function. These scores are called group cen¬ 
troids. The group centroid for the decline group is 1.10244, while the 
group centroid for the turnaround group is -.72083. By comparing the 
signs of the group centroids with the signs of the standardized coeffi¬ 
cients, we can build a profile of the difference between case in each 
group. The signs of the standardized variables are as follows. 
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Profit index + 
Expense control index + 
Employee utilization - 
Asset management index 
Revenue management index 
Credit q.c. index + 
Leverage and loss index + 
Growth index + 
Banks which score high on the employee utilization measures, the asset 
management measures, and the revenue management measures while scoring 
low on the profit index, which reflects the previous finding about the 
lower return on earning assets in turnaround groups, the expense control 
index, the credit quality control index, which implies good quality con¬ 
trol, the leverage and loss index, and the growth index are turnaround 
banks. Banks which score low on the employee utilization asset manage¬ 
ment and revenue management index while scoring high on the remaining in¬ 
dices are decline banks. If we restrict attention to the most important 
predictors, we can assert that the difference between the groups lies in 
the fact that turnaround banks have low overhead and operating expense, 
and have low levels of loan losses, while the decline banks do not. Since 
these differences are not evident during phase 1, the turnaround banks 
successfully implemented cost control and credit quality control strate¬ 
gies. 
The following chart sumnarizes the process of the turnaround. This 
chart combines the findings of the t-tests and the discriminant analysis. 
The chart lists the 10 variables which were found to discriminate the 
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Table 27 
Pattern of Means for Key Discriminators 
of Turnaround and Decline 
- Turnaround Banks 
1 = Significant difference in phase 1 or 2. 
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impure groups during the sixth year, and traces the mean performance of 
the impure groups throughout the six years of study. The statistically 
significant performance trends for phase 1 and phase 2 are noted. The 
chart captures the process of turnaround graphically: the fact that many 
of the trend changes for the turnaround group appear in years three and 
four of the decline suggest that the turnaround strategy requires early 
identification, and that it takes time to enact the turnaround. 
The foregoing discussion of the statistical analysis reflects the 
complexity of the turnaround process. The next chapter presents the re¬ 
sults of a review of the literature to ascertain management's perception 
of the turnaround process. Before this review, a restatement of the re¬ 
sults of this chapter will prove useful. First, the decline and turn¬ 
around banks are statistically equal during the first phase. Certain 
performance trends are different for the turnaround banks in the first 
phase, however. The turnaround banks recognize loan losses early in the 
stage of decline. They also recognize income improvements early in the 
decline, but they experience a growth in expenses that outweighs their 
income gains. During the turnaround, this experience is reversed. The 
turnaround banks slow their growth in income generation, but their ex¬ 
penses decline. The banks that continue to decline experience loan losses 
and increases in expense. The key components in the turnaround effort 
are the control of expenses and the control of loan quality. 
CHAPTER VI 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents an in-depth review of the history of the sam¬ 
ple banks during the six year period of the study. The major source of 
the information developed in this chapter is the material supplied by 
the banks. Each bank in the sample was asked to supply copies of their 
annual report for the period of the decline and turnaround. In addition, 
the banks were requested to supply any other information: staff reports, 
published articles, etc., that might be available in their libraries. 
The response rate was as follows: 
Table 28 
Response Rate of Sample Banks to Inquiry 
Total Response Percent 
Pure turnaround 8 5 75% 
Pure decline 7 6 71.4% 
Inconsistent turnaround 23 4 17.3% 
Inconsistent decline 13 8 61.5% 
The response rate was much higher for the pure groupings than for the im¬ 
pure groupings. Since perfect response was not expected, this informa¬ 
tion was supplemented by a review of the banking literature to analyze 
published reports about the experience of the banks. 
The information presented herein must be accepted with caution. It 
can be argued that annual reports and published reports do not reflect 
the true conditions of the performance of each bank. In some cases, 
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the annual report may serve more as public relations than public informa¬ 
tion. Since the report is subject to reviews by such client audiences 
as auditors, the board of directors, stockholders, and public agencies, 
there is some control over the content of the document. The matched 
analysis of the subjective discussion of the firm's performance with the 
objective performance data of this study improves the potential for de¬ 
veloping a true picture of the firm's position. 
The Strategies Developed for Turnaround 
Based on a review of the annual reports, a wide range of strategies 
appears pertinent to the effort of reversing declines. These strategies 
appear on Table #29; this section defines each of the strategies. The 
following section compares the differences in strategies between the de¬ 
cline and turnaround group. The strategies are presented in order of 
their frequency of appearance. 
The most frequently used strategies are the development of a new struc¬ 
ture and the use of cost controls. The new structure can take any one of 
several forms. In some cases, the new structure adopted is the holding 
company structure. In other cases, the new structure is the change from a 
multi bank holding company to a single bank holding company. In many 
cases, the change in structure involves a redefined reporting relation¬ 
ship within the corporate structure. Certain operations such as market¬ 
ing and/or loan policy are centralized through the mechanism of an office 
in corporate headquarters which reports directly to the chief executive 
officer. In many cases, the new structure is designed to meet the market 
environment; the structure is organized on the basis of geography or on 
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Table 29 
Frequency Count of Strategies 
Enacted During Phase 1 and Phase 2 
as Reported by 'turnaround and Decline Banks 
New structure 
Cost controls 
New business 
Reduct ion in problem loans 
Marketing 
Reduction in personnel 
Acquisition 
Targets 
Plans 
Control of loan risks 
Credit rat ioni,ng/decrease 
sensi t i vi Ly 
Now branches/nrplace branches 
New const jnmr services 
New markets 
tntemat ionai expansion 
Rrjst rict ing growth 
New technology in operations 
Change market del initLon 
New liead man 
I J<w manngrjw'nt team 
Increase d/mand ckjposits 
relative Lo time k savings 
Increase staffing 
Inr reased service charges 
Merge branelu'S 
Liquidate subsidi/irins 
Inrrnasnd emt rnl iSMit ion 
Increased training 
Work simpl i f ication/marvi; .'ni 
Sel 1 or close branches 
Increase cor r<*sj[x/iv lent activity 
Reduce di v<n si f icat ion 
Uiange Staff compliant ion 
Increase dejxjsit base 
Di veroil/ Joan j/oi t fol to 
10'duct \ <iu in loan voLume 
Huttage portfolio /ui/I lo/in d<nwud 
Turnaround 
Banks 
Decline 
Banks Total 
7 9 16 
6 10 16 
8 7 15 
5 8 13 
7 5 12 
5 7 12 
6 5 11 
4 7 11 
4 7 11 
4 7 11 
4 7 11 
5 5 10 
6 4 10 
5 4 9 
5 4 9 
1 5 6 
3 3 6 
l 5 6 
2 3 5 
2 3 5 
2 2 4 
4 4 
2 2 4 
4 4 
4 4 
4 4 
3 3 
1 2 3 
l 2 3 
L 1 2 
1 1 2 
1 1 
1 1 
l 1 
1 1 
i 1 
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the basis of customer grouping. Quite often, the structural adaption is 
of mixed breed; customer or geography based structures are combined with 
centralized key departments. A final type of structural arrangement is 
the profit center concept; the company is organized around several busi¬ 
ness components that can be measured on profit performance. This profit 
center concept does not necessarily match the makeup of businesses within 
the corporation; there can be more than one profit center within a single 
business. 
The review of annual reports identifies cost control as a key com¬ 
ponent of the turnaround effort, but offers little information as to the 
form these cost controls take. In general, there are two important classes 
of cost controls within the conmercial bank industry: interest costs and 
non-interest costs. Of these, interest costs for the higher component. 
Many banks regard interest costs as given; diat is, interest costs are de¬ 
termined by the market and cannot be influenced by the bank* In these 
cases, the cost control effort is concentrated on the control of non¬ 
interest expenses. The most important non-interest expenses are occupancy 
expenses and personnel expenses. In some cases, the banks do recognize 
that they can exercise some control over interest expense. Several strat¬ 
egies which can be classified as cost control strategies appear in this 
set of strategies; they shall be discussed in order. 
The development of new business is a frequently mentioned strategy. 
As with all businesses, new business can take several forms. New busi¬ 
ness can be old products sold to new customers, new business can be old 
products sold to old customers, it can be new products sold to new cus¬ 
tomers, and it can be new products sold to old customers (Gutmann, 1964). 
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The generation of new bank business follows all patterns. 
The reduction in problem loan strategy appears frequently in the 
sample. This strategy usually involves the development of a new proce¬ 
dure for reviewing the status of loans. For example, the non-payment 
period that is used to identify problem loans is reduced, so that poten¬ 
tial problems are recognized earlier. These potential problems are then 
reviewed by a committee to ascertain the potential for future payment. 
In most cases, a team of specialists is developed who spend full time on 
the problem loans. They offer advice to the customers that might result 
in improved performance for the customer, i.e., give the customer the 
ability to pay the loan; they take steps to collect through legal means 
vhere all other channels fail. In some cases, the reduction in problem 
loan strategy is developed around key industries or geographical areas. 
A key industry can be depressed. The cannon case is the real estate in¬ 
dustry. A key region might be depressed for economic or other rea¬ 
sons. A team of specialists is then formed to handle these specific loan 
problems. In most cases, this strategy is extended to new loans, which 
involves sane changes in the policy lor loan approvals; limits are changed 
for loan officers, audit procedures might be tightened, or statistical 
models for classifying loans might be developed. 
'Ihe reduction in personnel strategy is one of the cost control strat¬ 
egies. Frequently, the reduction in personnel takes place through attri¬ 
tion. Al times, more active measures arc necessary. In addition to re¬ 
ductions in personnel, many oi die sample banks act to limit the costs of 
personnel by holding wage increases to inininum levels. One bonk Iroze 
executive salaries. 
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The acquisition strategy is one method for generating new business. 
It is also a method for reducing a bank's fluctuation in performance in 
some cases. The acquisition strategy is limited by regulatory agencies. 
Before 1970, the major activity in acquisitions for conmercial banks was 
in the area of bank purchases. While some banks were prohibited from 
the purchase of other banks by state regulation, many in other states 
could and did. After 1970, the banks' acquisition activity expanded due 
to passage of federal regulations which permitted commercial banks to 
engage in "bank related business" acquisitions. After 1970, there was 
a large movement by sample banks into such businesses as mortgages, leas¬ 
ing, and investment advisory services. 
The idea that the banks should have targets and plans appears fre¬ 
quently in the sample. Cccmon targets include market share, cost tar¬ 
gets, loan volume, loss volume, earning per share, and earnings. Often, 
the targets reflect the major directions of the bank's effort to change 
performance. Plans usually are limited to specific areas, such as growth 
plans or personnel plans. In some cases, banks list plans for activities 
of social concern. A few banks stress the importance of strategic plan¬ 
ning; in same cases, new departments or new procedures are developed 
for strategic planning. While not every report includes time spans in 
their planning discussion, those that do direct their plans beyond a 
single year. 
The control of loan risks and credit rationing to decrease sensi¬ 
tivity are two of the strategies which are developed to avoid problems 
in the Loan portfolio. The control of risks has been discussed previ¬ 
ously; controls include careful review of both current loans and 
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applications for loans. In some cases, particularly for those banks which 
invest in real estate investment trusts, the control of risk include a re¬ 
duction of the amount invested in a troubled industry. Credit rationing 
to decrease sensitivity is a strategy designed to protect the banks from 
variations in the market interest rate. During the 70's, the fluctuation 
of the interest rate increased dramatically in comparison to earlier dec¬ 
ades. Several times, the cost of short term money which many banks use 
to finance long term loans exceeded the return of the portfolio. Some 
banks choose to decrease their exposure to this fluctuation by matching 
their portfolios of assets and liabilities. Variable rate liabilities 
are matched with variable rate assets, and fixed rate liabilities are 
matched with fixed rate assets. The method used to accomplish this match 
is credit rationing; loan applications are reviewed, and priced with the 
match in mind. Long terra fixed rate loan business is not accepted when 
it increases the bank's sensitivity to the change in the cost of funds. 
The addition of new branches, or replacing branches, the addition 
of new consumer services, the addition of new markets are all strategies 
used to increase business. New branches are used to develop a further 
consumer base for both deposits and loans. The experience of these sam¬ 
ple banks show that the return to new branches may not appear for sev¬ 
eral years. New consumer services include automated teller machines, 
and overdraft checking. One key to the success of both new branches and 
new consumer services is a successful marketing program. The marketing 
program often involves the use of branch personnel to cross sell services, 
in an attempt to make a customer of the bank a full service customer. 
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The new market strategy is a multi-faceted one; many of the strategies 
which appear in this list are actually strategies to enter new markets. 
Restricting growth is a strategy that involves the selective pruning 
of the organization to improve its profitability and/or the discontinua¬ 
tion of acquisitions. Most often, the restricting growth strategy fol¬ 
lows a period of aggressive growth strategy. As such, this strategy is 
one that is used after other strategies have failed. Most often, this 
strategy follows an attempt to improve returns from previous growth by 
cost cutting, etc. In one case, this strategy was the initial strat¬ 
egy adopted by an organization to avoid decline. While the bank had three 
years of decline, it attributed this decline to short term economic 
trends. This judgment proved accurate, as this particular bank did en¬ 
act a turnaround. 
New technology in operations, an option chosen six times, has dra¬ 
matic impact throughout the bank industry. The growth of computer ap¬ 
plications, the advent of electronic funds transfer, and the growth of 
automated teller machines has affected all banks. The banks in the sam¬ 
ple, however, adopted new technologies in operations as a strategy to 
improve cost control. For the most part, the technology chosen applied 
to the paper processing end of the business. Systems were adopted which 
could reduce the banks' dependence on clerical help. In several cases, 
this did not mean that the bank was relying on a new generation of ma¬ 
chines, but rather that the bank was adopting a present generation of 
machines to better use. 
The strategy of changing market definition is tied to the banks 
choice of growth or restricting growth. International growth requires 
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an international market orientation, while restricting growth requires a 
regional identification. The market definitions comrunicate the bank's 
strategy to relevant markets and to bank personnel; as such, this op¬ 
tion is a subset of the strategic posture of a bank. 
The appointment of a new head man and a new management team often 
occurred simultaneously. After a short period of studying the organiza¬ 
tion, the new head man would recruit a new management team. The appoint¬ 
ment of a new chief executive officer (see note) often followed a period 
of major deterioration in the organizations performance. In one case, the 
major deterioration included several instances of fraud. In another case, 
the deterioration included public identification of the bank's declining 
position. In general, the strategies enacted by these new executives did 
not differ appreciably from the strategies of veteran managers attempting 
to turnaround performance; however, the argument might be advanced that 
the newer executives did encounter some difficulties that veteran execu¬ 
tives would not, such as employee resistance. 
One policy used to control non-interest costs is the attempt to in¬ 
crease the level of demand deposits. This strategy usually included a 
marketing component and a new services component. The banks offered in¬ 
creased services as a method of "payment" for the use of deposit money. 
This policy was in part a reaction to the increased sophistication on the 
part of the consumer, who engaged in significant amounts of disinter 
mediation during the period of this study. 
Note: In the sample, there were more than five new ceo's appointed; how¬ 
ever, many of the appointments were promotions of the second in 
conmand. These are not categorized as new head men, in that they 
had participated in the operations of the banks for years before 
the appointment. 
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Some banks increased staffing to take advantage of growth opportun¬ 
ities. The fact that this strategy appears only in the turnaround sample 
may be significant, and shall be discussed elsewhere. 
Increased service charges obviously is an attempt to increase reve¬ 
nue. Often, the increase in service charges is accompanied by a work study 
and cost accounting program to identify the costs of services more clearly. 
Merging branches and liquidating subsidiaries are part of the re¬ 
stricting growth strategy, as are selling or closing branches, reducing 
diversification and restricting loan volume. Increased centralization 
often accompanies the attempt to change structure or to control costs. 
Increased training and work simplification and management are matched with 
cost control efforts. Increased correspondent activity is a method for 
increasing the bank's market or business. 
The remaining strategies each were adopted in only one bank. These 
strategies include changing staff compensation, increasing the deposit 
base, diversifying the loan portfolio, and managing the portfolio and 
loan demand. The purpose and definition of these strategies is self evi¬ 
dent. The only comment that is required is to note that the management 
of the loan portfolio and loan demand is a philosophy of portfolio man¬ 
agement that is different than the philosophy adopted when a bank chooses 
to reduce its credit sensitivity. Whereas the credit sensitivity strat¬ 
egy seeks to reduce the bank's exposure to fluctuations in the interest 
rate, the use of the portfolio management strategy seeks to give the bank 
full advantage of this fluctuation. The bank attempts to predict the 
trends of short term interest rates, and lend accordingly. If there is 
a prediction that short term rates will fall, the bank aggressively seeks 
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long term business at the current high rate. If the prediction is that 
short term rates will rise, the bank declines current long term business 
at the current low rate and invests the money in short term securities, 
which will then be turned over at the higher rate. Of course, the suc¬ 
cess of this strategy is critically dependent upon the success of the 
predictions of interest trends. 
Sunmary of strategic choices. The classification of strategies by fre¬ 
quency does not increase our understanding of the turnaround process for 
two reasons. First, the strategies are not unique; many are grouped to¬ 
gether to form a single strategy, with several components, for a particu¬ 
lar bank. Second, there is no distinction between turnaround and decline 
through the frequency count. This section will attempt to group the 
strategies into categories that often appear together; the next section 
will discuss the difference between the turnaround and decline strategy. 
Based on the quantitative analysis of previous chapters, we can state 
that two classes of strategies are important in the turnaround process: 
cost controls, and reduction in problem loans. The quantitative analysis 
of this chapter reveals that other classes of strategies are important: 
growth, new business or restricting growth strategies. A fifth classi¬ 
fication is suggested by its frequency of appearance; that is the adop¬ 
tion of new structure. 
The cost control strategies include reduction in personnel, action 
to increase demand deposits relative to time and savings deposits, merg¬ 
ing branches, liquidating subsidiaries, increased training, work simpli¬ 
fication, closing branches, and adopting new technology to operations. 
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The strategies used to reduce the level of problem loans include con¬ 
trolling loan risks both by review of present bookings and improved pro¬ 
cedures for new bookings, credit rationing and sensitivity management, 
diversifying the loan portfolio, and managing loan portfolio and demand 
for loans. 
The new business growth strategies include acquisitions, new branches, 
new consumer services, new markets, international expansion, increased 
staffing, and increased correspondent activity. 
The strategic options for restricting growth include merging branches, 
closing or selling branches, liquidating subsidiaries, reducing diversi¬ 
fication of the corporation, and reducing loan volume. 
The adoption of a new structure often accompanies the attempt at 
turnaround. This can mean increased centralization. At times, the new 
structure is designed by a new chief executive officer and/or a new man¬ 
agement team. The alternative methods used to restructure the organiza¬ 
tion are discussed in the previous section. 
This grouping of strategies leaves a few of the original set of strat¬ 
egies unclassified. The use of targets and plans might be classified in 
all the groupings; thus, these options are not classified. The change of 
market definition might be classified with growth, restricting growth, and 
the reduction of problem loans. The use of increased service charges and 
actions to increase the deposit base are not readily classifiable. Thus, 
they remain unclassified. 
This scheme of classification does not clarify the turnaround process 
further. A distinction needs to be made between those strategies that 
lead to a turnaround and those that lead to a decline. There are two 
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methods for making this distinction; first, through the use of the quan¬ 
titative results of the previous chapter, and second, through the analy¬ 
sis of the pattern of the strategies identified in this chapter. We turn 
to the second task first. 
The Difference Between the Decline Group 
and the Turnaround Croup m Strategy Choice 
Restricting the comparison of choice differences to those instances 
where a strategy was chosen by more than one bank, there are only three 
differences in the set of strategic choices. Turnaround banks choose 
training as part of their turnaround process in three cases, while none 
of the decline banks choose training. While this difference might be due 
to chance, the pattern suggests that turnaround may require an investment 
in training to change the performance of bank employees. Decline banks 
choose the option of restricting growth more often than the turnaround 
banks. In five of six cases, in which restricted growth is observed as 
part of the strategy, the choice is not successful and does not lead 
to turnaround in the six year period of the study. Only decline banks 
choose to merge branches or liquidate subsidiaries. There are several 
possible explanations for this difference between the groups. First, 
the difference could be due to the nature of the decline. The decline 
for the turnaround groups may not have been precipitated by unprofitable 
growth, and therefore the turnaround groups need not restrict decline. 
Second, this choice of turnaround strategy may be an option of last 
choice. It may be chosen after a bank has endured a period of decline 
greater than three years. The bank may have attempted other methods of 
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turnaround before the decision to restrict growth; having failed at those; 
it adopts the restriction strategy. Third, this difference could indicate 
that the banks chose the wrong strategy initially; that is, early in the 
decline they chose to restrict growth; this choice led to further decline. 
A review of the history of the banks which chose the option of restrict¬ 
ing growth reveals that the strategy to restrict growth is a strategy of 
last choice. For the five decline banks which enacted this strategy, 
three enacted it in phase 2. The remaining two banks enacted it during 
the last year of phase 1. 
The third difference between the groups is that the decline group 
chooses the option of increased centralization in four cases, while this 
option is never mentioned in the sample of turnaround banks. This dif¬ 
ference suggests that either decentralized operations lead to a longer 
term decline than centralized operations, or that the option of increas¬ 
ing centralization requires further time to succeed, or that the option 
is not a successful one. Unfortunately, the analysis offers little in¬ 
formation which can be used to accurately access the reasons for this dif¬ 
ference. It is possible that the difference is due to chance, especially 
since many of the strategies used by both groups increase centralization 
de facto: loan limits, loan review groups, and new structure. 
The following section compares these differences to the patterns and 
differences discovered during the quantitative analysis. 
Successful and Non-Successful Strategies 
The relative lack of differences in the set of strategic choices be¬ 
tween groups suggests that the process of turnaround is not determined in 
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the act of choosing a particular strategy, but rather in the act of im¬ 
plementing a particular strategy. In general, two different banks can 
choose the same strategy to turnaround performance. That strategy might 
be successful for one bank, and not successful for the other bank. In 
other words, the success of the turnaround is critically dependent on 
management's ability to implement the strategic choice. 
There are some indications, however, that other factors impact the 
turnaround process. These factors are the timing of the strategy, and 
the nature of the decline. Recall that there are performance differences 
in the groups during phase 1 which were unanticipated at the design of 
the study. These differences could be due in part to timing. The turn¬ 
around banks experience an increase in operating expenses early in the 
decline; their loan losses increase during phase 1; their assets and de¬ 
posits grow more slowly; their loan income does not deteriorate. These 
banks may react more quickly to problem loans than the decline banks, and 
increase investment in the attempt to reduce the level of problem loans. 
Their sensitivity to problem loans influence them to choose growth oppor¬ 
tunities carefully, and to avoid some growth opportunities. Their ini¬ 
tial reaction to loan losses and their initial increased investment pay 
returns during phase 2, when their assets increase at a greater rate than 
the decline groups. 
The difference could also be due to initial strategic differences. 
The decline group during phase 1 is increasing assets and deposits, but 
it is not increasing its loan income/gross loans ratio. The decline 
group might consider that their lack of loan income is due to the start 
up costs of the increased growth. They do not react until later than 
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the turnaround group. Upon the decision to react, the initial choice is 
to enact the same types of strategies that the turnaround group enacted 
increased operating expense to pay for tighter control of loans and the 
increased effort to reduce problem loans. If this initial attempt does 
not pay off, the subsequent strategy is a decision to reduce growth. 
In all likelihood, there are more than one type of decline; there¬ 
fore, there is more than one set of responses to the decline. There may 
be a decline that is due solely to bad loan experience. This decline is 
reversed by controlled growth and improved loan control procedures. A 
second type of decline is the decline that is caused by investment in 
growth in the loan portfolio and/or in acquisitions that does not bring 
returns that justify the cost. The turnaround strategy in this case re¬ 
quires an attempt to turnaround the performance of the bad loans/acquisi¬ 
tions. If such an attempt fails, the turnaround strategy then requires 
that the bank restrict growth in some manner. Unfortunately, this turn¬ 
around strategy requires more time than the six year period analyzed by 
this study. 
Summary 
It is evident that the turnaround process is a complex one. Ignor¬ 
ing for the moment the fact that there may be different causes of the de¬ 
cline, we can assert that any turnaround attempt requires attention on 
several components of the business simultaneously. An initial increase 
in expenses may be required; for the turnaround to occur, returns must 
accrue to these expenses within a short period of time. The turnaround 
requires careful analysis of growth opportunities; the growth opportunities 
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must add to profit in the short term. A key area of concern is the loan 
portfolio; its quality (a high quality portfolio has minimal risk expo¬ 
sure) must be assured. The turnaround process requires that a bank not 
only reverse its poor performance in expense control, but that it also 
improve performance in such areas as asset growth and equity growth. Ac¬ 
tion is required on all fronts of the business. Any initial increases 
in expenses incurred to pay for the turnaround must be reduced shortly. 
The turnaround may be acconpanied by a reduction in personnel; this re¬ 
duction in personnel cannot be successful unless there is a correspond¬ 
ing increase in productivity among remaining bank employees. 
If there is more than one type of decline, the turnaround process 
is even more complex. The results of this analysis suggest that there 
are at least two types of decline; a decline due to bad loan experi¬ 
ence, and a decline due to unsuccessful growth activity. A decline 
might also be caused by fraud. A decline that can be traced to unsuc¬ 
cessful growth activity will take longer to reverse. 
The major difference between the turnaround bank and the decline 
bank is not due to the choices made to enact the decline, but rather 
to the bank's ability to successfully implement a particular set of 
choices. Early response to the problem may be a key factor. 
At this point, the time span of the study requires carmen t. The 
six year period of analysis is arbitrary. At least one bank which 
declined for the period of this study turned around; at least one 
bank which had an impure turnaround almost failed in late 1979. These 
facts suggest that neither decline or turnaround is permanent; continued 
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success requires attention to the changing conditions of the bank; con¬ 
tinued decline can be reversed. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This chapter presents a summary of the study and its key conclu¬ 
sions; an analysis of the policy implications of the study; a critique 
of the weaknesses of the study; and finally, some suggestions for future 
research in the field. 
A Restatement of the Study's .Objectives 
and Conclusions 
The study attempts to identify the key differences between banks which 
turnaround performance after a decline, and those which do not tumaound 
performance. The initial design proposes that there would be specific 
key differences between the turnaround and decline banks. 
The initial sample is drawn from Bank Compustat tapes for the period 
1959 through 1978. The annual net income growth of each bank (136 total) 
is compared to the annual growth in net income for the industry. If a 
bank's growth in net income for a particular year is less than the in¬ 
dustry wide growth in net income, then that year is labeled as a decline 
year. A bank qualifies for inclusion in the study if there are three 
consecutive years of decline within the time span 1959 through 1978. 
These first three years of decline are called phase 1. For each 
bank, the following three years, called phase 2, are then observed. Dur¬ 
ing this second phase, the banks either declined or improved performance. 
Those banks which improved performance in the second phase are labeled 
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turnaround banks; those banks which continued to decline are labeled de¬ 
cline banks. These groupings are further subdivided into groups labeled 
as "pure" and "impure." In a case where phase 2 has three consecutive 
years of growth or decline in comparison with industry performance, then 
that case is labeled as pure decline or turnaround. In a case where phase 
2 exhibits growth in two of three years, the case is labeled impure turn¬ 
around. In a case where phase 2 exhibits decline in two of three years, 
the case is labeled impure decline. 
The analysis, which includes quantitative and qualitative components, 
is performed in two steps. The "pure" groups are analyzed. In these 
cases, phase 1 is a three year decline, while phase 2 is either a three 
year decline or three years of growth. Then, the full sample is analyzed. 
The full sample is formed by combining the pure and impure cases; thus, 
in the full sample analysis, some of the banks are classified on the basis 
of their performance in two of three years during phase 2. All of the 
banks decline for three years during phase 1. The final sample includes 
51 banks, categorized as follows: 
Pure turnaround 8 
Impure turnaround 23 
Pure decline 7 
Impure decline 13 
Total sample 51 
The quantitative analysis is performed on twenty-three variables, 
which are observed over the six year period of phase 1 and phase 2 for 
all the banks in the sample. These variables are chosen after a review 
of the bank management literature to discover the variables most often 
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used to analyze bank performance. The twenty three variables chosen are 
those developed by Dr. William Ford, a bank manager and a respected 
analyst of bank performance. The twenty three variables are tested in 
a regression model to confirm their explanatory power. These variables 
are then used for the remaining analyses. 
The quantitative analyses take place in two main steps. First, per¬ 
formance for each group of banks is computed for each phase. Performance 
is defined as change over time. The average change in each variable is 
computed for each bank for phase 1 and 2. Then, the mean performance of 
each group (pure decline, pure turnaround, full sample decline, full sam¬ 
ple turnaround) is calculated, and a t-test for difference between the 
group mean is performed. Second, a discriminant analysis is run on each 
group for the first, third, fourth, and six year of the sample period. 
Thus, there are two discriminant analyses during phase 1, and two dis¬ 
criminant analyses during phase 2. 
Two other types of tests are performed on the sample. A t-test is 
performed to compare the differences in the rate of decline between the 
groups; this test is only run on phase 1. A dummy regression is run to 
judge the influence of certain key extraneous variables, that is, vari¬ 
ables not among the twenty three specifically analyzed. These key vari¬ 
ables are the economic region of the bank, the size of the bank, and the 
structure of the bank. 
The qualitative analysis is a review of literature about the sample 
banks. Each bank in the sample is requested to provide information for 
the period phase 1 and phase 2. Those banks that respond to the inquiry 
submit copies of their annual reports, copies of speeches before financial 
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analysts, and copies of other reports written about the bank. The qual¬ 
itative analysis relies heavily on this information. An extensive re¬ 
view of the bank literature for the sample period supplies further infor¬ 
mation for analysis. 
The remainder of this section presents the initial hypotheses, and 
a brief sumnary of the results. 
Hypothesis #1: The rate of decline in net income for turnaround firms 
will be greater than the rate of decline in net income 
for decline firms. 
This hypothesis was not supported at the .05 level of significance. 
The rate of decline for turnaround firms was larger than the rate of de¬ 
cline for the decline firms, but not at a statistically significant 
level. 
Hypothesis #2: The performance of the groups will be the same on the 
financial and operating ratios for the decline phase 
(Phase 1) 
This hypothesis is not supported. There are some differences in 
performance between the groups during the first phase, when all groups 
are declining. 
Hypothesis #3: The performance of the groups is different on the finan¬ 
cial and operating ratios for phase 2. 
This hypothesis is confirmed. The findings stress the importance 
of the control of loan quality and overhead costs in the turnaround ef¬ 
fort. 
Hypothesis #4: The groups are not discriminated successfully during 
phase 1 (discriminant analysis at year one and year 
three). 
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This hypothesis is confirmed. There is not successful discrimina¬ 
tion during the first phase. 
Hypothesis #5: The groups are discriminated successfully when phase 2 
is analyzed, that is, year 4 and year 6. 
This hypothesis is supported. The results at year six show the im¬ 
portance of several key variables in the turnaround process. These key 
variables are: net income/employees, overhead/earning assets, operating 
expense/eaming assets, asset growth, and loan loss provision/earning 
assets. When combined with the previous results, these results show that 
the turnaround bank has controlled its overhead expenses, has recovered 
from past loan losses and has begun to increase its asset base follow¬ 
ing a period of slower growth during phase 1. 
Hypothesis #6: Several variables will be more important than the other 
variables in the discriminant function. 
As evidenced by the discussion of the last paragraph, this hypothesis 
is supported. The initial hypothesis suggests 8 key variables as discrim¬ 
inators; some of the eight are confirmed. 
Hypothesis #7: Extraneous variables will have insignificant effects. 
With a few minor exceptions, this hypothesis is confirmed. 
Since the twenty three variables represent eight types of performance 
ratios, an attempt is made in the study to build scales for each of these 
eight types of performance. The scales are built through a factor analy¬ 
sis. These eight scales are then used as input for discriminant analy¬ 
sis, following the format of the original hypotheses. The results are 
similar to those presented for the full data set. In the sixth year, the 
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key discrimination is provided by expense and credit quality control, 
growth measures, and employee utilization measures. 
The review of bank reports and other material leads to an interest¬ 
ing discovery. With few minor exceptions, banks which decline describe 
the same types of strategies as banks which turnaround. Those strategies 
which are used most frequently are: the adoption of a new structure, the 
introduction of cost controls, the addition of new business, and reduc¬ 
tion in personnel. The fact that the turnaround and decline groups choose 
the same type of strategies indicates either that the process of implement¬ 
ing strategies is more important than the choice of strategy, or that the 
strategies chosen lead to the turnaround of a particular type of decline, 
and those banks which did not turnaround experienced a different type of 
decline than those that did turnaround. 
The Policy Implications of the Study 
The study has implications in three general fields; first the field of 
policy research, second, the field of bank management, and third, the field 
of bank regulation. This section briefly reviews the implications in each 
field. 
Until relatively recently, the chief identifying characteristic of 
the policy field has probably been the use of the case study as the pri¬ 
mary method for both teaching and research. The case study has served 
its purpose well, and still remains as an important research tool for 
the field. Recently, increasing attention has been given to the impor¬ 
tance of research that goes beyond the limitations of the case study, 
and analyzes policy in a cross sectional and time series perspective. 
This attention has given rise to a debate of the relative merits of quan¬ 
titative and qualitative research. The debate is certainly not unique 
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to the policy field (San Miguel, 1977), but its resolution does impact 
the field of policy. 
The debate, in this author's opinion, often misses a crucial dis¬ 
tinction. The relative merits of a particular research methodology de¬ 
pend entirely upon the purpose of that methodology. If the purpose of 
research is to test theory, there can be little doubt that the method¬ 
ology requires quantification. If the purpose of the research is to de¬ 
scribe phenomena, or to build theory, then qualitative research can be 
useful. In most cases, research is designed for several purposes. In 
the policy field, in particular, research is often practitioner oriented. 
In the case of this particular research study, the attempt has been to 
identify the key variables of concern for bank managers who are facing 
a particular circumstance, that is, decline, in their organization. The 
quantitative analysis reveals what variables are important; not how the 
manager can manipulate them; the qualitative analysis shows how managers 
changed their organizations under conditions of decline. Neither ap¬ 
proach, alone, offers aid to the practitioner; hopefully, the combina¬ 
tion of approaches offer that aid. When research design follows purpose, 
the field of knowledge can and will advance. 
As the policy field moves from its reliance on the case study, it 
moves toward theories of strategic behavior. An important part of this 
move is the creation of theories and the testing of theories that apply 
across industries. The experience of many managers, and the wisdom of 
many researchers, suggests that the management skill can be carried 
across industries; a successful executive will be successful in any in¬ 
dustry. If this is true, then there are similarities between all 
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organizations, and useful theory about the policy of organizations can 
only be developed in cross sectional contexts. While it may be true 
that these similarities exist, to date, the nature of the similarities 
and perhaps more importantly, the differences, have not been developed. 
While we can successfully test theories about manufacturing industries, 
we may not be able to combine these theories with theories about service 
industries. The assumption of this study is that banking is a unique 
industry; while it may be similar to other industries, the problems and 
concerns of the bank manager can not always be analyzed in a multi in¬ 
dustry context. The development of a general theory of business policy 
may have to await further study of conditions within specific industries. 
Then, the base of industry specific studies can be used to build a model 
based on the similarities and differences between industries. While the 
efforts in analyzing specific industries advance at the cost of sacri¬ 
ficing application to all industries, the efforts to build a general theory 
without also analyzing specific industries runs the greater risk of gen¬ 
eralizing to everybody, but being entirely accurate for few industries. 
In the field of bank management, this study has several implications. 
Most generally, the study confirms that bank management can enact turn¬ 
around. While regional economic conditions may affect the turnaround (it 
is certainly easier to manage turnaround in a growth area than a decline 
area), the study confirms that turnaround can take place in even declin¬ 
ing economic regions. More specifically, the study identifies those 
areas of concern that the turnaround manager must concentrate on. The 
two key areas are the loan portfolio and the control of overhead. Ini¬ 
tially, the turnaround may require an increase in expense. Eventually, 
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the turnaround will require control of those expenses. The productiv¬ 
ity of personnel must be increased. The methods for increasing this 
productivity includes the use of centralization in key areas, the reduc¬ 
tion of personnel, and the addition of new and profitable business. The 
successful turnaround bank reduces expenses while increasing output; it 
improves its quality control and adds quality loans to its portfolio; it 
grows slowly into new profitable ventures. The decline bank grows; its 
profits do not. 
This study has some implications for the regulators of banks. Given 
that a bank has had three years of decline, there are certain actions 
that the banks should begin to consider. The regulator of a successful 
bank will not only know those options; he will take action to encourage 
bank managers to consider those options. Perhaps more importantly, the 
data available to the bank regulator far exceeds the data available to 
this researcher. This study only hints at the potential that such a base 
offers; the regulators have access to a real life laboratory for testing 
the effects of alternative policy options under alternate conditions. 
Weaknesses of the Study 
This study suffers from several weaknesses. The time span of the 
study coincides with a period of major change within the banking indus¬ 
try. The impact of the change is not entirely clear even at this date. 
Many of the strategies attempted by the sample banks were opportunities 
newly available to the banking industry. The period is, in a sense, a 
learning period for the bank industry. Thus, the conditions which con¬ 
tribute to both decline and turnaround may not be seen again. New 
145 
developments may bring entirely new conditions to the bank industry; these 
new conditions may negate the findings of this study. 
A second weakness is similar to the first, in that the time period 
of the decline and turnaround may be a weakness. Six years may be too 
long or too short a time period. Perhaps there is a difference between 
short term decline and long term decline. It is entirely unclear as to 
whether this study would be labeled short or long term. For those banks 
which declined for the full six years of the study, there is still oppor¬ 
tunity for a turnaround. Public reports indicate that one of these banks 
did, indeed, turnaround. Further analysis is necessary to attain a clear 
definition of the terms decline and turnaround. 
Still another weakness of the study is its inability to isolate types 
of decline. Since this has been discussed earlier, further comment is 
not necessary. 
Since this study is exploratory in nature, it can not identify the 
true causes of decline and/or turnaround. It does identify those condi¬ 
tions which accompany a turnaround, and implicitly assumes that those 
conditions can be controlled by management. The assumption may not be 
accurate. There is an infinite set of alternate explanations that might 
be used to explain the turnaround. While this study lays to rest the 
irost popular alternate explanations, others can not be rejected without 
further testing. 
As a final weakness, we must recognize the findings of some research¬ 
ers who suggest that the Compustat data base is not entirely accurate. 
(for a discussion, see Glueck and Willis, 1979). Different banks report 
certain accounts in different ways, which makes comparisons across banks 
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difficult. For example, some banks combine reported items into one ac¬ 
count, while other banks list these reported items in separate accounts. 
The Compustat Tapes are checked for validity in several steps (see Appen¬ 
dix) . The variables used in this study are variables which are analyzed 
by bank regulators and other regulators; under such conditions, there is 
little chance for systematic error in the reports. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
The weakness of the study highlight several areas that require fur¬ 
ther research. Longer time spans of decline should be investigated to 
discover the patterns of turnaround in long term declines. In addition, 
the fact that there may be more than one type of decline suggests an area 
for future research to identify if there are different types of decline, 
and the implications for turnaround of such a difference. 
Perhaps the most important research that could follow this study is 
research into the implementation processes of turnaround strategies. 
Such questions as when the decline is first recognized, how turnaround 
strategies are formulated, how they are enacted, judged, and finished 
are not answered by this research. The present study suggest several 
hypotheses that might be tested in a study of the implementation of a 
turnaround; if this study provides seme useful hypotheses, it will have 
many of its initial objectives. 
In addition to research on the process of implementing strategy, use¬ 
ful research might be directed toward the analysis of types of decline. In 
the cases of banks which did not turnaround in this study, the continued 
decline might be due to the fact that the initial strategies were 
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inappropriate. Hofer (1980) argues that the successful turnaround strat¬ 
egy is contingent upon the firm's operational and strategic position dur¬ 
ing the decline. In the context of this study, we might reason that the 
continued decline group differs from the turnaround group in type of de¬ 
cline, and therefore, the necessary strategies for turnaround are differ¬ 
ent. Further research to build a taxonomy of decline types (and the appro¬ 
priate turnaround strategies for each decline type) will prove useful. 
Another question not answered by this study is the relationship of 
the traditional economic cycle to the process of decline and turnaround. 
Intuitively, we would expect that there are more declines during reces¬ 
sionary times than during an expansion in the economy. In this study, there 
were both declines and turnarounds during both recession and expansion 
periods. However, the study makes no attempt to test for differences in 
turnaround strategies between expansionary and recessionary times. The 
performance of the national economy may be a significant extraneous vari¬ 
able; the implications that the business cycle holds for the turnaround 
process offer an interesting and significant opportunity for future research. 
A final suggestion for future research is that further research on 
the turnaround process is necessary for other industries. As this work 
is completed, the decline of the auto industry (and indeed, the decline 
of the nation) are topics of current popular public interest. The at¬ 
tendant theorizing about the cause and cures for the decline offer evi¬ 
dence for the current speculative state of our knowledge about the proc¬ 
ess of turnaround not only in the banking industry, but in other key in¬ 
dustries. Further research can shed light on this important area of con¬ 
cern to managers, workers, and consumers. 
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APPENDIX A 
This appendix presents the definition of each of the variables used 
in the study, as reported by the Campus tat tapes. 
vl). Net income/equity 
Net income: Net current operating earnings (after minority inter¬ 
est) plus net after tax and after minority interest 
profit or loss on securities sold or redeemed. Ibis 
net income figure is before any additions or deduc¬ 
tions for extraordinary items. 
Equity: This is computed by adding preferred stock (par value) 
and the total book value. 
Preferred stock (par value) is the total dollar value, 
at par or stated value, of all preferred stock out¬ 
standing. Excludes the dollar value at par of all 
preferred stock repurchased and carried as treasury 
stock. 
Total Book Value is the total equity of the common 
stockholders in the capital of the bank. This includes 
common stock, surplus, undivided profits, reserves for 
contingencies, and other capital reserves. 
v2). Return on earning assets 
This is computed by adding aggregate loan and invest¬ 
ment revenue, trading account income, and interest on 
due from banks. 
This is computed by adding due from banks, total in¬ 
vestment securities, trading account securities, and 
gross loans. 
Aggregate loan and investment revenue is the sum total 
of revenues received from all loan and investment 
securities. This includes: interest on fees and loans, 
interest income on federal funds sold, interest income 
on securities purchased with agreement to resell, and 
total interest and dividends on investments. 
Trading Account Income is the total revenues net of in¬ 
cidental expenses received from the bank's purchase 
and/or resale of securities with other banks or with 
Return: 
Earning 
Assets: 
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t 
the public. Included income and expense items are: 
interest and profits or losses on trading account 
securities, re-evaluation adjustments, incidental 
income and expenses related to the purchase and sale 
of such securities. Non-incidental and indirect ex¬ 
penses (such as salaries, conmissions and interest 
on borrowed money) are not netted against revenue. 
Interest on Due from Banks is interest earned on de¬ 
posits in other banks. 
Due From Banks is the sum total of deposits (time) 
at other banks, which draw interest. 
Total Investment Securities is the total of all secur¬ 
ities held in the bank's investment account. 
Trading Account Securities is the aggregate net value 
of all securities regularly purchased and held by the 
bank in a dealer trading account for resale to other 
banks and/or the public. 
Gross Loans is the aggregate face value of all out¬ 
standing loans before the deduction of reserves for bad 
debt losses on loans. 
v3). Net in teres t/eaming assets 
Net Interest: This is computed by adding aggregate loan and invest¬ 
ment revenue, trading account income, and interest on 
due from banks; total interest expense is subtracted 
from this figure. The first three items are defined 
above; total interest costs are defined below. 
Earning Assets are computed as reported above. 
Total interest expense is the total interest paid on 
deposits, borrowings, and capital notes and expendi¬ 
tures. 
expense/earning assets 
The total of all operating expense charged against the 
bank's operating revenue. This includes: aggregate 
salaries and related expense, total interest on de¬ 
posits and borrowings, interest on capital notes and 
debentures, and aggregate other current operating ex¬ 
pense. This item does not include income taxes. 
Earning Assets are computed as explained above. 
v4). Operating 
Operating 
Expenses: 
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v5). Overhead/earning assets 
Overhead: This is reported as aggregate Other current expenses. 
Earning assets are computed as explained above. 
Aggregate Other Current Operating Expenses are the 
total operating expenses reported by the bank, other 
than salary and interest expense. This includes 
provisions for loan losses, occupancy, expense of 
bank premises, furniture and equipment expenses, and 
other current operating expenses. 
v6). Interest on deposits/all deposits 
Interest on 
Deposits:' 
The total interest and expense paid on all deposit 
accounts and borrowed money. 
Total 
Deposits: 
The total of all deposits in the bank's domestic and 
foreign offices. 
v7). Interest on deposits/time and savings 
Interest on deposits is defined above. 
Time and savings is the aggregate amount of time and savings deposits. 
v8). Net income/employees 
Net income is as defined above. 
Employees is the total number of employees on the bank's payroll at 
the end of the year. 
v9). Payroll expense/employees 
Payroll expense is the sum expended for salaries and wages and for 
employee benefits (pension and insurance, etc.) 
vlO). Assets/employees 
Assets are the total assets of the corporation 
vll). Gross loans/all deposits 
Gross loans includes gross loans and Federal funds sold and secur^- 
ities purchased with agreement to resell (defined below) 
Total deposits are as defined above. 
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Federal funds sold and securities purchased with agreement to re¬ 
sell are the excess reserve balances, held in the Federal Reserve 
Bank, that have been loaned to another bank; and loans made to 
other banks and/or customers as a result of the acquisition of 
securities (or negotiable evidence of indebtedness) that are under 
resale agreements or similar arrangements. 
vl2). Cash and treasuries/total demand deposits 
Cash and Treasuries is the sum of cash and due from banks, and 
U.S. Treasury securities. 
Total Demand Deposits is the total demand deposits in the bank. 
vl3). Loan income/gross loans 
Loan income is the revenue received from interest and fees on loans. 
Gross loans include gross loans and Federal funds sold, etc. (as 
defined above). 
vl4). Securities income/securities 
Securities income is the total income from investments, excepting 
investments on state and town obligations 
Securities is the average value of taxable investments for the 
year. 
vl5). Municipal income/muncipals 
Municipal income is the interest on state and town obligations. 
Municipals is the average value of non-taxable investments for the 
year. 
vl6). Loan loss provision/earning assets 
The loan loss provision is the amount identified by management to 
add to reserves for loans in a particular year. 
Earning assets are computed as defined above. 
vl7). Gross chargeoffs/loans 
Gross chargeoffs are the net credit or charge to reserves for debt 
recovery. 
Gross loans are computed as defined above. 
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vl8). Equity/assets 
Equity is computed as defined above. 
Assets are the total assets of the bank. 
vl9). Loan loss coverage ratio 
Loan loss coverage ratio is the sum of current operating earnings 
before taxes and the provision for loan losses, divided 
by the net credit or charge to reserves for debt re¬ 
covery. 
v20). Reserve/gross loans 
Reserve is the current unused balance of the provisions made for 
possible loan losses pursuant to the U.S. Treasury 
tax formula. This includes the provision made pur¬ 
suant to the tax formula, and amounts in excess of 
the formula which represent management judgment with 
respect to possible loss. 
v21). Asset growth 
Asset growth is the annual % growth in assets. 
v22). Deposit growth 
Deposit growth is the annual % growth in deposits. 
v23). Equity growth 
Equity growth is the annual % growth in equity. 
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This appendix presents a brief description of each bank in the sample; 
turnaround banks are described first. 
Pure Turnaround Banks 
Colorado National Bankshares 
Between 1972 and 1978, Colorado National underwent decline and turn¬ 
around. Colorado National is a registered bank holding company, with in¬ 
terests in commercial banking, leasing, real estate services, mortgage 
banking, and insurance services. In 1971, the corporation acquired two 
banks, acquired a mortgage company, and organized a bank. In 1972, the 
corporation acquired two more banks, and organized one. In 1973, a leas¬ 
ing company was formed. In 1974, the corporation acquired two more banks 
and formed an insurance agency. In 1975, the bank entered a joint real 
estate venture to build an office building. In 1976, the corporation or¬ 
ganized an industrial bank. 
Detroitbank Corporation 
Detroitbank endured a decline and turnaround during the period 1969- 
1975. In 1973, the corporation was formed to acquire the Detroit Bank and 
Trust Company. Detroitbank is a registered bank holding company with 121 
domestic branches. Its general banking services include international 
banking, trust services, and leasing. In 1974, the corporation formed a 
leasing company. In 1975, the corporation acquired a bank. 
Mercantile Texas Corporation 
This bank underwent decline and turnaround during the period 1971 to 
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1977. In 1975, the Mercantile Texas Corporation was formed to purchase the 
Mercantile National Bank of Texas. The corporation is a registered bank 
holding company with subsidiaries in data processing and insurance. During 
the turnaround, significant corporate activities included the hiring of a 
new chief executive officer and new managers, the introduction of the 
profit center concept, the formation of the holding company, the acquisi¬ 
tion of a business, and an aggressive campaign to secure business in medium 
sized corporations. 
Midlantic Banks 
Midlantic endured a decline and turnaround for the years 1972-1978. 
During this period the corporation acquired several banks and a mortgage 
company. The corporation is a bank holding company with six conmercial 
banking subsidiaries and three bank related subsidiaries. The areas of 
diversification include mortgage business, factoring, and leasing. The 
bank attributes part of its success to aggressive marketing (television 
campaigns, etc.). 
Society Corporation 
The period 1970-1976 was one of decline and turnaround for the Society 
Corporation. During this period, the bank purchased several banks, and had 
several others join the corporation as affiliates. The bank also received 
approval to form an insurance company. The corporation's strategy during 
this period included the use of market sensitive liabilities to support 
market sensitive assets, the use of little diversification, the use of 
cost controls, service to local markets, and the avoidance of high risk 
loans. 
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Union Conmerce Corporation 
Union Conmerce entered its decline in 1966, and turned around by 1972. 
In 1970, the corporation was formed to become the principal owner of the 
Union Conmerce Bank. Union Conmerce is the lead bank in the corporation, 
which has three subsidiary banks. The corporation now includes a leasing 
company and a capital management company. 
Union Planters Corporation 
1972 to 1977 was a period of decline and turnaround for this corpora¬ 
tion, which was formed in 1971 to purchase the Union Planter's National 
Bank of Memphis. The business of the corporation include conmercial bank¬ 
ing, trust services, real estate financing, data processing, credit life 
insurance, and mortgage banking. This bank is somewhat unique in the sam¬ 
ple, in that during the period of the decline significant fraud problems 
were uncovered. The new management restructured the bank, entered new 
businesses, installed new loan procedures, and reduced personnel. 
United Virginia Bankshares 
The period 1972 to 1978 was one of decline and turnaround. These 
years saw many acquisitions at the corporation; included among the ac¬ 
quisitions were conmercial banks and a factoring company. Ihe corpora¬ 
tion also formed leasing and investment businesses during this time. In 
1978, the corporation sold the factoring company. The bank's annual re¬ 
port describes its turnaround strategy: "Our principal efforts in 1976 
will be directed toward emphasizing quality and pricing, reducing loan 
losses, restoring non-accrual assets to earning status, vigorously seek¬ 
ing core deposits — both demand and time and controlling non-interest 
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expenses. We shall continue to meet the needs of our customers by select¬ 
ing sound credits for productive purposes." 
Impure Turnaround Banks 
BankAmerica Corporation 
The period of decline and turnaround for this banking giant was 1960 
through 1966. This time preceded the actual formation of the corporation, 
which was in 1968. The corporation purchased what had been known as the 
Bank of America. This bank provides consumer services, conmercial services, 
trust services, leasing, funds management, data processing, real estate 
services,and other bank related services. 
Chemical New York Corporation 
Chemical's decline and turnaround occurred in the period 1970 through 
1976. The bank's activities during this period included the acquisition 
of several banks, a mortgage company, a consumer finance company, and an 
investment advice company. The bank's business covers 22 states and 38 
countries, and includes a Metropolitan Bank, a Corporate Bank, an Inter¬ 
national Bank, a Trust and Investment Bank, and a Real Estate Bank. 
Continental Illinois Corporation 
The period of decline and turnaround for Continental was 1965 to 
1971. The holding company structure was adopted in 1968 (the corpora¬ 
tion purchased Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company). The holding 
company includes a mortgage bank, a reality advice firm, leasing services, 
and venture capital services among its businesses. 
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Fidelity Union Bancorp 
In 1970, this corporation was formed to purchase Fidelity Union Trust 
Company and two other banks. Ihe period 1970 through 1976 included a 
period of decline and turnaround. During this period, the corporation 
acquired several banks, and formed a data processing company (subsequently 
discontinued). The bank engages in international banking, corrmercial 
banking, and consumer finance. 
First Empire State Corporation 
The period 1972 to 1978 was this bank's time of turnaround and decline. 
They acquired several banks and formed a financial services corporation. 
The bank's business includes commercial banking, real estate financing, 
and small business capital formation. 
First Hawaiian Incorporated 
The corporation was formed in 1973 to become the holding company for 
the First Hawaiian Bank of Honolulu. The years 1971 through 1977 included 
a time of decline and turnaround for the corporation. During this time 
period, the corporation formed an industrial loan company and a leasing 
company. The corporation's business includes the bank, a leasing company, 
two thrift companies (loan companies) and a property management company. 
The bank's turnaround efforts included the attempt to improve the perform¬ 
ance of the loan portfolio, and an attempt to control costs. 
First Pennsylvania Corporation 
The corporation's business includes commercial banking, mortgage 
banking, consumer finance services, securities dealing, and investment 
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advice. The bank first entered its decline in 1972, and enacted its turn¬ 
around by 1978. The bank's turnaround efforts included a restructuring 
of major portions of the organization, the use of counter cyclical subsid¬ 
iaries, and aggressive portfolio management. These moves were accompanied 
by an attempt to control expenses (which included a staff reduction). 
While this bank did enact a turnaround during the period of study, 1980 
found the bank in considerable trouble. Its failure was prevented only by 
the assistance of several banks (whose efforts were encouraged by federal 
authorities). 
First Maryland Bancorp 
The corporation was formed in 1973 to purchase the First National Bank 
of Maryland, which had entered a decline in 1971. By 1977, the corpora¬ 
tion had witnessed a turnaround. During this period, the corporation ac¬ 
quired several banks and a credit business. The corporation's businesses 
include credit, leasing, mortgage banking, financial services, and commer¬ 
cial banking. 
Hawaiian Bancorp Inc. 
The corporation was formed in 1971 to purchase the Bank of Hawaii, 
which entered its decline in 1969. The decline was reversed by 1975. Ihe 
corporation's businesses include conmercial banking, foreign banking, in¬ 
vestment advice, computer services, leasing devices, and industrial loans. 
Hospital Trust Corporation 
Hospital Trust is a one bank holding company (formed in 1969 to ac¬ 
quire the Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company) which enacted a turnaround 
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during the period 1972 through 1978. The corporation's businesses include 
the bank, leasing services, construction mortgages, and short term loans 
on income producing properties. 
Huntington Bancshares 
This multi-bank holding company declined and turned around during the 
years 1970 through 1976. In this period, the corporation acquired sev- 
eral banks and formed a mortgage subsidiary. The corporation's business 
includes cotrmercial banicing, international banking, computer services, 
real estate services, and investment counseling. 
Liberty National Corporation 
The Liberty National Corporation entered its decline in 1969 (one 
year after the corporation was formed to buy Liberty National Bank and 
Trust of Oklahoma), and reversed the decline by 1975. During this time- 
span, the corporation purchased a factoring company and formed a finan¬ 
cial corporation. The corporate business includes two banks, a financial 
corporation, a mortgage company, a real estate company, and a leasing 
corporation. 
Maryland National Corporation 
The corporation declined and turned around during the period 1970 
through 1976. The bank formed several companies during this period: a 
leasing corporation, a realty advisory company, a capital management com¬ 
pany, an industrial finance company, and a home loan and realty company. 
In addition, the corporation acquired two banks. 
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Mellon National Corporation 
The corporation was formed in 1971 to purchase the Mellon Bank, which 
had entered its decline period in 1969. By 1975, the decline had been 
reversed. During this time period, the bank (or its corporate headquar¬ 
ters) acquired or formed a mortgage company, a foreign bank, a leasing 
company, and an international finance company. 
National Detroit Corporation 
The corporation was formed in 1972 to purchase the National Bank of 
Detroit, which entered its period of decline in 1969. The turnaround was 
accomplished by 1975. During this period, the corporation acquired sev¬ 
eral banks and formed a leasing company. The corporate business includes 
coranercial and retail banking, international banking, mortgage banking, 
trust services, and computer services. 
New England Merchant's Inc. 
New England Merchant's National Bank entered its decline period in 
1970. The holding company (New England Merchant's Inc.) was formed in 
1971. Turnaround was achieved by 1976. During this period, the corpor¬ 
ation acquired some banks, and formed a realty company and an investment 
advisors group. In addition, a leasing company became a subsidiary. The 
corporation engages in commercial banking services, and bank related busi¬ 
ness such as venture capital, leasing, and realty financing. 
Northern Trust Corporation 
The corporation was formed in 1971 to purchase Northern Trust Bank. 
The corporation enacted a turnaround during the period 1970 to 1976. 
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During this period, the corporation formed a farm management company, and 
several trust companies. The corporation's businesses include domestic 
banking, international banking, trust services, bond underwriting and 
distribution, farmland fiduciary management, and leasing activities. 
Pittsburgh National Corporation 
The corporation declined and turned around in the period 1970 to 
1976. The corporation is a one bank holding company with interests in 
insurance and mortgage banking. During the period, the corporation formed 
a company to provide financing for its affiliates, and formed an insurance 
related business. One strategy recognized for its contribution in the 
bank's success was the strategy of finding a market "niche" in foreign 
operations, so that the bank did not compete directly with major inter¬ 
national banks. This strategy involved lending internationally on die 
basis of regional expertise; that is, supporting international lending 
with regional sources of money, and providing lending needs for local com¬ 
panies which compete on the international markets. 
Republic of Texas Corporation 
The corporation form was enacted in 1974 to reorganize the Republic 
National Bank of Dallas, which declined and turned around during die period 
1970 through 1976. During this period, the corporation acquired several 
banks. The corporate business includes domestic and international banic¬ 
ing, trust services, government securities underwriting, mortgage banking, 
credit life insurance, and other bank related services. During 1973, die 
bank recorded the second highest growth rate among the year's top growdi 
banking companies (the bank ranked 51st in the previous year). 
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Texas Commerce Bancshares 
Texas Cotnnerce enacted a turnaround during the period 1964 to 1970. 
The corporation's business includes commercial banking services, inter¬ 
national banking, leasing, money market operations, personal banking, and 
trust services. 
United Bank Corporation of New York 
This multibank holding company was incorporated in 1971, the first 
year of the bank's decline. The corporation staged a turnaround by 1977. 
During this period, the bank acquired several banks. In addition to bank¬ 
ing services, the corporation offers non-banking services such as leasing 
and data management. 
United National Bank of Pittsburg 
This bank enacted a turnaround during the years 1969 to 1975. During 
this period, one bank merged into United National. The bank offers com¬ 
mercial, savings, trust and real estate services. 
Western Bancorporation 
The corporation began its decline in 1970, and completed its turn¬ 
around by 1976. During this period, the bank merged several of its sub¬ 
sidiaries. In addition, the bank formed a finance company in Hong Kong, 
acquired an asset management company, and a data processing subsidiary. 
The corporation holds controlling interests in 22 banks operating in 11 
states; it provides a wide range of banking and bank related services. 
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Pure Decline Banks 
Baybanks Incorporated 
Baybanks entered a decline period for the year 1969 through 1975. 
Baybanks is a multi-bank holding company, which owns a majority interest 
in eleven banks in Massachusetts. The member banks control a small busi¬ 
ness investment company, a data services company, and a finance and leas¬ 
ing company. 
Equimark Corporation 
The corporation was formed in 1968 to acquire control of Western 
Pennsylvania National Bank. The corporation declined during the years 
1970 to 1976. In the year previous to the decline, the bank acquired an 
equipment leasing company, which was subsequently sold (1975). During 
the decline, the company acquired a consumer finance company, which was 
also subsequently sold (1975). The company formed and sold another bank 
related business (this sale was in 1976), and formed a corrmercial finance 
company. 
Greater Jersey Bancorp 
The corporation was formed in 1971 to reorganize the New Jersey Bank, 
N.A. The company experienced decline for the period 1971 to 1977. Dur¬ 
ing this time, the company acquired several banks and a mortgage company. 
The chief subsidiaries of the corporation included the bank, a mortgage 
company, and a leasing company. Towards the end of the decline, the com¬ 
pany enacted strategies to concentrate its market in a portion of the 
state (rather than the whole state) and to control costs. 
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Hartford National Corporation 
Hartford National endured a decline for the period 1969 through 1975. 
During this time, the company established a realty company, formed a trust 
company, and formed a financial services company. In 1973, it sold its in¬ 
terest in a mortgage company. Its major businesses included domestic bank¬ 
ing, international banking, trust services, bond operations, and venture 
capital for small businesses. 
Lincoln First Banks 
During its period of decline from 1969 to 1975, Lincoln acquired sev¬ 
eral banks, a mortgage company, and formed a comnercial finance corpora¬ 
tion. During this time, the company restructured its operations, which 
moved from a functional structure to a customer oriented structure. 
Marine Midland Banks 
Marine Midland experienced decline for the period 1969 to 1975. Dur¬ 
ing this period, the bank changed to a regional structure (which was sub¬ 
sequently changed again when N.Y. State passed a law permitting unit branch 
banking in the state). During the decline, the bank froze executive sal¬ 
aries and engaged in personnel reduction efforts. An attempt was made to 
match the sensitivity of assets and liabilities, to avoid wide swings in 
return. Attempts were made to control all costs. After this period, the 
bank was purchased by a Hong Kong bank. 
Shawm t Corporation 
Shawmut endured a decline during the period 1969 to 1975. During 
this period, the corporation acquired and merged several banks. The bank 
restructured its management group, tightened its loan review procedures, 
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and took a cautious attitude toward asset expansion. Toward the end of 
the period, the bank recognized the need to reduce the loan portfolio, and 
to control expenses (both by the use of standardized products and operat¬ 
ing procedures, and by the reduction of staffing levels). 
Impure Decline Banks 
Bancal Tristate Corporation 
Bancal is a one bank holding company which experienced decline for 
the period 1971 to 1977. During this period, the bank's management recog¬ 
nized that previous growth had caused increased expenses; management turned 
its attention to these expenses. The attention included attempts to re¬ 
duce staff and to control occupancy expenses. The bank also added subsid¬ 
iaries in leasing data management, investment advisory services, and cap¬ 
ital management. During the later stages of the decline, the bank acted 
to divest itself of unprofitable subsidiaries (a mortgage company was sold 
in 1975). At this time, the bank dropped some of its loan business, added 
new management, restructured its loan portfolio, and adopted a new loan 
review procedure. The bank also sold 30 branches. 
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico 
Banco Popular is a corporation whose headquarters is in Puerto Rico. 
Its business includes banks in Puerto Rico, New York, and Los Angeles. 
During its decline period (1972-1978) the corporation expanded interna¬ 
tional business through the use of correspondent relationships, added new 
branches, opened its Los Angeles branch, liquidated a subsidiary, and pur¬ 
chased a bank. 
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CBT Corporation 
The Corporation was formed to serve as the holding company for the 
Connecticut Bank and Trust Company in 1970. The corporation endured a 
decline for the period 1969 to 1975. During this period, the corporation 
formed several companies (in data services, realty, capital management, 
business credit). The corporation also acquired a bank, a financial cor¬ 
poration, and a discount corporation. The corporation's businesses in¬ 
cluded consumer finance, correspondent activities, data processing, trust 
services, financial services, capital management, and international bank¬ 
ing. 
Crocker National Corporation 
Crocker National Corporation experienced a decline for the period 1969 
to 1975. During this time, the corporation acquired a leasing ccaiipany and 
a mortgage company, and formed a small business investment company. Most 
of this business was sold after the period of the decline (in 1977 and 1978). 
The bank underwent significant management changes during the decline. New 
management hired many specialists from outside the bank, adopted a new 
structure, changed staff compensation, increased training, and reduced 
borrowing. After the period of this study, the new CEO was named Banker 
of The Year, in recognition of his successful attempts to reverse the de¬ 
cline. 
Financial General Bankshares 
Financial General experienced decline for the period 1971 to 19/7. 
During this period, the bank formed a new bank in the Virgin Islands, sold 
its majority interest in several banks, sold its minority interest in 
several banks, and merged two banks. 
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First Union Corporation (N.C.) 
First Union endured decline for the period 1971 to 1977. During this 
time, the bank adopted tight controls of expenses, adopted a new structure, 
shifted its attention from growth to consolidation, consolidated loan of¬ 
fices and reduced personnel, trained specialized staff to deal with prob¬ 
lem loans, and increased its attention to consumer and commercial loans 
while restricting its attention to housing and real estate lending. 
General Bancshares 
General Bancshares showed decline for the period 1970 to 1976. Dur¬ 
ing the period, the bank acquired other banks. The corporation is a hold¬ 
ing company designed solely for the ownership and management of banks, with 
a controlling interest in 12 banks. 
Girard Company 
The Girard Company's period of decline for this study was 1969 to 
1975. Early in the decline, bank management recognized that the bank's 
low level of performance could be traced to a combination of difficult 
economic conditions, and problems within the bank. The bank instituted 
a work management program, acquired an investment group, and acquired some 
new branches. The bank embarked on a new program of loan diversification 
to increase profit margins and reduce the concentration of borrowing by 
major domestic corporations. The bank obtained a new leasing corporation, 
and some new foreign offices. The bank increased its concentration on loan 
criteria and pricing policy, as well as cost control. The bank made an 
attempt to increase its performance in local markets. 
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Indiana National Corporation 
Indiana National experienced decline for most of the period 1972 to 
1978. During this period, the bank formed a leasing company, a finance 
company, a property management company, a realty advisors company, and a 
mortgage company. It acquired a credit insurance company, and discontinued 
its business in mobile home services. 
Philadelphia National Corporation 
Philadelphia National Corporation experienced its decline in the years 
1971 to 1977. During this period, the bank activated a comnercial finance 
company, acquired a consumer finance company, and increased its holdings 
in a British bank. The bank adopted internal management and structural 
changes. Towards the later years of this decline, the bank strengthened 
its strategic planning process to emphasize careful market identification 
and allocation of resources. It adapted new procedures to promptly iden¬ 
tify problem loans. 
Security Pacific Corporation 
Security Pacific endured a decline for the period 1969 to 1975. Dur¬ 
ing this time, it adopted the holding company structure (1972). The cor- 
poration acquired a financial company and an investment company, and formed 
a leasing company. It increased its services (in part by its adoption of 
the Master Charge card), and expanded its business in northern California 
and in international markets. The corporation reorganized its corporate 
banking branch along industry lines. 
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State Street Boston Corporation 
The corporation was formed as a one bank holding company to acquire 
the assets of the State Street Bank and Trust Company in 1970. During 
the years 1969 to 1975, the bank declined. Significant activities dur¬ 
ing this time included the formation of a credit company, the formation 
of a securities service corporation, and the formation of a financial 
services company. These activities were accompanied by the purchase of 
real estate companies, a mortgage company, and banks. The bank reorgan¬ 
ized its structure. It reduced its investments in a problem area — real 
estate. 
Southwest Bancshares 
This bank experienced decline during the period 1972 through 1978. 
During the period, the corporation acquired several companies, merged a 
bank into the company, and formed a life insurance company. The corpora¬ 
tion's major businesses included conmercial banking, mortgage banking, 
leasing, personal property management, and credit life insurance. 
APPENDIX C 
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APPENDIX C: COMPUSTAT 
Standard and Poor's Bank Compustat is a data file which records 
quarterly and annual performance data for major banks. The sources of 
this data include 10k (annual) and 10Q (quarterly) reports to the Secur¬ 
ity Exchange Commission, company annual reports, company news releases 
and general reports, and company contacts. 
The Compustat tapes are checked systematically to assure their va¬ 
lidity. Spot checks are performed to assure the accurate recording of 
data; data is compared against past data to detect fluctuations that 
might be due to erroneous recording; the data is checked for accuracy 
within parameters by crosschecking categories of data (e.g., does the 
closing price of a stock fall within the range of highs and lows for the 
stock within a certain period). As a further check, the research staff 
receives comprehensive training, and is assigned individual industry re¬ 
sponsibility. 
APPENDIX D 
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APPENDIX D: CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS 
The companies in the sample are chosen by comparing their performance 
in a given year against the industry's performance for that year. As of 
1/1/79 the method for accounting for the industry was changed from a cash 
to an accrual basis; therefore, comparisons of the year 1969 to the year 
1968 are not based on consistent performance measures; net income changes 
could be due to the accounting change, rather than actual changes in per¬ 
formance. Three banks in the study include the year 1969 as years of de¬ 
cline or turnaround. For one of the banks, the year 1969 appears in phase 
1. For this particular bank, the decline during the year was so dramatic 
that it leaves little doubt that the year was truly a decline. For the 
remaining two banks, the year 1969 appears during phase 2. In one case, 
1969 is a decline year, while in the other case, 1969 is a growth year. 
The decline is 8.4%, while the growth is greater than 20%. We can be 
fairly confident that the growth rate of 20% reflects actual growth. We 
could suspect that the decline rate is low enough to justify the argu¬ 
ment that the change was not due to an actual performance change, but 
rather to the accounting change. If this objection is true; the bank 
in question would change from an inconsistent turnaround (that is, a 
member of the impure turnaround group) to a pure turnaround bank. This 
change would not impact the results of the study in any significant way, 
since pure turnaround banks are also included as members of the impure 
group. 

